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This study examines the politics of George Savile, first Marquis of Halifax between 
the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-1681 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689. It examines 
Halifax’s politics in the context of a set of primary sources that have hitherto not been given 
enough attention in Halifax studies. This set of sources is his aphorisms. Halifax is well-
known as a political writer and an aphorist, but not much focus has been given to his short 
pieces and their connection to his politics in practice. This study fills the gap by looking at 
Halifax’s politics in the context of the thoughts and ideas imbedded in his aphorisms. 
Halifax’s aphorisms reveal a deep acceptance of the imperfections of the human condition. 
He believed that the human mind was limited in what it can know with certainty; and 
human nature, rather than reason, dominated the human character. Such imperfections 
were fully and explicitly accepted by Halifax. It was an integral part of his worldview as 
revealed by his aphorisms. By reading Halifax’s politics and political career in the context of 
these aphorisms, a specific interpretation emerges. This interpretation is that the spirit of 
his politics was very much in tune with his sceptical outlook of the human condition and his 




A Note about Dates and Quotations 
 
The dates used in this study are in old style. The start of a new year, however, has 
been treated differently. In seventeenth-century England, the calendar year started on 25 
March. This study has taken the year as starting on 1 January instead.  England’s calendar at 
the time was also ten days behind from the calendar used on the European continent. This 
study has cited the dates of foreign correspondence and dispatches according to the dates 
provided by their authors. In cases where both the English and foreign calendar dates are 
given in a correspondence, they will be cited alongside each other respectively.  
 
This study has also kept the original spelling and punctuation of the primary material 
it has quoted from. Because this study makes use of edited versions of primary sources, 
some of the quotations will have already been modernized. Additionally, in citing Halifax’s 








George Savile, first Marquis of Halifax, was a Restoration politician with a complex 
reputation. His political conduct has been both criticised and praised by posterity. A 
contemporary during the entirety of the Restoration era, Halifax is chiefly remembered for 
the roles he played in the more tumultuous events of the period. He was politically active 
during the infamous Exclusion Crisis between 1679 and 1681. This was a time when fears of 
a Catholic threat to Protestant England reached its height and eventually pulled Charles II’s 
Catholic brother and heir presumptive, James Duke of York, into the spotlight. Many feared 
that the Catholic Duke would inevitably bring about the ruin of Protestant England upon his 
succession. Some sought to prevent this grim future by a radical solution. The Whigs, as they 
were later called, became the main supporters of a project to exclude James from the royal 
line of succession. These Exclusionist Whigs were countered by those later known as the 
Tories, who upheld the monarchy’s majesty and its hereditary nature. Halifax, who was in 
no way on friendly terms with the Duke, defended his birth right and openly opposed 
Exclusion in 1680. He subsequently took part in the government policies to suppress the 
Whigs after 1681. This did not mean, however, that he exalted the monarchy or was 
subservient to the Crown. After the Whigs were effectively defeated in 1683, Halifax tried to 
steer Charles away from what he saw as unconstitutional and unpopular policies. During 
James II’s reign, Halifax actively opposed his attempts to revive Catholicism in England 
against the wishes of his Protestant subjects. The Marquis’ most notable actions after the 
Exclusion Crisis was the role he played during the Glorious Revolution. This event saw James 
II deposed and William of Orange along with his wife Princess Mary crowned as the new 
King and Queen. During the Revolution, events compelled Halifax to ultimately side with the 
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Prince and have him crowned King. It was an odd twist of irony that Halifax would formally 
offer the English crowns to William and Mary in 1689, a mere nine years after having 
vigorously defended James’ right to the throne in 1680. 
 
Posterity has understood Halifax’s variable politics and career in a variety of ways. 
Since his death in 1695 to the early-nineteenth century, those historians who have 
commented on the Marquis tended to interpret his politics as a manifestation of a lack of 
principles. On the other side of the spectrum, historians between the early-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries would see his conduct as being motivated by pragmatism and 
patriotism. Rather than being a manifestation of a lack of principles, his politics was 
reinterpreted as that of a virtuous moderate, the Trimmer, who would trim the sails 
between political extremes in order to keep the ship of state afloat. These revisionist 
interpretations were informed by a growing acceptance of Halifax as not only a seasoned 
politician, but also a profound intellectual thinker. Scholars during this period began to 
recognise the depth of his numerous writings and incorporated them in reinterpretations of 
his politics. Among Halifax’s most famous writings was the political pamphlet, The Character 
of a Trimmer. This pamphlet has been read as his defence of political moderation in 
government and a vindication of his creed. As scholarly consensus gravitated towards a 
positive view of Halifax’s politics, other scholars from the early-twentieth century onwards 
began giving greater focus to his writings. Through more nuanced readings of Halifax’s 
works, scholars went on to interpret his politics through more intellectual themes such as 
Toryism, Machiavellian concepts, and dichotomies between idealism and realism. The 
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interpretation of Halifax’s politics is an area of scholarship that has been developing over 
the centuries since his death. 
 
This study aims to contribute to this developing area by offering another 
interpretation of Halifax’s politics and career. It will do so by using a set of primary sources 
that has not been given enough focus. This set of sources is his aphorisms. Halifax wrote 
numerous prose works, but he was also an avid practitioner of the aphoristic genre. This 
was apparent as early as 1750, when a sizeable compilation of his aphorisms was published. 
The topics of these aphorisms vary greatly, from politics and the art of government to 
thoughts about human nature. Modern scholars have recognised Halifax as an aphorist, but 
few studies on him have focused on the aphorisms. Specifically, no attempt has been made 
to interpret Halifax’s political conduct through the character insights provided by his short 
pieces. This study aims to fill this historiographical gap by undertaking a reading of Halifax’s 
politics in the context of his aphorisms. 
 
Developments within Halifax scholarship have also given compelling reasons to 
revisit his political career and give greater attention to his aphorisms. Much of the scholarly 
output about Halifax was dated before Mark N. Brown’s 1989 The Works of George Savile, 
Marquis of Halifax. Brown’s new compilation of Halifax’s works opened new ground for 
studies on this Restoration figure. Before Brown’s compilation, scholarship on Halifax 
operated on a fixed canon of his works that remain practically unchanged for two centuries. 
Brown’s compilation added a significant number of previously unknown and unpublished 
works by Halifax. Among these unpublished works are numerous collections of his 
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aphorisms. These unpublished collections significantly bolstered the number of Halifax’s 
extant aphorisms. It indicated that the 1750 compilation was but a small selection of his 
actual output in the aphoristic genre. The themes of these new aphorisms follow that of the 
1750 compilation, being a mixture of political and miscellaneous thoughts. However, these 
new aphorisms have given a much fuller picture of Halifax’s worldview and character. Taking 
the aphorisms together, they can be read as a source that lays out the inner character of 
this Restoration politician. 
 
This study offers a specific interpretation of Halifax by reading his politics in the 
context of his aphorisms. The topics of the aphorisms varied greatly, but there was an 
underlying theme that pervaded through many of them no matter the topic. This theme was 
his acceptance of humanity’s epistemological limitations and its nature driven character. 
Halifax believed that there were insurmountable limitations on what the human mind can 
know with absolute certainty. This sceptical view extended to his ideas about the fallibility 
of human foresight and human notions held to be fundamental. Halifax’s aphorisms also 
showed his belief that the human character was dominated by human nature rather than 
guided by reason. From this view, he believed that human beings, being influenced more by 
nature than reason, were liable to commit actions that were irrational or harmful to the 
wider community. For Halifax, such tendencies borne from human nature needed to be 
checked. Despite this, Halifax believed that these imperfections were an inescapable reality. 
In his aphorisms, he emphasised on the need to navigate through these imperfections 
rather than ignoring or defying them. In other words, the Marquis fully accepted the 
imperfections inherent in the human condition. This study will suggest that the notions 
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imbedded in these aphorisms were entirely consistent with his politics and conduct 
throughout a specific period of his career. The resulting interpretation will be that Halifax’s 
politics, between the Exclusion Crisis and the Glorious Revolution, was consistent with his 
acceptance of human imperfection. 
 
This study comprises of eight chapters. Chapter one discusses the existing 
scholarship surrounding Halifax studies and highlights this study’s place within this 
historiography. Chapter two serves as an introductory narrative to Halifax’s early life and 
early political career up until 1678. Chapters three to seven will be a narrative of Halifax’s 
political career between 1678 to 1689 and will serve as the main body of this study. The 
narratives in these specific chapters will be given in conjunction with close readings of his 
aphorisms. Each of these chapters aim to show a consistency between Halifax’s politics and 
specific notions conveyed in his aphorisms. 
 
Accordingly, chapter three focuses on the Exclusion Crisis between 1679 and 1681 
and discusses Halifax’s rejection of Exclusion. It will be shown in this chapter that this 
rejection was consistent with his sceptical views of human foresight and his understanding 
of human nature. Chapter four deals with Halifax’s subsequent participation in the 
government’s suppression of the Whigs. This chapter will suggest that his participation was 
characteristic given his criticisms of extremist mentalities in his aphorisms, like the one he 
thought the Whigs harboured at the time. Chapter five will cover the period 1683 to 1685, 
between the effective defeat of the Whigs and Charles II’s death. This chapter shows 
Halifax’s attempts to steer Charles away from unconstitutional and unpopular conduct. 
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These attempts will be shown to be consistent with Halifax’s awareness of the practical 
flaws inherent in a government’s claim to absolute power. Chapter six deals with Halifax’s 
political conduct during James II’s short reign. It focuses on his strategy to frustrate James’ 
Catholic policies. This chapter will develop from Halifax’s aphoristic ideas introduced in 
chapter five. Specifically, it suggests that his strategy was in line with his sceptical views of 
government authority and that authority in fact depended on the compliance of the people. 
This chapter also touches on Halifax’s decision to distance himself from inviting William’s 
intervention into English affairs. As will be shown, his cautious attitude was in line with his 
self-conscious awareness of the detrimental effects of yielding too much to one’s impulses, 
such as an excessive eagerness to achieve a particular goal. Chapter seven deals with 
Halifax’s support for William of Orange’s bid for the English throne during the Glorious 
Revolution. This chapter suggests that his actions were consistent with his aphoristic ideas 
about adhering to the circumstances of the moment rather than speculative constitutional 
and legal fundamentals. 
  
Finally, chapter eight will gather the threads throughout chapters three to seven. It 
will show that the notions conveyed in the aphorisms of the preceding chapters were part 
of a larger view of the human condition. It stresses that the two major components of this 
view were Halifax’s beliefs in the limitations of the human mind and the nature driven 
character of human beings. Halifax fully accepted such imperfections, and this acceptance 
was an integral part of his worldview. Insofar as Halifax’s political conduct was consistent 
with his belief of the mind’s limitations and views of human behaviour, this chapter will 
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retrospectively suggest that his politics throughout the studied period resonated with his 




Chapter 1 – Historiography and Methodology 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is threefold. It’s first purpose is to chart the 
development of Halifax scholarship between H. C. Foxcroft’s monumental work on Halifax in 
the early-nineteenth century and Mark N. Brown’s no less impressive rediscovery of several 
of the Marquis’ unpublished works in 1989. By undertaking this survey, this chapter will set 
this study in the context of the new ground opened by Brown’s scholarship. The second 
purpose of this chapter is to address this study’s contribution to current scholarship on 
Halifax. Specifically, it will explain how this current study of Halifax’s politics using his many 
aphorisms as its main primary source will fill a historiographical gap and offer a unique 
interpretation of his politics. Finally, the third purpose of this chapter is to address some 
methodological issues that might be present in this study. It will address issues of 
interpretation relating to this study’s emphasis on the aphorisms and specify reasons for its 
particular focus on Halifax’s political career from 1679 to 1689. 
 
Halifax Scholarship from H. C. Foxcroft to Mark N. Brown 
 
Scholarly interest in Halifax would not begin in earnest until two centuries after his 
death. To be sure, there were some early attempts between the intervening centuries to 
understand this Restoration politician.1 A notable example would be Thomas B. Macaulay’s 
brief character studies during the early- to mid-nineteenth century.2 William Durrant 
                                                          
1 A fuller discussion of these early attempts will be further examined below. 
2 Thomas B. Macaulay, Macaulay’s Essay on Sir William Temple, ed. G. A. Twentyman (London: Macmillan and 
Co., Limited, 1905), pp. 74-77; Thomas B. Macaulay, The History of England from the Accession of James II, vol. 
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Cooper’s introduction to the 1858 Savile Correspondence also contained a brief dedicated 
account of Halifax’s career during Charles II’s reign.3 But significant attempts at studying the 
Marquis would not really begin until H. C. Foxcroft’s scholarship beginning from 1896. 
Foxcroft in her own time noted the lack of scholarly attention to everything Halifax. In her 
1896 article on Halifax’s works, she lamented that “despite eulogies so suggestive, the brief, 
if admirable, notice prefixed by Mr. Cooper to the ‘Savile Correspondence’ remains the only 
attempt at a memoir.”4 Foxcroft was also surprised that Halifax’s literary endeavours were 
not better known. As she wrote, his name “occurs in no history of English literature with 
which the present writer is acquainted; no collected or critical edition of his works has yet 
appeared.”5 Noting the neglected state of Halifax scholarship, Foxcroft followed her article 
with her two-volume Life and Letters of Sir George Savile two years later.6 Life and Letters 
filled much of the lacuna noted by Foxcroft in two ways. It was the first scholarly and full-
length biography of Halifax and its part two also served as a complete compilation of his 
known literary works at the time. Through Life and Letters, Halifax’s life and his literary 
endeavours were brought together in one convenient work.  
                                                          
1 (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1849), pp. 242-246. Macaulay’s Essay first appeared in 
1838 and his History began print in 1848.  
3 William Durrant Cooper, Introduction to Savile Correspondence. Letters to and from Henry Savile, Esq., envoy 
at Paris, and vice-chamberlain to Charles II. and James II. including letters from his brother George, Marquess 
of Halifax, ed. William Durrant Cooper ([London]: Printed for the Cambden Society, 1858; New York: Johnson 
Reprint Corporation, 1968), pp. vi-xiv. All citations of Savile Correspondence refer to the Johnson Reprint 
edition. 
4 H. C. Foxcroft, “The Works of George Savile, First Marquis of Halifax,” The English Historical Review vol. 11, 
no. 44 (1896): p. 703. 
5 Ibid., 703; By Foxcroft’s time, many of Halifax’s works have already been published. A compilation of Halifax’s 
political pamphlets was published in 1700, and then a supplement of his other works was added to the canon 
in 1750. See George Savile, Marquis of Halifax, Miscellanies By the Right Noble LORD, The Late Lord Marquess 
of Halifax, ed. [Unnamed] (London: Printed for Matt. Gillyflower at the Spread-Eagle in Westminster-Hall, 
1700); George Savile, Marquis of Halifax, A Character of King Charles the Second: And Political, Moral and 
Miscellaneous Thoughts and Reflections, ed. [Alexander Pope] (London: Printed for J. and R. Tonson and S. 
Draper in the Strand, 1750). 
6 H. C. Foxcroft, The Life and Letters of Sir George Savile, Bart. First Marquis of Halifax &c., vols. 1-2, (London: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1898; New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1968). All citations of Life and 
Letters refer to the Johnson Reprint edition. 
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Foxcroft’s efforts, especially Life and Letters, were pivotal to Halifax scholarship. The 
value of her work lies not only in the biography itself, but also in the primary materials she 
collated and furnished for that biography. Throughout Life and Letters, Foxcroft traced 
through Halifax’s life with great detail and supplemented her account with pages upon 
pages of correspondence cited in full as well as contemporary accounts relating to the 
Marquis. To be sure, many of these materials were already available to the public, but 
Foxcroft’s biography collated it all where they related to Halifax. This made Life and Letters a 
general reference point for a bulk of primary sources relevant to the Marquis’ life. Given the 
detail provided and the sources collated by Foxcroft, her work naturally became the 
common starting point for subsequent scholars studying Halifax. In 1912, Walter Raleigh 
wrote that “all who concern themselves with Halifax must acknowledge their great debt to 
the careful and exhaustive work of Miss Foxcroft.”7 In 1972, Foxcroft’s Life and Letters was 
still considered “the standard biography” by James Conniff.8 A more recent example of 
Foxcroft’s continuing relevance was Luca G. Castellin’s 2016 study on Halifax’s thought, in 
which it listed her abridged biography, A Character of the Trimmer, as a biographical 
source.9 Foxcroft’s scholarship on Halifax was, therefore, a foundational beginning for 
modern Halifax studies that still carries relevance into the twenty-first century. 
 
                                                          
7 Walter Raleigh, Introduction to The Complete Works of George Savile First Marquess of Halifax, by George 
Savile, Marquis of Halifax, ed. Walter Raleigh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912), p. xii n1. 
8 James Conniff, “The Politics of Trimming: Halifax and the Acceptance of Political Controversy,” The Journal of 
Politics vol. 34, no. 4 (1972): p. 1175 n6. 
9 Luca G. Castellin, “The International Character of a Trimmer: Interest, Reason of State, and Balance of Power 
in Halifax’s Political Thought,” The International History Review vol. 38, no. 4 (2016): p. 622 n4; for the 
abridged biography, see H. C. Foxcroft, A Character of the Trimmer: Being a Short Life of the First Marquis of 
Halifax, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946). 
14 
 
There was no shortage of scholars trying to understand Halifax following Foxcroft’s 
scholarship. Her work shortly sparked numerous character studies of the Marquis. These 
assessments often aim to provide a general outline of his character and thought in light of 
the narrative and sources furnished by Foxcroft. The result was a general recognition of the 
depth of Halifax’s character. Herbert Paul in his 1899 essay, “The Great Tractarian”, made 
ample use of the biographical information made available by Foxcroft and proceeded to give 
an analysis of Halifax’s political career, his literary endeavours and philosophical thought. 
The complexity of character that Halifax showed in all three aspects was clear in Paul’s 
conclusion. As he wrote, “such, then, was George, Lord Halifax – Constitutional 
Revolutionalist, Conservative Republican, pious freethinker, philosophic politician”.10 
Raleigh approached his study of the Marquis in a similar way. In the introduction to his own 
1912 compilation of Halifax’s works, Raleigh familiarised his readers to the Marquis’ politics 
and thought, drilling into his principles, his career, and his works. For Raleigh, his 
appreciation of the depth of Halifax was apparent in his opening paragraph. From his point 
of view, the Restoration politician was “the practical genius of the English Revolution, and 
the acutest critical genius among English politicians”.11 A. W. Reed, whose lecture on Halifax 
was transcribed in 1928, delved into his career and also his writings in the context under 
which they were written. Reed’s conclusion from his study was no less laudatory than Paul’s 
and Raleigh’s. As he wrote, Halifax “and his friend Sir William Temple had much in common. 
Statesmen of remarkable prescience, men of acknowledged probity, independent and 
                                                          
10 Herbert Paul, “The Great Tractarian,” in Men and Letters, ed. James Knowles (London: John Lane, the Bodley 
Head, 1901), p. 239. Paul’s essay on Halifax is dated March 1899. See, ibid., p. 240. 
11 Raleigh, Introduction to Works of George Savile, p. vii. 
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imperturbable”.12 Through these early scholarly efforts, Halifax’s depth of character became 
established. As will be seen, such interpretations of the Marquis would take on an additional 
layer of complexity and sophistication as the twentieth century continued. 
 
Starting from Foxcroft, scholarly attention to Halifax’s intellectual thought also 
began to increase. This trend can already be seen in the studies of Paul, Raleigh and Reed as 
they all took into account of Halifax’s writings. This development continued and scholars 
would understand the Marquis not only as a seasoned politician, but also a profound 
intellectual thinker. G. P. Gooch lavished high praise on Halifax when he compared the 
Marquis to Thomas Hobbes, writing that both “are beyond comparison the most stimulating 
political writers of seventeenth-century England.”13 J. P. Kenyon, in his general survey of 
Halifax’s career and works also recognised him as a political thinker in his own right.14 
Specialised studies of Halifax’s intellectual thought have emerged as a result of this 
recognition. The insights offered from this area of scholarship have been numerous. 
Laurence Stapleton’s 1941 comparative study of Halifax’s thought with Sir Walter Raleigh’s 
found similarities between the two in their political pragmatism, moderation in government 
and their notions of the sovereignty of the people.15 In finding similarities between the two, 
Stapleton also found a common “humanistic Stoicisim” and Machiavellianism.16 The 
                                                          
12 A. W. Reed, “George Savile, Marquis of Halifax,” in The Social & Political Ideas of some English Thinkers of 
the Augustan Age A.D. 1650-1750, ed. F. J. C. Hearnshaw (London: George G. Harrap & Company Ltd., 1928), p. 
67. 
13 G. P. Gooch, Political Thought in England: From Bacon to Halifax (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 
154. 
14 J. P. Kenyon, Introduction to Halifax: Complete Works, by George Savile, Marquis of Halifax, ed. J. P. Kenyon 
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 38. 
15 Laurence Stapleton, “Halifax and Raleigh,” Journal of the History of Ideas vol. 2, no. 2 (1941): pp. 211-224. 
16 Ibid., p. 223. 
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connection between Halifax and Machiavelli was taken up by scholars such as Felix Raab and 
J. E. Parsons jr in 1964 and 1978 respectively. Raab argued that Halifax’s writings indicated 
that he had “digested” the lessons and ideas of Machiavelli on such notions as interest and 
religion.17 Parsons likewise noted a connection between Halifax’s realism and Machiavelli’s 
and a particularly Machiavellian character to the former’s sceptical views on religion.18 
Some scholars also drew connections between Halifax and modern political thought. 
Conniff, for instance, saw Halifax’s political ideas as an embodiment of a transition point 
between an old political tradition, in which political conflicts were shunned, and the modern 
tradition, in which conflicts based on interest were accepted.19 As a result of these studies 
on Halifax’s intellectual thought, scholarly understanding of the Marquis took on an 
additional layer of nuance and sophistication. 
 
It can be seen, then, that ever since Foxcroft’s Life and Letters, there has been a 
lively output of scholarship on Halifax and the various aspects about him. His place in 
scholarship has shifted from being a neglected figure to having various studies published 
showing his complexity. As a result of this, scholarly understanding of Halifax has improved 
significantly since Foxcroft. Much of this scholarly output, however, operated from a canon 
of Halifax’s works that remain practically fixed until the late-twentieth century. There was 
one early attempt to add to the Halifax canon. This was Hugh Macdonald’s controversial 
                                                          
17 Felix Raab, The English Face of Machiavelli: A Changing Interpretation 1500-1700 (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 242-249. 
18 J. E. Parsons, Jr., “Halifax: The Complete Trimmer Revisited,” Interpretation: a Journal of Political Philosophy 
vol. 7, no. 3 (1978): pp. 73-80, 81-82. 
19 Conniff, “Politics of Trimming,” pp. 1172-1202. 
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attribution of an anonymous pamphlet, Observations Upon a Late Libel, to the Marquis.20 
Aside from this disputed attribution, the Halifax canon remained unchanged until 1989, 
when Mark N. Brown’s three-volume The Works of George Savile, Marquis of Halifax was 
published. Brown’s Works changed the landscape for Halifax scholarship. It added numerous 
works by the Marquis which were previously unpublished and widely unknown.21 29 works 
and a letter are included in this compilation, and only thirteen of these had seen 
publication.22 The subject matters of these unpublished works are various, touching on such 
diverse topics as government reform, religion, characters of contemporaries, politics and 
the human condition. Among these unpublished works are several collections of Halifax’s 
aphorisms.  
 
Much of the scholarship on Halifax predated Brown’s Works. As such, many had not 
the opportunity to make use of these new sources. The one notable exception was E. J. 
Dwyer, who in his 1984 thesis on Halifax had access to the manuscripts to some of these 
                                                          
20 Hugh Macdonald, Introduction to Observations Upon a late Libel, called A Letter from a Person of Quality to 
his Friend, concerning the King's Declaration, &c, by [George Savile, Marquis of Halifax], ed. Hugh MacDonald 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), pp. 6-11. For the objections to MacDonald’s attribution see, 
Mark N. Brown, Introduction to Part One of The Works of George Savile, Marquis of Halifax, by George Savile, 
Marquis of Halifax, ed. Mark N. Brown, vol. 1, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 14-15. For a summary of 
the controversy this attribution generated see, Arthur Sherbo, "The Cambridge Review," Studies in 
Bibliography vol. 52 (1999): pp. 196-197. 
21 Brown’s compilation has been positively received by his reviewers. With the exception of Observations upon 
a late Libell, his attributions to Halifax of the works included in this compilation were not questioned. For these 
reviews, see Gary S. De Krey, Review of The Works of George Savile, Marquis of Halifax, by George Savile, 
Marquis of Halifax, edited by Mark N. Brown, Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies vol. 
22, no. 4 (1990): pp. 676-678; Martine Watson Brownley, “Halifax and the Ideology of the Aphorism,” Review 
of The Works of George Savile, Marquis of Halifax, by George Savile, Marquis of Halifax, edited by Mark N. 
Brown, Modern Philology vol. 90, no. 1 (1992): pp. 70-79; Paul Seaward, Review of The Works of George Savile, 
Marquis of Halifax, by George Savile, Marquis of Halifax, edited by Mark N. Brown, The English Historical 
Review vol. 108, no. 426 (1993): pp. 203-204. 
22 Paul Seaward, Review of The Works, p. 203. 
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sources and utilised them in his study.23 Only a few studies focusing on Halifax have since 
started using Brown’s new sources. Examples are Martine Brownley’s study of Halifax’s 
preference for the aphoristic genre; Castellin’s aforementioned study on Halifax’s thought 
on international relations; and of course Brown’s detailed introductions on each of the 
seven parts of his Works.24 Brown’s Works therefore gave Halifax scholarship new and so far 
largely unexplored angles to study this Restoration politician. This current study aims to 
capitalise on the new ground Brown has opened. Specifically, it will focus on a specific 
subset of Halifax’s works that has not been given enough scholarly attention. This subset is 
the aforementioned aphorisms. 
 
Capitalising on new ground and filling a historiographical gap 
 
Halifax already had a well-established reputation as an aphorist long before Brown’s 
1989 Works. Certainly, the wider public would have had the opportunity to know of Halifax’s 
aphoristic endeavours as early as 1700, when thirty three of his previously anonymous 
aphorisms were republished officially under his name.25 Later in 1750 a larger collection of 
his aphorisms were published from documents in the possession of his granddaughter, the 
Countess of Burlington.26 By the middle of the eighteenth century, it would seem that 
                                                          
23 The source was included in Dwyer’s bibliography as “Commonplace Books” 1 and 2 under Leicester Record 
Office Finch MSS. See E. J. Dwyer, “The Marquis of Halifax and the General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,” 
M. Litt Thesis (Trinity College, Dublin, 1984), p. 299.  
24 Brownley, “Ideology of the Aphorism”; Castellin, “International Character of the Trimmer”; Mark N. Brown, 
Introductions to Parts One to Seven of The Works of George Savile, Marquis of Halifax, by George Savile, 
Marquis of Halifax, ed. Mark N. Brown, vols. 1-3, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). 
25 These thirty-three aphorisms were published anonymously as Papers of the Great Almanzor in 1693 and 
subsequently republished as “Maxims of State” in 1700 in the Miscellanies. See also George Savile, Marquis of 
Halifax, The following Maxims were found amongst the papers of the Great Almanzor (Printed in the year M DC 
XCIII, 1693). 
26 Halifax, A Character of Charles the Second, pp. 63-183. 
19 
 
Halifax’s aphorisms were being positively received by the English public. In 1755, one 
compiler of the genre wrote that “the maxims of state… drawn up by Lord HALIFAX, have 
been greatly esteemed; as being the result of long experience and sound policy.”27 This 
claim of Halifax’s aphorisms being “greatly esteemed” might have carried some truth to it as 
well, for Benjamin Franklin was later found to have drawn from some of the Marquis’ short 
pieces in Poor Richard’s sayings.28 Halifax’s posthumous reputation as an aphorist eventually 
developed to the point where he could be compared to that celebrated seventeenth-
century French aphorist, Francois de La Rochefoucauld. For instance, Raleigh described 
Halifax’s published aphorisms as the “most notable English collection of Maxims, the 
nearest parallel and rival to the work of La Rochefoucauld and La Bruyere”; and H. R. Trevor-
Roper in 1957 described Halifax as the “English La Rochefoucauld”.29 As such, Halifax’s 
reputation as an aphorist was already established well before the full extent of his aphoristic 
endeavours was uncovered by Brown. 
 
Despite Halifax’s known practice to compose aphorisms, the extent of his 
endeavours in this genre as revealed by Brown’s Works was still startling. As Brownley 
remarked in her review and discussion on Brown’s new compilation, “from a literary 
perspective the new material that is most surprising and that makes Halifax a more puzzling 
literary case study than before is his maxims.” Brownley was surprised by the large amount 
                                                          
27 Preface by a Friend to A Collection of the Moral and Instructive Sentiments, Maxims, Cautions and Reflexions, 
Contained in the Histories of Pamela, Clarissa, and Sir Charles Grandison, by Samuel Richardson (London: 
Printed for S. Richardson, 1755), p. vii. 
28 Robert Newcomb, “Poor Richard’s Debt to Lord Halifax,” Modern Language Association vol. 70, no. 3 (1955): 
pp. 535-536. 
29 Raleigh, Introduction to Works of George Savile, xxiii-xxiv; H. R. Trevor-Roper, Historical Essays (London: 
MacMillan & Co Ltd, 1957), p. 254. 
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of aphorisms unearthed. To give an idea of this, it was estimated that in the third volume, 
which comprises only of aphorisms, only 27 pages out of the 459 were published before 
1989.30 This is not counting the other bulk of Halifax’s aphorisms in the second volume. 
Halifax, as Brownley noted, “apparently engaged in a single-minded and tireless pursuit of 
maxims.”31 Having devoted so much effort to this genre, Halifax was not simply a dabbling 
aphorist but an avid and committed practitioner of that literary art form.  
 
Many of the studies on Halifax before 1989 did not have a specific focus on his 
aphorisms. Scholars often only used them as supplements with his other works.32 After 
Brown’s Works, scholars have duly taken notice of the new aphorisms. Paul A. Rahe, for 
instance, used much of the new material, including the aphorisms, to support his claim that 
Halifax was part of an emerging political trend that distrusted a politics motivated by 
religion.33 Castellin also used the new aphorisms to extract Halifax’s ideas and views about 
the reason of state.34 Despite this awareness of the new short pieces, scholarly attempts to 
understand Halifax specifically through his aphorisms remain scarce. No attempt, 
particularly, has been made to read his politics in the context of these aphorisms. To be 
sure, there were a few notable examples that give centre stage to the short pieces. These 
were Brown and Brownley’s discussions of them. Brown, in his insightful introductions to 
parts three and seven of his Works, discussed various aspects of Halifax’s intellectual 
                                                          
30 Brownley, “Ideology of the Aphorism,” pp. 72-73. 
31 Ibid., p. 73. 
32 Examples of such studies include for instance, Conniff, “Politics of Trimming”; Parsons, “Trimmer Revisited”. 
Dwyer also made use of some of the unpublished aphorisms that Brown would eventually publish. For an 
example of this, see Dwyer, “The Marquis of Halifax,” pp. 207-208. See specifically notes 60-64 
33 Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Caroline Press, 1992), pp. 400-401. See specifically n13. 
34 Castellin, “International Character of a Trimmer,” p. 626 n53. 
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thought shown throughout his aphorisms. Among these aspects were his views of human 
behaviour being dominated by human nature and the passions, and of politics as being 
based on pragmatism and not on truth.35 Brownley focused on Halifax’s dedication to the 
aphoristic genre and attempted to explain this dedication. Accordingly, Brownley posited 
that Halifax preferred the aphorism because it served as a “creative solution” for explicating 
a political ideology, what she called “conservative constitutionalism”, which resisted full 
explication and contained some unattractive implications that the short genre was able to 
hide.36 Both studies, however, touched only briefly on how the values imbedded in those 
aphorisms impact on Halifax’s politics in practice. Therefore, studies that involve his 
aphorisms as a key source to understanding his politics have been rare. This study aims to 
fill this historiographical gap by reading Halifax’s politics in the context of his many 
aphorisms. It will suggest that the aphorisms should be regarded as an important source for 
understanding the Marquis’ politics between the Exclusion Crisis and the Glorious 
Revolution. 
 
There are good reasons to assign importance to the aphorisms in a study of Halifax’s 
politics. The first reason is that they are a more candid reflection of his internal character. 
Brown has cautioned scholars about taking Halifax’s honesty for granted when reading into 
his published political pamphlets. The main reason for this was that his political pamphlets 
were written primarily to influence public opinion. As propaganda pieces, the candidness of 
Halifax’s political pamphlets should not be taken for granted. As Brown himself wrote,  
                                                          
35 Brown, Introduction to Part Three, pp. 128-134; Brown, Introduction to Part Seven, pp. 12-22.  
36 Brownley, “Ideology of the Aphorism,” pp. 74-77. 
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It must be remembered that these pamphlets were intended, not as the mere 
publicizing of the author’s own views on certain issues, but as anonymous 
propaganda designed to influence public opinion, and with it political behaviour. 
Halifax was too shrewd a student of human nature to offend those whom he hoped 
to persuade, so that one must try to distinguish – where possible – his private 
opinions from what he expressed for public consumption.37 
To be sure, Brown acknowledged that the content of the pamphlets do coincide with 
Halifax’s private opinions “to a great extent”, but overall he cautioned the reading of the 
pamphlets as explicit expressions of the Marquis’ politics.38 By contrast, the aphorisms may 
be considered a more candid expression of Halifax’s actual opinions. His political aphorisms 
were described as a “spontaneous and candid revelation of Halifax’s private opinion of the 
men, the events, and the conditions of contemporary political life.”39 Additionally, Halifax’s 
miscellaneous aphorisms, which touch on matters beyond politics, were also found to be 
“the product of years of gradually accumulated observations, insights, and reflections”.40 
The aphorisms, therefore, may be regarded as a more accurate reflection of Halifax’s private 
character as opposed to his political pamphlets which were published primarily for political 
reasons. 
 
The aphorism as a genre, too, has some important implications in this study of 
Halifax. The genre should not only be seen as a mere literary preference, but a genre that 
                                                          
37 Mark N. Brown, General Introduction to The Works of George Savile, Marquis of Halifax, by George Savile, 
Marquis of Halifax, ed. Mark N. Brown, vol. 1, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. xxiii. 
38 Ibid., p. xxiii. 
39 Brown, Introduction to Part Three, p. 128. 
40 Brown, Introduction to Part Seven, p. 9. 
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carries with it a part of the aphorist’s character. Ben Grant, in his survey of the various 
characteristics of the aphorism, put forward the case about the personal nature of this 
genre. For Grant, every aphorist gives to their aphorisms two personal signatures. Authority, 
the giving the aphorisms a mark of ownership is one them. As Grant puts it, “aphorisms are 
distinguished from proverbs on the basis that they are attributed to a named individual, an 
author, while proverbs are anonymous.” In this sense, the aphorisms are imbedded with 
what he called an “authorizing signature.”41 But to Grant, there was an additional signature 
that goes beyond the mere attachment of an aphorist’s name to their short pieces. The 
second aspect of this “double signature” is the worldview the aphorist imbues into those 
short pieces. In making this claim, Grant explicitly borrowed from Murray S. Davies, who 
wrote that, 
What distinguishes the great aphorists is that all their aphorisms can be traced back 
to a common attitude toward the world. Behind their many aphorisms stands a 
single principle applied to a variety of topics: Pascal’s ‘self-fragility’, La 
Rochefoucauld’s ‘self-interest’, Schopenhauer’s ‘self-denial’, Nietzsche’s ‘self-
empowerment’.42 
The aphorism is therefore a highly personal part of the aphorist in the sense that they also 
carry their worldview. Halifax’s own aphorisms can be interpreted through this angle too. 
This study will read his politics in the context of the worldview imbedded in those 
aphorisms. 
  
                                                          
41 Ben Grant, The Aphorism and Other Short Forms (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 67. 
42 Murray S. Davies, "Aphorisms and Cliches: The Generation and Dissipation of Conceptual Charisma," Annual 
Review of Sociology vol. 25 (1999): 256; Grant quotes this in full as well. See Grant, The Aphorism, 67. 
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An interpretation from aphorisms 
 
By using Halifax’s aphorisms this study will offer a unique perspective on him in an 
area that is still undergoing developments. This is the interpretation of the Marquis’ politics 
and political career. Ever since Halifax’s death in 1695, contemporaries and historians have 
grappled with the puzzle of explaining his seemingly inconsistent political conduct. Views 
about his politics have undergone major shifts over the centuries. Between his death and 
the middle of the twentieth century, two main interpretations can be detected. The first 
interpretation tended to see Halifax’s inconsistent career as being due to a lack of political 
principles. Bishop Gilbert Burnet, a contemporary and associate of Halifax, was among the 
first to make such an assessment. In private, Burnet found Halifax to be amiable. "He was 
always talking of morality and friendship. He was punctual in all payments, and just in all his 
private dealings." But in the realm of politics Burnet found Halifax to be an inconsistent 
man, as he wrote that "with relation to the public, he went backwards and forwards, and 
changed sides so often, that in conclusion no side trusted him.” Part of this inconsistency 
was suggested to be related to a lack of principles. For instance, Halifax’s apparently 
republican ideals certainly did not bear out as he took part in some of Charles II’s most 
repressive policies against the Whig party, who themselves had republican tendencies. In 
Burnet’s own words, Halifax “seemed full of commonwealth notions: yet he went into the 
worst part of King Charles's reign." The resulting image drawn by Burnet was a Halifax 
whose inconsistent politics could not be explained by any discernible principles. Ambition to 
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raise his family’s status seemed more likely to be Halifax’s driving force from Burnet’s point 
of view. As he wrote, Halifax’s “heart was much set on raising his family”.43 
 
Among contemporaries, this was by no means unanimous. For instance, Halifax’s 
domestic chaplain, Alexander Sion, took the opposite position. Sion was among the earliest 
to attempt a compilation of some of the Marquis’ works after his death, entitled 
“Saviliana”.44 No such compilation under that name was ever published, but the manuscript 
did contain his general appraisal of Halifax. Sion’s assessment of him was laudatory. In 
contrast to Burnet’s assessment, Halifax was described as a man who "always indeavoured 
to raise his Country more than his Family, and besides Titles and Honors, never got anything 
by the Crown." Furthermore, his loyalty to the Stuart dynasty was implied, as Sion wrote 
that Halifax was also "the wise and faithful Counseller of Kings, one of whom might have 
reigned more quietly, and the other longer had they given into the methods proposed by his 
Lordship."45 Far from being the inconsistent politician who lacked principles, Halifax was 
consistent in his patriotism and faithfulness to his nation and his monarchs. 
 
                                                          
43 Gilbert Burnet, Bishop Burnet’s History of His Own Time: From the Restoration of Charles II. to the Treaty of 
Peace at Utrecht, in the Reign of Queen Anne. A New Edition with Historical and Biographical Notes, and Fifty-
One Portraits, vol. 1, (London: William Smith, 113, Fleet Street, 1838), pp. 181-182. 
44 The manuscript was entitled “Saviliana or The Works of George Savile Late Marquis of Halifax In four Tracts 
The Character of a Trimmer A Letter to a Dissenter The Anatomy of an Equivalent and Advice to a Daughter”. 
The authorship of this manuscript is not explicit. Foxcroft thought it was Halifax’s other domestic chaplain, 
William Mompesson but it has been strongly shown by Brown that this was Alexander Sion by comparing the 
handwriting in the manuscript with two letters signed by Sion. For a discussion of authorship of this 
manuscript, see Foxcroft, Life and Letters, vol. 1, pp. xii-xiv; Brown, General Introduction to Works, p. xxix n1, 
n2. 
45 The excerpt from “Saviliana” has been printed in Foxcroft, Life and Letters, vol. 2, p. 196. 
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Burnet’s view, however, tended to prevail with commentators over the succeeding 
century and a half. David Hume, writing in the mid-seventeenth century, saw Halifax merely 
as a political intriguer. He acknowledged his association with a group of political moderates 
known as “Trimmers”, but he qualified this by suggesting that the Marquis was animated to 
this position more by ambition than by integrity. As he wrote of Halifax, “this conduct [of 
political neutrality between parties], which is more natural to men of integrity than of 
ambition, could not however procure him the former character; and he was always, with 
reason, regarded as an intriguer rather than a patriot.”46 Nineteenth-century historian Sir 
James Mackintosh characterised Halifax in a similarly negative light. The Marquis, according 
to Mackintosh’s assessment, was a disillusioned politician who later turned to his own 
ambitions at the expense of political principles. As Mackintosh wrote, 
His [Halifax’s] political speculations being soon found incapable of being reduced to 
practice, melted away in the sunshine of royal favour; the disappointment of 
visionary hopes led him to despair of great improvements, to despise the moderate 
services which an individual may render to the community, and to turn with disgust 
from public principles to the indulgence of his own vanity and ambition.47  
Halifax survived through wit and eloquence and “of these various means of advancement, 
he availed himself for a time with little scruple and with some success.” But his character 
defects led to successes which were short-lived. Among the most important was that “he 
had too keen a perception of human weakness and folly not to find many pretexts and 
                                                          
46 David Hume, The History of Great Britain, from the Accession of James I. To the Revolution in 1688, vol. 8, 
(Dublin: Printed by James Williams in Skinner-Row, 1780), p. 172. 
47 Sir James Mackintosh, History of the Revolution in England in 1688. comprising a view of the Reign of James 
II. from his accession, to the enterprise of the Prince of Orange (London: Printed for Longman, Rees, Orme, 
Brown, Green & Longman, 1834), p. 8. 
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temptations for changing his measures and deserting his connections.”48 Mackintosh 
acknowledged that Halifax had talents, but he saw few principles in the man. Hence the 
portraits drawn from Hume’s and Mackintosh’s renderings were unflattering. From their 
points of views, Halifax was a politician who lacked virtuous principles and was more 
inclined towards political intriguing and furthering his own ambitions. 
 
A second interpretation, closer to Sion’s, would emerge directly opposed to these 
negative views. Such interpretations saw Halifax in a more sympathetic light, and concepts 
of moderation, pragmatism and patriotism would be affixed upon the politician. Macaulay, 
writing in the same century as Mackintosh, was among the first proponents of Halifax as a 
virtuous moderate. His generous assessment benefitted from the correct belief that the 
Marquis penned the famous The Character of a Trimmer, which, on the surface, professed 
itself to be a defence of political moderation.49 Unlike Hume, Macaulay sympathised with 
Halifax and his association as a trimmer. From Macaulay’s point of view, Halifax was not the 
political intriguer that Hume painted him to be. Rather, his character and his conduct were 
guided by the virtues of moderation, representative of a political “trimmer” who would trim 
the sails between political extremes and balance them out.50 Such views were expressed in 
his Essay on Sir William Temple, but he developed them to a fuller extent in his History of 
                                                          
48 Mackintosh, History of the Revolution, pp. 8-9. 
49 Macaulay made direct references to Halifax’s Character of a Trimmer in his Essay on Sir William Temple. The 
cautiousness of his claim that Halifax authored Character of a Trimmer reflected the fact that the pamphlet 
was still sometimes attributed to Halifax’s uncle and another political moderate of the time, Sir William 
Coventry. See, Foxcroft, “The Works of George Savile,” p. 704. 
50 Macaulay Essay on Sir William Temple, pp. 74-75. Macaulay’s comments about trimming between heat and 
cold, despotism and anarchy, Catholicism and Protestant Dissent were direct references to Halifax’s pamphlet. 
Cf. George Savile, Marquis of Halifax, “The Character of a Trimmer,” in The Works of George Savile, Marquis of 
Halifax, ed. Mark N. Brown, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 243.  
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England. In a passage that summarised Halifax from Macaulay’s point of view, he wrote 
that, 
Such a man [as Halifax] could not long be constant to any band of political allies. He 
must not, however, be confounded with the vulgar crowd of renegades. For though, 
like them, he passed from side to side, his transition was always in the direction 
opposite to theirs. He had nothing in common with those who fly from extreme to 
extreme, and who regard the party which they have deserted with an animosity far 
exceeding that of consistent enemies. His place was between the hostile divisions of 
the community, and he never wandered far beyond the frontier of either.51 
Macaulay’s portrait was vastly different from Hume’s and Mackintosh’s. Halifax’s constant 
switching of sides was not because he lacked principles, but because he had principles for 
which he stood. Such principles were that of the “trimmer”.52 
  
Half a century later, Foxcroft’s Life and Letters would complement Macaulay’s 
portrait. The portrait she drew, however, was more implicit than explicit. She seemed more 
content with letting the evidence speak for itself than giving an overarching analysis on 
Halifax. Indeed, at the conclusion of Life and Letters, she conceded that “the scheme of this 
work precludes any formal attempt at analysis, for which sufficient materials are now before 
the reader.”53 Such was Foxcroft’s approach that Kenyon commented that her Life and 
Letters was “an enormous quarry of fact piled on fact, like the two- and three-decker lives of 
                                                          
51 Macaulay, History of England, vol. 1, pp. 244-245. 
52 Ibid., p. 244. 
53 Foxcroft, Life and Letters, vol. 2, p. 192. 
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Victorian statesmen on which it may have been consciously modelled.”54 Despite this, 
Foxcroft’s narrative and arrangement of the primary sources painted an image of Halifax 
that added more substance to Macaulay’s interpretation of a virtuous moderate. Foxcroft 
did not stress the importance of a “trimming” principle in Halifax; but a politics that was 
against brash extremes could be seen through the details.55 The general image of Halifax 
from Foxcroft’s narrative was a politician who was a patriot, pragmatist and proponent of 
moderation.56 These views were subsequently expressed in her slightly altered abridged 
biography, A Character of the Trimmer in 1946. As Foxcroft concluded this later work, she 
wrote that Halifax’s “own general policy whether in office or in opposition, was simple and 
consistent.” In foreign policy, “his first object was always to secure these islands and their 
dependencies from foreign interference, dynastic or ecclesiastical.” As for his politics at 
home, “he was equally concerned to preserve, in the interest of the average citizen, our 
Laws, our Liberties, and our Unity as a nation”. For Halifax, such domestic aspirations 
involved the balancing of Crown and Parliament and to “’trim’ the barque of State as to 
keep her on an even keel.”57 To Foxcroft, Halifax was a moderate politician who worked for 
the good of the English nation from a pragmatic rather than an ideological standpoint. 
 
As scholarship on Halifax developed after Foxcroft, it was this second interpretation 
of the Marquis as a virtuous moderate that established itself by the early-twentieth century. 
                                                          
54 Kenyon, Introduction to Halifax: Complete Works, p. 25. 
55 Take, for example, Foxcroft’s rendering of Halifax’s actions during the Exclusion Crisis, or on the subsequent 
reaction against the Whigs by Charles’ government. In the former, Foxcroft showed Halifax as urging caution 
due to the possibility of another civil war, and in the latter he was shown pushing for reconciliation with the 
Whigs. See Foxcroft, Life and Letters, vol. 1, pp. 233-249, 302-303, 323-325. 
56 A similar interpretation arose from Kenyon’s reading of Foxcroft. See Kenyon, Introduction to Halifax: 
Complete Works, p. 25. 
57 Foxcroft, Character of the Trimmer, p. 340. 
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Paul, Raleigh, and Reed all interpreted Halifax’s conduct along these lines. Paul wrote of 
Halifax that “he was more thoroughly imbued than any other Englishman with the English 
spirit of compromise”; Raleigh enthusiastically followed Macaulay in applying the metaphor 
of the trimmer to Halifax’s politics; and Reed lamented that seventeenth-century 
contemporaries had “failed to understand Halifax’s contempt of party loyalty and his virtues 
as a ‘trimmer.’”58 This second interpretation still echoed as the century progressed. Writing 
in 1969, Kenyon believed that Macaulay’s characterisation quoted above was “still the most 
accurate and perceptive analysis of Halifax’s conduct we have”.59 No longer was this 
Restoration politician the inconsistent man who lacked the principles to commit to a 
position. Rather, modern scholarship has decisively sided with Macaulay and Foxcroft in 
reassessing Halifax as a man imbued with the virtues of patriotism, pragmatism and 
moderation. 
 
Hitherto, the interpretations of Halifax’s politics and career fall along two identifiable 
lines. The first asserted that they were more or less evidence of a lack of principles, whereas 
the second defended him by asserting otherwise. As the dust settled in favour of the second 
position, scholars began to move past this dichotomy between principles and lack thereof. 
Scholars now accepted that Halifax’s political conduct was motivated by consistent themes 
and began to focus on defining those themes beyond the categories of patriotism, 
pragmatism and moderation. These scholars would seek out these themes in Halifax’s 
various writings. This interpretive approach to understanding Halifax’s politics does overlap 
                                                          
58 Paul, “Tractarian,” p. 210; Raleigh, Introduction to Works of George Savile, pp. vii-viii; Reed, “George Savile,” 
pp. 67-68. 
59 Kenyon, Introduction to Halifax: Complete Works, pp. 23-24. 
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with that adopted by the specialised studies on his intellectual thought. However, rather 
than focusing solely on the themes of his thought in isolation, this approach involved using 
those themes to characterise his politics. This approach of finding consistent themes 
between Halifax’s politics and his intellectual works would not have been endorsed by all 
scholars. Brown, for instance, saw inherent risks of misinterpretations from “the writing of 
history that tried to make sense of a man’s life more in terms of his self-consistency than his 
development.”60  
 
Despite the inherent risks, works in this category have offered insightful suggestions 
as to possible themes to Halifax’s politics. Ruth Patricia Trickey’s 1951 study can be 
considered an early example of this. Accepting the biographical details already established 
by existing scholarship, Trickey instead focused on drawing out a consistent character 
throughout such aspects as Halifax’s political career, writings and even his composition 
style.61 For Trickey, the unifying theme found in Halifax was his simultaneous recognition of 
the ideal and the real that permeated throughout those categories.62 Another example is a 
1975 study done by Edward Millican. Millican sought to show that Halifax’s political theory 
was not that of the Whigs, but rather that he was “an articulate spokesman for the Tory 
position”, which supported a monarchy who ruled according to the laws.63 The approach he 
took to show this was by an examination of Halifax’s writings in conjunction with an account 
                                                          
60 Brown, General Introduction to Works, p. xxii. 
61 Ruth Patricia Trickey, “A Study of Sir George Saville : First Marquis of Halifax,” MA Thesis (Butler University, 
1951). 
62 Ibid., pp. 51-53. 
63 Edward Millican, "The Political Theory of the Marquis of Halifax," PhD Dissertation (University of California, 
1975), pp. 20-21. 
32 
 
of his political actions. Indeed, Millican’s explicit goal in his study was to set Halifax’s 
political ideas in relation to “the conceptions of the polity prevalent in the seventeenth 
century England, and the political struggles in which Halifax was an active and important 
participant.”64 In doing so, his study attempted to show that the Marquis was not only more 
Tory in political thought but also consistent with this in his actual politics. Parsons’ 1978 
study on Halifax’s intellectual debt to Machiavelli can also be considered a part of this trend 
of interpretations too. In assessing Halifax’s thought in relation to Machiavelli’s, Parsons 
suggested that the Marquis’ political conduct was informed by a Machiavellian view of 
religion.65 As can be seen, this emerging interpretive approach to studying Halifax’s politics 
have yielded some suggestive ways of understanding it beyond such concepts as 
moderation or pragmatism. 
 
This study considers itself part of this trend of interpretive approaches. It accepts 
that Halifax’s political conduct was not a mere manifestation of a lack of principles. But 
rather than seeking to explain his conduct through the common categories discussed above, 
this study aims to identify Halifax’s politics with a worldview that was deeply influenced by 
his ideas about the human condition. Studies touching on Halifax’s views about the human 
condition are not new. For instance, A. G. Fogg’s 1965 thesis on Halifax’s political thought 
touched on the topic of his views of human nature. Specifically, Fogg emphasised that 
Halifax’s political thought rested much on the assumptions he held about human 
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65 Parsons, “Trimmer Revisited,” pp. 84-86. 
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behaviour.66 Conniff’s study also identified Halifax’s epistemological scepticism and cynicism 
of human nature in explaining the modernity of his thought.67 Dwyer’s study serves as 
another notable example in this area, as it drew a contextual connection between Halifax’ 
intellectual thought with such traditions as Pyrrhonian scepticism and the early-modern 
moralistes’ views about human nature.68 Finally, Brown’s aforementioned introductions to 
Halifax’s aphorisms are of great relevance to this area of scholarship. This is especially the 
case with his introduction to part seven in which he discussed the salient characteristics of 
the Marquis’ views on human nature.69 It can be seen, then, that quite a few studies already 
touch on Halifax’s views about the human condition. However, whereas these studies are 
confined to Halifax’s intellectual thought, this study will specifically aim to show how his 
views in this area can be used to understand his politics in practice. 
 
In keeping with the focus on Halifax’s aphorisms, this study will extract his views of 
the human condition primarily from those short pieces. It is true that not all his aphorisms 
are consistent in their propositions. Brown, for instance, found some contradictory remarks 
in Halifax’s views about the persistence of an individual’s nature throughout one’s life. 
Despite Halifax’s ambiguous remarks on this matter, Brown nonetheless found a consistent 
attitude that tended towards the rejection of a persistent nature.70 In a similar way, the 
reading of the aphorisms in this study finds a common attitude that Halifax applied to a 
variety of subject matters. This common attitude can be characterised as a deep acceptance 
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of the boundaries or limitations believed by Halifax to be inherent in the human condition. 
For Halifax, such boundaries principally relate to the human mind and human character. Of 
the mind, Halifax believed it to be limited in what it can know with certainty; of human 
character, he believed that it was inevitably dominated by nature and the passions rather 
than reason. Halifax incorporated this acceptance of human imperfection in his approach to 
a variety of subjects within the aphorisms. The aphorisms, therefore, contain Halifax’s 
particular approach to the world, or a worldview in other words. Reading Halifax’s political 
actions in the context of his aphorisms, this study will suggest that those actions were 
characteristic of him in the sense that it aligned with his worldview shown in those short 
pieces. In this way, this study suggests merely a consistency between the two rather than a 
positive confirmation of causality. Nonetheless, the specific interpretation that emerges 
from this study is that the spirit of Halifax’ politics resonated with his sceptical outlook of 
the human condition.  
 
All this being said, this study does not consider itself isolated from the larger 
historiographical context. This study will take advantage of relevant developments in the 
historiography of seventeenth-century England. Indeed, much of this development provide 
additional context for this study’s understanding of Halifax’s career and the times in which 
he lived. The studies that include a detailed account of Restoration politics have provided 
helpful peripheral information on Halifax’s political career. Kenyon’s Robert Spencer, Earl of 
Sunderland, for instance, provided useful information on Halifax’s interactions with national 
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policy during his time in government between 1679 and 1685.71 Wider studies on the 
politics and sentiments prevalent during the Restoration era also help put Halifax’s politics 
in a better context. For example, though Halifax has been largely credited with defeating the 
second Exclusion Bill in 1680, subsequent studies have found that the Bill was never likely to 
pass, with or without Halifax’s aid.72 On a wider scale, Tim Harris’ two-volume “social history 
of politics” on the Restoration era provided helpful perspectives into the contemporary 
atmosphere of the times in which Halifax lived.73 Such insights help one get a better sense 
of the issues that Halifax and his contemporaries were grappling with. As suggested here, 
this study will benefit from the various insights offered by these wider studies about 
seventeenth-century England. 
 
 Just as scholarship on the wider Restoration era has relevance to this study, the 
reverse will also be true, though in a modest capacity. Insofar as the issue of political 
moderates or “Trimmers” during the late-Restoration period is a subject of scholarly 
interest, this study helps elucidate the worldview of one the proponents of this moderate 
position. Tim Harris’ work showing the divide between the Whigs and Tories during this 
period indicated the need to understand the middle position. Having shown both the Whig 
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and Tory positions during Charles II’s reign, Harris cautioned the reader from drawing a 
simplistic Whig-Tory divide from his analysis. He acknowledged that there were moderate 
Whigs and Tories, as well as a more independent position.74 As he wrote, 
The subject of trimmers is an important one, and deserves fuller treatment than can 
be afforded here. There certainly were people who saw themselves as occupying a 
middle position between the two extremes, who espoused an ideological position 
which they saw as being distinct from that of either party, and who often applied the 
label of ‘trimmer’ to themselves. What is less clear is whether we can we talk about 
the trimmers as a distinctive and coherent third force in politics at this time.75  
This study will not answer such questions about a moderate or “trimmer” party. But it will 
show the distinctive worldview of one of the most notable moderates during the late-Stuart 
era. By doing so it offers a case study from which to extrapolate some potential 
philosophical and ideological motivations of the moderate position during this period. 
 
Final notes on methodology 
 
It remains to say a few words about the methodology of this study as well as the 
period chosen for study. Hazards no doubt exist when one’s chief primary sources are 
aphorisms. The most notable hazard is that of interpretation. The short and brief nature of 
aphorisms inevitably presents ambiguity and imprecision with regards to their meaning. 
Unlike treatises with more exact definitions and commentary, the aphorism’s ambiguity 
                                                          
74 Harris, Restoration, pp. 323-326. 
75 Ibid., p. 325. 
37 
 
means that there are a number of open interpretations that can be imposed upon them. 
This leads to the potential issue where one reads a specific meaning into an aphorism and 
another might read a different meaning. To circumvent any confusion as far as possible, this 
study has made conscious efforts to clarify its interpretation on a particular aphorism where 
multiple meanings are a likely possibility.  
 
There is also a notable hazard in reading Halifax’s politics in the context of a selected 
set of aphorisms. This hazard is the potential for other sets of aphorisms to contradict the 
selected set. This is particularly a problem where advice of an aphorism bearing consistency 
with one of his actions is contradicted by the advice of another aphorism. Indeed, due to the 
sheer number of Halifax’s short pieces, this possibility seems unavoidable. This study, 
however, does not intend to resolve such contradictions and this seems justified given 
Halifax’s own character. Halifax in his aphorisms revealed himself to be someone who 
rejected the idea of universal guides to action. This is to say that he did not believe that any 
practical advice was absolutely correct at all times. As he wrote in one aphorism, “those 
who lean upon general maxims, will often have terrible falls. A maxim without 
distinguishing, is a crutch for a lame understanding.”76 In another aphorism, Halifax similarly 
reflected, “dangerous to come neer a fool that is charged with a Maxime; hee lets it of right 
or wrong, for want of knowing how to apply it.”77 From these aphorisms, it seems apparent 
that Halifax believed every situation had its own appropriate line of conduct or maxim, and 
that the maxim’s advice might be invalidated when inappropriately applied to another 
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situation. Considering this, Halifax would have been comfortable with jotting down 
seemingly contradictory advice because each had its own practical validity when applied 
within an appropriate framework. In terms of applying the aphorisms to Halifax’s political 
actions, the task then becomes less about resolving inconsistencies between them and more 
about ensuring that the aphorisms chosen fit plausibly into the context of those actions. 
This latter approach is the one taken in this study. 
 
This study’s focus on the period in question requires some explanation also. The 
question might be asked as to why this study specifically focuses on the period between the 
Exclusion Crisis and the Glorious Revolution. One could go further and inquire why the focus 
should not be on the entirety of Halifax’s life. To these questions two answers explain the 
period chosen. The first is that Halifax likely did not begin writing and compiling his 
aphorisms until the Exclusion Crisis. From internal and circumstantial evidence and cross 
referencing from other works by Halifax, Brown suggested that the likely composition 
period for his aphorisms were between the early 1680s to the last few years of his life, with 
a large majority of them likely written towards the latter period.78 This puts the likely 
composition dates within the studied period. No detailed diary or journal revealing Halifax’s 
thoughts and politics over his life have survived. In light of this, the aphorisms under these 
circumstances can be considered an alternative source for exploring his internal character 
during the chosen period.79 Furthermore, there is also danger in extending the application 
of these aphorisms too far back in time. This is because Halifax’s character at the time he 
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wrote his aphorisms might have differed from when he first began his career. As Brown 
suggested, “Halifax’s writings inevitably reveal him in various ways, but when studied as the 
key to his politics they can be misleading. One reason is that they all fall within the last 
quarter of his life, and what is characteristic of his last fifteen years is not always so of his 
first forty-five.”80 By focusing on Halifax’s politics during the likely period over which he 
wrote his aphorisms, this study mitigates the risk of falling into this danger of misapplying 
them. 
 
The second reason was that the Exclusion Crisis and the Glorious Revolution 
contained what can be argued as Halifax’s most notable political decisions.  This was the 
general impression of many who studied him. Raleigh, for instance, wrote of Halifax that 
“the greatest of his achievements, it will probably be agreed, was the rejection of the 
Exclusion Bill in 1680 by the House of Lords.”81 Kenyon remarked that Halifax’s fame lay in 
his actions during the Exclusion Crisis and the Revolution; and Brownley also described 
Halifax’s rejection of the Exclusion Bill and his subsequent role in the Revolution as “the two 
major achievements of his career”.82 For these reasons, the period chosen can be justified 
on the basis that it comprised the core of Halifax’s political career as many scholars 
understood it. Based on the considerations above, it was thought the most ideal to confine 
the period of this study to between the Exclusion Crisis and the Glorious Revolution. 
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Finally, it should be noted that the goal of this study is not to challenge the current 
political narrative on Halifax. This study is essentially an interpretive rereading of Halifax’s 
political career. This means that the overarching political narrative regarding Halifax will 
follow more or less from established scholarship. The methodological implications of this is 
that the biographical details of Halifax in this study is based on that which has already been 
established chiefly by Foxcroft and supplemented by others such as Brown as well as by the 
wider Restoration scholarship. Where appropriate, Halifax’s letters or relevant accounts 
from contemporaries will be duly cited, but no attempt will be made nor new archival 
correspondences will be specifically brought forth to create a new narrative of the actual 





Chapter 2 – A Prelude 
 
Before diving into a reading of Halifax’s politics in terms of his aphorisms, a brief 
introduction will be given as to his early life and career. This brief chapter gives a short 
narrative of Halifax’s life and career up to 1678, just before the advent of the Popish Plot 
which ushered in the Exclusion Crisis. This supplies an introductory narrative to the 
succeeding chapters.  
 
George Savile’s early life 
 
George Savile was born on 11th November 1633 to Yorkshire Baronet Sir William 
Savile and Anne Coventry. The Saviles, a wealthy and prominent Yorkshire family, boasted a 
somewhat illustrious pedigree so that George Savile, from birth, could already point to a few 
prominent connections by blood; the most notable examples being his great-uncle the Earl 
of Strafford and his maternal grandfather Lord Keeper Coventry. Notable figures more 
contemporary to Savile’s lifetime included his cousin, Thomas Thynne, the future Viscount 
Weymouth; his uncles William and Henry Coventry; and perhaps most famously his other 
uncle, Anthony Ashley Cooper, future Earl of Shaftesbury.83 Yet blood connections did not 
always guarantee amicable relations in person. Though these connections furnished him 
well with political allies, Savile later found Ashley Cooper among his most formidable 
political opponents. Nor could familial eminence spare the Saviles from the indiscriminate 
hardships which civil war brought. 
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Born but years before the English Civil War, it was almost inevitable that Savile was 
not without his own experiences of those conflicts. His father, though he supported the 
popular cause during the Short Parliament and the beginning of the Long Parliament, 
ultimately sided with the Crown. As is always possible in times of conflict, Sir William 
perished whilst serving as an officer in the King’s army; the young Savile therefore lost his 
father during this tumultuous period by the age of 11. As for, Savile himself during this time, 
he and other members of the family, had to constantly repair to locales of safety as the 
conflict raged on.84 It has even been claimed that Savile was present at and endured with his 
mother the siege of Castle Sheffield in 1644.85  After the death of Savile’s father, Parliament 
also took an active interest in Savile’s wardship, granting Parliamentarian Lord Wharton the 
guardianship of the child and care of his education in addition to a yearly allowance drawn 
from his estates.86 
 
However, “it is doubtful”, as noted by Foxcroft, “whether Lord Wharton ever 
succeeded, even temporarily, in enforcing his claims.”87 For, coincidence or not, it was 
around this time when Lady Savile decided to send her son abroad for an education on 
Continental soil. During his time on the Continent, where it was likely he gained proficiency 
in the French language, he visited a variety of locations; he was in Angers by December 
1647, Leghorn by October 1649, Naples in the following November, Rome by 1649/50 and 
finally again in France, Orleans until 1651. Savile apparently returned to England by the time 
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he had come of age in 1654.88 Though the Parliamentarian’s victory meant the loss of 
property for many landed Royalists, the Savile assets were kept more or less intact, perhaps 
due to his mother’s prudent management. And so when Savile returned home around the 
age of 25, his financial position was substantially better off than most of his fellow 
Cavaliers.89 
 
There is scant information about Savile between his return to England and the 
Restoration of Charles in 1660. There are, however, suggestions of his involvement in the 
Royalist activities of the time, with his possible association with an abortive rising in 1655.90 
Though Savile was not among those arrested, there was in fact interest in detaining him for 
information about the rising.91 Whether Savile played any important part in bringing about 
the Restoration of Charles II is unknown. What is certain was that he sat in the House of 
Commons jointly representing Pontefract with William Lowther during the Convention 
Parliament, which was responsible for recalling the King. Savile’s time in the Commons did 
not turn out to be the start to what was eventually a long career in politics. For whatever 
reason he never sat in that House again after the Convention’s dissolution.92  
 
Being outside of the political arena that was Parliament, Savile still held local 
government offices, serving as a deputy-lieutenant and JP of the West Riding and a 
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commissioner for executing the Corporation Act in the county of York.93 Through his political 
connections at the time, with his uncle Sir William Coventry and the Duke of Buckingham 
being his most notable patrons, attempts were made to obtain for Savile a peerage and his 
entry into the House of Lords. However, it was not until the fall of the chief minister at the 
time, the Earl of Clarendon, that this was possible; for Clarendon, animated by his rivalry 
with Savile’s patrons, strongly objected to granting the young Baronet a noble title when the 
suggestion was raised. When Clarendon eventually fell from grace in 1667 the road laid 
clear for Savile’s entry into the peerage. The writs were issued in January of 1668, and on 
the 23rd he was thus summoned to sit in the House of Lords as Baron Savile of Eland and 
Viscount Halifax.94 
 
Halifax’s early political career 
 
Halifax’s political career could be argued to have begun in earnest during the events 
of 1672, in which he was admitted into the Privy Council. During the largely unpopular 
second Anglo-Dutch War of 1672 to 1674, Halifax was chosen to embark on a diplomatic 
mission to the French King to reaffirm England’s commitment to the Anglo-French alliance.95 
Like many of his contemporaries, however, Halifax saw France as the greater threat on the 
Continent and sought leniency towards the Dutch whenever possible.96 When Halifax and 
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his ambassadorial colleagues returned from their diplomatic mission without any tangible 
gains, Parliament turned on the government when it met in 1673. By then, Charles’ pro-
French policies had led many to suspect that the King was attempting to establish 
Catholicism in England. The league with France notwithstanding, Charles also issued a 
Declaration of Indulgence back in 1672, which favoured not only Protestant Dissenters but 
Catholics as well. Adding fuel to this suspicion was the company Charles was keeping 
himself, who were well-known Catholics. All this, as Tim Harris wrote, “inevitably created 
the impression that popery was on the increase.”97 
 
Halifax joined the opposition, the Country party, in their efforts to put a check on the 
government’s Catholic learnings. He lent his support to the Test Act of 1673, which 
effectively barred Catholics from civil and military service.98 Early in 1674, during a 
discussion in the Lords about how best to secure the Protestant religion, Halifax moved that 
all Catholic recusants should be disarmed. Later on, he along with another peer further 
proposed that royal family members who married Catholics should be excluded from the 
line of succession. This, however, was not intended to apply to James, even though the 
Duke’s conversion to the Catholic faith was known to Halifax by then.99 Halifax was 
nonetheless alarmed by James’ conversion and harboured visible distrust in the Duke. 
During a Lords debate on Charles’ Declaration of Indulgence, he said that “if we could make 
good the eastern compliment, ‘O king, live for ever,’ he could trust the King with everything; 
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but since that was so much a compliment that it could never become real, he could not be 
implicit in his confidence.”100 
 
Halifax’s opposition to the government continued throughout the 1670s. His position 
eventually pitted him against the Lord Treasurer, Earl of Danby, who became the chief 
minister during much of that decade. It was true that Danby and Halifax had a personal 
rivalry of sorts, yet, as Brown noted, the latter would have had reason to oppose Danby’s 
government on the grounds that he was seemingly attempting to govern in a style that 
tended to encourage absolutist tendencies.101 In a notable instance of distrust in Danby’s 
government, Halifax joined with the opposition voices and vehemently opposed his attempt 
in 1675 to introduce a test bill, which required all office holders and members of Parliament 
to make an oath never to undertake measures against the government or to alter it in either 
Church or state.102 By then, Charles had tolerated enough of Halifax’s dissention and he was 
shortly dismissed from the Privy Council.103 
 
The opposition’s assaults on Danby’s government made no substantial headways.  
The two remained in deadlock until 1678, when the fictitious revelations of a Catholic plot 
provided the opposition the means to bring down Danby. However, this came at the cost of 
immediately ushering in the infamous Exclusion Crisis. Halifax’s career took a drastic turn 
during the course of the Crisis. Having fashioned himself as an ardent critic of Danby’s 
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government in the 1670s, he would paradoxically become deeply entrenched in Charles’ 




Chapter 3 – The Exclusion Crisis 
 
Danby and his government ultimately would not survive the panic-rife atmosphere 
of the Popish Plot period. The opposition would exploit the Plot in order to bring about the 
chief minister’s downfall. Anxiety about Catholicism would not end with Danby though. The 
nation next turn its attentions to Charles’ Catholic brother and heir presumptive to the 
throne. Many feared that a Catholic succession would inevitably bring about the ruin of 
Protestant England. In response to these fears, the solution of excluding him from the line of 
succession would be vigorously pursued by members of a political group known as the 
Whigs. The start of this campaign for James’ exclusion effectively marked the beginning of 
the Exclusion Crisis.  
 
Halifax would find himself embroiled in this Crisis against the Whigs. This chapter 
discusses his rejection of Exclusion. It will contrast Halifax’s approach with that of the Whigs 
to the problem of a Catholic successor. As will be seen, Halifax’s approach was based more 
upon a consideration of the more immediate circumstances, whereas the Whig approach 
was based upon a conviction of their foresight. Halifax’s rejection of the Whig’s approach in 
favour of a more pragmatic one was entirely consistent with his aphorisms, which show his 
notable scepticism of human foresight. Halifax believed that one’s foresight had its limits, 
and it was folly to rely too heavily on this flawed faculty. Aside from the inherent flaws of 
Exclusion, it will also be seen that Halifax rejected it in order to check Whig ambitions to 
become kingmakers. His concern about these ambitions was also consistent with his 
aphorisms. In his short pieces, Halifax was not only sceptical about the capabilities of the 
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human mind, but he believed that human self-interest, if left uncheck, would have 
undesirable consequences for existing political arrangements. 
 
The fall of Danby and the advent of a succession crisis 
 
Danby’s fall came in the advent of the infamous Popish Plot. The Plot, “revealed” 
principally by one Titus Oates in 1678, alleged that there existed a Catholic plot to 
assassinate the King and rise up against English Protestants.104 The Plot was entirely 
fictitious, but there were certain developments that gave it an appearance of credibility. 
Edward Coleman, former secretary of James, was among those implicated in the Plot by 
Oates. His house was subsequently searched and among the papers found were 
incriminating letters dating from the mid-1670s pertaining to the advancement of the 
Catholic cause in England.105 Later in the year, Sir Edmund Godfrey, the JP who previously 
received Oates’ depositions, was found dead under suspicious circumstances. It was 
presumed by many that he had been murdered by Catholics to prevent vital information 
about the Plot from being exposed. To many, it seemed that Oates’ revelations did have 
credibility. Even some of Charles’ top advisors were initially prone to believing this.106 
 
The Plot generated a heightened sense of anti-Catholic paranoia. The opposition in 
Parliament exploited this against Danby’s government, particularly attacking its keeping up 
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of the standing army.107 The catalyst for the minister’s downfall, however, came in the form 
of Ralph Montagu. Montagu was recalled unceremoniously from his ambassadorship in 
Paris, and when he tried to seek compensation from Danby, the chief minister refused.108 
Montagu’s response to this rejection was to have disastrous consequences for Danby. The 
former ambassador had in his possession damaging letters showing that Danby had been 
involved in negotiations with France for subsidies earlier in 1678. These negotiations also 
took place at a time when the government was asking parliamentary grants to prepare a 
war against France. Acting in concert with members of the opposition and the French, 
Montagu exposed these letters in Parliament.109 In the debacle that ensued, Danby was 
accused of association with Popery and attempting to introduce arbitrary government.110 At 
a time when anti-Catholic sentiments reached its height, Montagu’s evidence provided 
sufficient material to bring down and impeach the minister. Despite Charles’ efforts to save 
his servant, the opposition was successful in effecting Danby’s fall. The articles of 
impeachment were voted in December 1678, and in April the following year he was sent to 
the Tower, where he languished until 1684.111 
 
After Danby’s fall, Charles decided to reconstitute his Privy Council. In choosing his 
new Council, he included members of the opposition in the hopes of dividing them.112 
Charles included Halifax in this new Council, though with great reluctance and only under 
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strenuous arguments from his other advisors.113 Halifax played his part in Danby’s downfall 
as a member of the opposition. He was among those who admitted that they would exploit 
the Popish Plot in order to break up the political alliance between Danby and James, and 
also to deprive Charles of the parliamentary grants needed to maintain his standing army.114 
In taking such a course, Halifax, as mentioned before, was possibly fearful that Danby’s 
continued prominence would eventually lead to the introduction of a more absolutist 
government. Brown further pointed out that the eventual discovery of Danby’s dealings 
with France behind the nation’s back would have justified the Plot’s exploitation from 
Halifax’s point of view.115 Regardless of the motivations for his actions, Halifax would 
acquire what Brown called, “a responsible ministerial perspective” after being admitted into 
this Privy Council. As a result, his political priorities shifted.116 This was much to Charles’ 
advantage, for no sooner had one problem passed than another came into view. 
 
With Danby gone, the spotlight eventually turned to the Duke of York. The 
heightened fears over Popery remained and there was a belief that James, being a Catholic 
heir to the throne, was an encouragement to any Catholic plot which sought the King’s 
assassination.117 This line of interpretation was formally endorsed by the Commons on 27 
April 1679.118 More significantly, James himself became implicated in Coleman’s 
incriminating letters, thereby directly linking the royal Duke to the Popish Plot conspiracy.119 
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National anxiety over a Catholic succession now came into limelight. Concern over James’ 
Catholic religion was not new, and it was an issue that cropped up even before 1679.120 
However, the Popish Plot further fuelled anxieties about this and his likely succession to the 
throne. Many feared that the ruin of Protestant England would inevitably follow the Duke’s 
crowning. As Harris has shown clearly, those who feared the prospect of James’ reign drew 
from examples in history as well as the present. The English were for instance reminded of 
the atrocities committed upon Protestants during Catholic Mary I’s reign.121 Other examples 
of Catholic cruelty were also drawn from other events in history, such as during the Thirty 
Years War.122 Then there were some who looked to absolutist France as another indicator of 
what England would look like under a Catholic monarch. Under such a monarch, it was 
feared that England would be ruled in an arbitrary style similar to Louis XIV’s France.123 
Indeed, the perceived association between Popery and arbitrary government had become 
cemented by the time of the Popish Plot.124 In the eyes of many, James’ succession would 
bring both to England.  
 
A new political force would emerge with the aim of preventing this grim future by a 
radical remedy. The Whigs, as they were later known, looked to many solutions, but many 
would choose to advocate the preventive measure of excluding James from the line of 
succession. The Whigs were opposed by those who were later known as the Tories, who 
rejected Exclusion as a solution to the problem of a Catholic successor. This political conflict 
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over James’ succession became a central issue over the years 1679 to 1681. This period of 
heated antagonisms over the succession eventually became known as the Exclusion Crisis.125 
Three Exclusion Parliaments would sit during this period. Each prepared an Exclusion Bill to 
effectively sever James from the line of succession. The first and third Exclusion Bills never 
progressed past the Commons due to dissolutions. The second Bill in 1680 passed the 
Commons but was immediately voted out by the Upper House. As will be shown below, 
Halifax himself played a notable role in opposing Exclusion. 
 
Halifax’s general position on Exclusion 
 
Halifax served as Privy Councillor throughout this Crisis. In this capacity, he advised 
Charles as the government sought to diffuse the excited national climate and fend off 
attempts to alter the royal succession. He was particularly active in this role during the first 
year of the Crisis when he formed a short-lived “Triumvirate” with the Earls Sunderland and 
Essex.126 However, Halifax’s most prominent piece of service to Charles would be his open 
opposition to the second Exclusion Bill of 1680. Halifax’s opposition to Exclusion can be 
considered the key characteristic of his domestic politics at this time. His position was in line 
with that of the Tories insofar as he rejected it as a viable solution to the nation’s fears.  
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Halifax was not, however, oblivious to the prevailing concerns at the time. He was 
aware of and conformed to the heightened anxieties caused by the Popish Plot. In 
investigating the Plot in April 1679, Halifax was described as being among those “eminent in 
pleading for indulgence to tender-conscienced Protestants, and severity against Papists.”127 
Outwardly, Halifax acquiesced fully in the truth of the Plot, as he wrote to his brother in July 
that year, “I cannot blame you for being a little stirr’d to see men’s unbelief so ill placed as 
to think there is no plott here.”128 However, at a time when rejecting the Plot’s veracity was 
considered anathema, it is suggestive that Halifax would entertain even the possibility of its 
being a fabrication.129 As Halifax told his fellow colleague in government, Sir William 
Temple, “the plot must be handled as if it were true, whether it were so or no, in those 
points that were so generally believed by city or country as well as both houses”.130 This 
would suggest that Halifax had his doubts about the truth of the Plot but believed it to be in 
the government’s best interest to conform to the prevailing anxieties.131 
 
Despite his possible scepticism of the Plot’s veracity, Halifax did share the common 
apprehension of having a Catholic successor in James. As mentioned above, his distrust of 
James was already visible by 1673, and in 1680 he acknowledged that the royal Duke for 
being a Catholic must “sufferr [sic]”.132 But on the issue of the succession he disagreed with 
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the Exclusionists.  Whereas the Exclusionists wished to repudiate entirely the rightful 
inheritance of the heir presumptive, Halifax advocated for less radical solutions, such as 
placing legal limitations on the powers of a future Catholic monarch.133 Halifax’s hostile 
stance to Exclusion could be seen early on in the Crisis. After the prospect of disinheriting 
James became a point of parliamentary discussion in April 1679, Halifax strongly opposed it. 
As Bishop Burnet recalled, “both Tillotson and I, who thought we had some interest in lord 
Halifax, took great pains on him, to divert him from opposing it [Exclusion] so furiously as he 
did.” As Burnet further wrote, Halifax was to become “the champion against the 
exclusion.”134 
 
Halifax’s rejection of Exclusion was characteristic in two ways in the context of his 
aphorisms. It was characteristic in the sense that it aligned with his scepticism of human 
foresight; and it was characteristic given his views of human nature. The former will be 
elaborated first. The objections to Exclusion did not devolve into a single category. There 
were many Tories who, out of constitutional scruple or their loyalty to the Crown, were 
abhorrent of the mere notion of disinheriting James from the line of succession.135 There 
were others still who objected to it on the more practical grounds that it would lead to 
another civil war.136 Halifax was in the latter category. He did not attack Exclusion on 
principle, and he would even concede that Parliament “rather has a power yn nott” to 
disinherit James.137 But he was sceptical about the appropriateness of the measure under 
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the current circumstances. He thought it was too strong a remedy. As he wrote to his 
political colleague Sir Thomas Thynne in October 1680, “if there is any possibility of making 
ourselves safe by lower expedients, I had rather use them, than venture upon so strong a 
remedy, as the disinheriting the next heir of the Crown.”138 Halifax saw inherent risks in 
such a radical measure. He alluded to Exclusion as a cure that was as harmful as the disease 
it was curing. In the same letter, he lamented to his friend about the precarious path the 
Exclusionists were leading the nation. “A fine world, and a happy prospect of things, when 
our remedies are little less to be feared than our disease”.139  
 
As hinted above, Halifax did not oppose Exclusion on the grounds of legality. Rather, 
he rejected the Exclusionist viewpoint that the measure was necessary and expedient. This 
is an important distinction to make because the arguments for the necessity of Exclusion 
rested upon a strong claim about the future. It was characteristic of Halifax to reject such 
claims. His aphorisms showed a notable scepticism about the reliability of human foresight. 
He acknowledged that the human mind was limited in assessing a situation beyond what 
was more immediate. A comparative discussion of these contrasting viewpoints will provide 
greater context to Halifax’s rejection of Exclusion in this regard. 
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Whig claims about the future 
 
The Exclusionists’ claims about the future can be seen in the arguments they used to 
justify disinheriting James. These often gravitated towards the prediction that James’ reign 
would almost inevitably result in the weakening or destruction of England’s Protestant and 
constitutional foundations. In the first place, pamphleteer Charles Blount argued that a 
Catholic successor in England was bound to violate any promises to preserve the Protestant 
religion and to rule by law. “If ever a Popish Successor comes amongst you, let his promises 
of keeping your Religion and Laws, or of his Conversion, be never so plausible, credit ‘em 
not; for if you do, you will infallibly be deceiv’d, and in time find them to be but like the Bait 
to a Mouse-trap.” Rather, such a successor would seek to rule by a standing army without 
Parliament, and then “he and his Council will Levy his Arbitrary Taxes, and his Army shall 
gather them for him.” Exclusion was seen as the most expedient solution to preventing this 
grim future that would follow a Catholic successor. As Blount himself reasoned, “you may 
much easier prevent the Distemper at first, than remedy it when it has once got a Head”.140 
Another pamphleteer similarly considered it as certain that Popery and arbitrary 
government would follow in the wake of a Catholic successor. As the author rhetorically 
asked their readers, “will such a Successor, think you, have so much Love for another 
Religion as his own, or for those of another Profession (whom by his Perswation he is 
obliged to esteem all damned Hereticks) as for those of his own”. It was logical that such a 
successor would seek to extirpate those “Hereticks”. As the author continued, “will it not 
naturally follow, that he will advance the one and discountenance and depress the 
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other.”141 The main assumption here was that once a Catholic successor sat on the throne, 
they would invariably bring disaster to Protestant England. This assumption was digested 
and taken for granted in other pamphlets. For instance, Thomas Hunt wrote that once 
James succeeded to the throne, “he must be a Slave to one part of the People, to Destroy 
the other.”142 In another pamphlet, W. G. Gent argued that such a radical solution as 
Exclusion was justified whenever “there can be no safety, but general Ruin and Destruction 
expected from the next Successor.”143 As can be seen here, all these Exclusionist pamphlets 
make a claim about the future. This claim was that James’ reign would almost certainly 
undermine or destroy the Protestant and constitutional foundations of England. 
 
This belief can be seen within the debates in Parliament too. The Exclusionists’ 
expression of this can be vividly seen during the second Exclusion Parliament in 1680. 
During a debate on 11 November, an objection to Exclusion was made on the grounds that it 
amounted to a punishment of the Duke for nothing more than “his being perverted to 
Popery from the Protestant Religion.”144 To this objection, the Exclusionists insisted that the 
measure was to prevent the likely ruin that James would bring once he became king. Sir 
William Jones argued that “this Bill is not a punishment without hearing the Duke… We do 
not punish the Duke as a Criminal, but we are preventing the Evil that is likely to befall us 
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from that Religion he professes.”145 Sir Francis Winnington argued in stronger terms that “if 
an ancient family might possibly be ruined by the eldest son, it is not unjust to disinherit 
him. The Parliament does see, that, if a Popish Prince comes to the Crown, the Kingdom will 
be ruined”.146 Others, such as John Trenchard believed that Exclusion was not an act of 
injustice against the Duke because of the gravity of the implications should he succeed.  
“There is a great difference betwixt putting a man barely out of his Right, and where there is 
danger that he will involve the Nation in misery.”147 In all these examples, Exclusion was not 
seen as unjust or unjustified; it was justified as simply a preventative for the “Evil that is 
likely to befall us.” But as a preventative, it was premised upon the prediction that James 
would likely bring ruin to Protestant England if he came to the throne. 
 
To be sure, alternative solutions such as limiting the powers of a Catholic monarch 
also rested on this assumption of a future threat from James. Indeed, the explicit purpose of 
such limitations was “that he [a Catholic successor] may be disabled to do any harm.”148 
However, the pursuit for Exclusion was premised on a stronger claim of the future, and 
hence relied more on the foresight of the human mind. This was because the Exclusionists 
insisted on the additional claim that James would ultimately be able to shake off any 
alternative restrictions once he succeeded. Their prediction was not only that James would 
bring ruin should he succeed; but that as long as he succeeded, nothing could be done to 
restrain him from bringing this ruin. This was true of placing legal limitations on James’ royal 
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powers. As Blount argued, “if you think to bind and fetter him by Laws, that will be no better 
than the wise men of Gotham’s hedging in the Cuckow; for when he (as all other Popish 
Kings do) governs by an Army, what will all your Laws signifie.”149 This rhetoric was mirrored 
during the debates in the House of Commons. During the first Exclusion Parliament in 1679, 
Charles had made himself clear on 30 April that he would support the idea of limitations. 
Such a scheme would deprive a Catholic monarch powers over the established church and 
substantially increase the powers of Parliament at the same time.150 These proposals were 
closely in line with what Halifax, among other Counsellors, was recommending at the 
time.151 Charles’ proposals were ultimately rejected. The Exclusionists distrusted the 
sincerity of the King.152 But aside from this distrust, they also believed that James’ Catholic 
ambitions and power would not be bound by these laws. As Richard Hampden argued on 11 
May, “for us to go about to tie a Popish Successor with Laws for preservation of the 
Protestant Religion, is binding Sampson with withes; he will break them when he is 
awake.”153 John Swynfin argued similarly. “Consider what a new-converted King will do. He 
will throw away all his Power and Treasure into the Pope’s Arms, who governs him; and can 
you think that those Laws will do you any good against a Popish Successor, when he comes 
to the Crown?”154 As can be seen here, there was an impression among the Exclusionists 
that it was impossible to restrain James by legal limitations once he became king. 
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Nor were these limitations the only alternative remedy proposed. During the ill-fated 
Oxford Parliament of March 1681, the expedient of establishing a regency during James’ 
reign was proposed. This remedy would allow James to succeed as King in name only while a 
regent governed in his stead.155 Again, this expedient was rejected in favour of Exclusion. 
One of the main objections to a regency was that it was impossible to separate royal power 
from James once he became King. Sir William Pulteney argued, for instance, that “our Law 
will not endure it to divide the Person of the King from the Power.”156 The belief was that as 
long as James held the title of King, he could always defy his restrictions or restore himself 
back to practical power. As Jones argued, “but if you do not exclude the Duke's title by Law, 
the Duke is King still, and then learned Lawyers will tell you, that, by the 1st Hen. VII, all 
incapacity is done away by his being King.”157 Others such as Sir Nicholas Carew feared that 
James as King would simply defy his restrictions under a regency, which might render 
Protestant self-defence traitorous. “I would be satisfied, if the Duke will not submit to that, 
whether those who fight against him are not Traytors to the Law?”158 Winnington argued 
that a regency to separate James’ royal power was a legal contradiction that would void the 
restrictions placed upon him. As he said, “Acts of Parliament against Common-sense are 
void in themselves; to make a man King, and not suffer him to exercise kingly power, is a 
contradiction.” For this reason, Winnington remained firm on his support for Exclusion. “If 
the Duke comes to the Crown a Papist, he brings merum Imperium along with him”, and a 
regency would not restrain James’ power in any way. As he continued, “we have no security 
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in Law by this Expedient. You take away no authority from the Duke, should he be King. 
Therefore I hope the Bill of Exclusion will pass”.159 From the Exclusionist perspective, James’ 
reign would likely bring disaster to Protestant England and no alternative restrictions could 
prevent this once he was on the throne. This meant that preventing James’ succession was 
the strongest available solution for the Exclusionists. In this sense, the push for Exclusion 
was premised upon a stronger claim about the future than the advocacy for limitations or a 
regency. The latter category allowed for the possibility of restraining a Catholic monarch 
once on the throne, whilst the former went further and rejected this possibility. 
 
Halifax’s scepticism of claims about the future 
 
Halifax was not persuaded by the arguments about the supposed necessity of 
Exclusion. He stood by his opposition to it throughout the Crisis. His crowning moment 
against Exclusion was when it was brought up to the House of Lords on 15 November 1680. 
From there, ensued a fierce debate in the House over the Bill, with Halifax arguing against it 
and Shaftesbury and other Exclusionist lords for it. During this debate, Halifax argued for a 
more pragmatic assessment of the Bill’s merits. He made clear that disinheriting James from 
the succession was neither expedient nor necessary. From a fragmented report of this 
debate, Halifax invoked the dreaded spectre of another civil war. He argued that Exclusion 
would be disputed by James himself and that the Duke had at his disposal a considerable 
degree of support from Scotland and Ireland.160 This corroborates another account given in 
the Life of James the Second. According to this account, Halifax pointed out the imprudence 
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of declaring “the Duke an enemy of the State, who was actually at the head of a powerfull 
Nation, where there was an Army too; that in Ireland his power was no less considerable 
where there was 10, or 15 Papists for one Protestant, that he had great interest in the Fleet 
and credit with the English Troops.”161 Moreover, Halifax believed that Exclusion was not 
the only solution. To begin with, Parliament could simply refuse James any revenue and 
then “hee cannot doe much hurt”.162 Halifax expressed his confidence that an appropriate 
expedient to deal with a Catholic successor could be drawn up and gave his own assurances 
for it. Hence a few days later, George Vernon, a Whig MP, mentioned that “I heard he 
[Halifax] should say, ‘That if the Lords would reject the Bill, he would engage, on his Honour, 
to bring in such a Proposition as would please the Parliament.’” Such reassurances did not 
convince Vernon, who continued that "I would rather have his head, than any Popish Lord's 
in the Tower." 163  Nonetheless this sheds light on Halifax’ point of view. To him, Exclusion 
was neither practical under the current circumstances nor was it absolutely necessary, as 
alternatives could still be devised. 
 
The House debate over the second Exclusion Bill was tense and lasted for much of 
the day. According to a second-hand anecdote, there was a point at which it seemed as 
though swords would be drawn. If violence were to break out, Halifax was to be a prime 
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target. Accordingly, one of the lords present “got as near to the marquis of Halifax as he 
could, being resolved to make sure of him, in case any violence had been offered”. Some 
other Exclusionists present were of a similar mind.164 Fortunately, the debate ended without 
the clashing of swords. By appearance, the House was swayed by Halifax’s oratory as the Bill 
was thrown out by a vote of 63 to 30 on the first reading. The votes, however, were largely 
predetermined by the strong royalist composition within it. As such, the Bill would likely not 
have passed with or without Halifax’s intervention.165 Nonetheless, contemporary opinion 
credited him with the defeat of the Bill that day and his efforts did probably lead to its 
speedy rejection.166 
 
It was characteristic of Halifax that he would be unconvinced by the supposed merits 
of Exclusion. From his aphorisms, it can be seen that he was an empiricist at heart. His 
thoughts about action and conduct indicated his belief that human aspirations should be 
tempered by considerations of the present circumstances. As he reflected in one aphorism, 
“men apply that thought to compass this or that thing, and are very able in the means to the 
end, without considering whether the end is worth making up of the means.”167 In another 
aphorism, Halifax similarly wrote, “When a designe is once entertained, the mind is tempted 
to carry it on with skill, and it gathering strength by continuance, men have not time to 
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consider that it would bee more adviseable to let it quite alone.”168 As suggested here, 
Halifax’s aphorisms encouraged a mentality of practical doubt in one’s goals. Rather than 
doggedly pursuing them, people should constantly doubt the efficacy of their aspirations 
based on considerations of practical reality. This empirical attitude lines up with his 
rejection of Exclusion. Halifax did not reject Exclusion as a solution, but he emphasised 
James’ defendable claim to the Crown and the support he could gather in defending that 
claim; should Exclusion pass, James had the ability to fight for his right with armed support. 
From this assessment of the political circumstances, Exclusion was still a remedy to the 
threat of a future Catholic successor, but it came at the cost of another civil war mere 
decades after a previous one. This was likely what Halifax meant when he wrote to Thynne 
in October 1680 describing the disinheriting of James as “so strong a remedy”. 
 
However, Halifax’s rejection of Exclusion aligned with his aphorisms in a way that 
went beyond his empirical character. In so far as Exclusion was an extreme precaution 
based upon human foresight, he was consistent in rejecting it. As he wrote in one aphorism,  
It would discourage a man from taking precautions, if hee considered how often they 
are disappointed. Precautions do as often invite a mischief as prevent it. A midling 
foresight is the best; to foresee at too great a distance, doth often recoyle upon 
us.169  
Halifax here warned against a heavy reliance on human foresight because precautions borne 
from it can disappoint and produce additional problems. In other words, human foresight 
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was imperfect, and it was folly to place too much emphasis on it. Indeed, Halifax was a deep 
believer of the limitations of the human mind and part of this belief was his scepticism of 
the powers of human foresight. As he reflected in one aphorism, “there are some such very 
great Foreseers, that they grow into the Vanity of pretending to see where nothing is to be 
seen. He that will see at too great a distance, will sometimes mistake a bush for a Horse”.170 
Just as there were limits to how far the eye can clearly see, he believed that there were 
limits to how far the human mind can reliably predict. Halifax railed at those who refused to 
accept this and attempt to foreclose all future eventualities in their schemes and actions. 
“Men’s saying, they will leave nothing to Chance is impertinent, because it is impossible; 
Chance is a Goddesse, and will not bee so used.”171 To Halifax, human foresight had 
fundamental limitations. It could not predict all future eventualities with absolute certainty. 
Unsurprisingly, he discouraged a heavy reliance on it. 
 
An attention to the more immediate circumstances provided a better guide for 
actions than the speculations of a fallible human foresight. As one aphorism said, 
Chance and accidents are such gamesters in Politicks, that tho’ no wise statesmen 
will bett too much on their side, yet they will consider them so farr, as to bound their 
foresight, within a reasonable distance. The best schemes may not only be 
impertinent, but dangerous too, by being too remote.172 
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Halifax accepted that chance and unforeseen accidents must always be real factors in 
politics. It was wise to exercise some foresight to mitigate the risks of these factors. But an 
individual courts with folly when they obsess in refining their policies to the impossible point 
of encompassing all these accidents. As Halifax wrote within another aphorism, “the 
Prospect of a wise Man will be bounded. A Man may so overdo it in looking too far before 
him, that he may stumble the more for it.”173 Here, Halifax explained more fully why it was 
dangerous to focus solely on human foresight and why “the best schemes” may be 
dangerous by being too remote. An obsession to speculate what was to come distracts the 
individual from the more immediate pitfalls that could stumble them. Predictions were 
always liable to being wrong, but current circumstances had real impacts. All these notions 
were consistent with Halifax’s rejection of Exclusion. The Whigs pushed for Exclusion based 
on arguments of necessity borne from strong claims about the future. Halifax, however, was 
unconvinced by such arguments; and rather than focusing on the remote and speculative 
threat of a future Catholic successor, he chose to prioritise on avoiding the more immediate 
danger of a civil war. More than simply empiricism, Halifax’s rejection of Exclusion was also 
consistent with his sceptical attitude with regards to human foresight. 
 
Checking Whig ambitions 
 
Halifax’s opposition to Exclusion was also characteristic given his views of human 
nature. Aside from considering the inherent flaws of Exclusion, Halifax also rejected it to 
check Whig ambitions to become kingmakers. According to the fragments of his speech, 
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Halifax raised the concern that after Exclusion, there would be another bill to extend it 
further. As he argued, “the bill is not Calculated rightly if this doth passe another bill” and “is 
brought to Goe farther.”174 Halifax here was implying his suspicion that some of the Whigs 
would seek to put another candidate on the throne after disinheriting James. This was not 
entirely ungrounded since some of the Whigs did desire to put Charles’ illegitimate son, the 
Duke of Monmouth on the throne.175 Halifax suspected as much in Monmouth and also 
others such as the Duchess of Portsmouth for her own son. After the second Exclusion Bill 
was rejected, a subsequent proposal was brought up by Shaftesbury that the King divorce 
the Queen and remarry in order to produce a legitimate Protestant heir. This would amount 
to a less direct way of preventing James from succeeding the throne. On this proposal, 
Halifax alluded to the personal ambitions of those who were trying to deny James’ 
succession. It was reported by a French dispatch that, 
“Lord Halifax, wishing to undo the effect of what had been proposed by Lord 
Shaftesbury about the exclusion of the Duke of York and the divorce, said that all 
these proposals were based only on private interest, and had no object but to bring 
about the success of unjust and chimerical pretensions. He said much else which 
could only apply to the Duke of Monmouth, and he added that there were some 
more secret and dangerous designs, and insinuated, without naming the Duchess of 
Portsmouth, that she had views for her son.”176  
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Halifax expressed these suspicions more fully in an interview with the Dutch ambassador in 
December 1680. In the interview, Halifax wanted to warn William of Orange against trusting 
the Whigs and their push for Exclusion. By appearance, William stood to gain if James was 
excluded. His wife, Princess Mary, was next in line after James and there was a group among 
the Exclusionists who wanted her to succeed if Exclusion was successful. On the other hand, 
Monmouth and his supporters might also stand in the way of Mary’s succession and by 
extension William’s own elevation within the English hierarchy.177 Therefore, the Prince had 
reason to be both anxious at and interested in the outcome of the Whigs’ campaign.178 
Halifax warned that Exclusion would be of no benefit to the Prince. He argued that excluding 
James from the throne was only the first step that would set up a precedence for Parliament 
to pass further exclusions. All this, he suspected, would open the way for Monmouth to be 
placed on the throne.179 In rejecting Exclusion, then, Halifax was also in part checking the 
Whigs’ supposed ambitions to control the royal succession and become effective 
kingmakers. 
 
Halifax’s concern about the Exclusionists’ ambitions was characteristic in the context 
of another notable theme in his aphorisms. This was his belief that people’s actions were 
guided more by human nature than by reason. His aphorisms were rife with his views about 
this. Two scathing examples convey his general thoughts about the nature of humanity: 
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A Centaure is no Monster, what ever hee is thought, there being few men whose 
bigger half is not Beast. Men are the Masters of the Mint, and so take upon them to 
coyne Beast into a Rationall Creature. 
Men wonder to see others unreasonable, when the greater cause of wonder is 
to see that they are reasonable. The reasonable man is the monster to be stared 
at. It is the reasonable man is the dissenter, taking the church in its primitive 
signification.180 
That Halifax believed human nature predominated in one’s behaviour was a point that has 
been well addressed by Brown in his own discussion of Halifax’s aphorisms. With supporting 
evidence from the collections, he argued that “it was evident to Halifax’s observation of 
men’s actual behaviour that they were guided more often by nature and passion than 
reason.”181 For Halifax, then, human nature was an inseparable and often dominating aspect 
of the human character. 
 
More relevant to the current context with the Whigs, Halifax believed that in any 
conflict, humans, guided by their self-interest, had a tendency to take their victories to their 
extreme conclusion. As he wrote in one aphorism, 
Men rise in their desires, and the first end on both sides going no further than self 
defense, grows to offend and to oppress, when they are under the temptation of 
having sufficient power for it.182 
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Because individuals often yield to their self-interest they are often apt to take self-defence 
beyond its proper boundaries. Once their own safety and dominance is secured, their 
desires grow which give them the temptation “to offend and to oppress” the fallen party. 
Halifax expressed a similar thought, though in a strictly political context in another 
aphorism. “It is the same in the clashing of all jurisdiction as it is between Prince and people; 
the prevailing party gets more and carryes the victory beyond the thing contested for.”183 
Halifax’s low estimation of people’s ability to curb their self-interest in a political contest can 
be seen in his distrust of the Exclusionists’ ambitions. 
 
Moreover, this human tendency to follow self-interest to its extreme conclusion also 
has implications in the realm of English politics. From Halifax’s point of view, the English 
government was a limited government in the sense that it depended upon a balance of 
power between it and its people.184 Under this arrangement, it was not in the interest of the 
body politic to allow unbounded power to both parties. Doing so either leads to government 
tyranny or anarchy. It was necessary, in this political context, to check human self-interest 
so that neither side completely prevails over the other in their contests against each other. 
Quoting the above aphorism in full, Halifax wrote that, 
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Men rise in their desires, and the first end on both sides going no further than self 
defense, grows to offend and to oppress, when they are under the temptation of 
having sufficient power for it. As the government is limited, wise men will wish, that 
the success of either side may be so too. And the mean is so nice, between 
defending our own Liberty, and taking away our adversarys’, that there have been 
very few examples of it.185 
For Halifax, it should be in the interest of “wise men” to “wish that the success of either 
side” in a political contest under a limited government be restrained. All this translates to 
the necessity of checking human nature in the political arena so that it did not disrupt the 
harmony of a political arrangement. Halifax’s opposition to Exclusion partly from a suspicion 
of Whig ambitions to control the royal succession was consistent with this. It points to a 
concern to prevent human self-interest from fundamentally affecting the balance between 
Crown and Parliament. 
 
The aftermath of Halifax’s opposition 
 
Halifax paid a bitter price for his actions against Exclusion. He became the target of 
intense Whig hostility for the role he played in throwing out the 1680 Bill. The Commons 
addressed Charles to expel him from the Privy Council and he was branded a “Promoter of 
Popery, and an Enemy to the King and Kingdom.”186 Adding to this was the additional blow 
that Halifax felt many of his political allies had abandoned him after his open opposition to 
Exclusion. “I must only cast about for a new set of friends”, as he wrote to his brother in 
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December 1680, “for my old ones have been so very zealous for the publick that some of 
them thought it as meritorious to persecute me as others believed it excusable to desert 
me.”187 Nonetheless, Halifax endured his situation with an outward stoicism. When he 
wrote to his brother about the possibility of further attacks from the Commons, Halifax 
wrote that “I have recourse still to my small philosophy, and have not only the comfort of 
innocence to support me, but the impossibility of avoiding any strokes of this kind without 
such indecencys… as I can never digest.”188 
 
Endured Halifax did. After the dissolution of the Oxford Parliament in March 1681, 
the last of the Exclusion Parliaments, Charles would never summon another parliament for 
the short remainder of his lifetime. Despite all the seeming clamour for Exclusion, the Duke 
of York’s right to the throne remained unscathed. The Exclusionist Whigs, for all their 
hostility, were unwilling to fight another civil war for their cause, and Charles had stood firm 
on the matter of preserving the succession.189 After the dissolution, the Whigs could do little 
to promote Exclusion outside the framework of a parliament. Thereafter, the fortunes of the 
Whigs would see a dramatic reversal. Charles’ government subsequently introduced a series 
of reactionary measures against their leadership and their bases of support. Halifax had 
survived an ordeal by the passing of the Exclusion Crisis. Still ranking among Charles’ Privy 
Councillors, he would play an active part in the government’s reactionary measures. In this 
political climate, Halifax’s conduct continued to resonate with the values of his aphorisms. 
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Chapter 4 – The Counterattack on the Whigs 
 
Charles’ dissolution of the Oxford Parliament in March 1681 marked a new phase in 
the fortunes of the Whig interest. Soon after dissolving Parliament, the King’s government 
went on to enact a series of measures to weaken the Whigs’ political power. Halifax would 
participate in these policies against the Whigs. As will be shown, Halifax’s actions came at a 
time when England required national stability in order to deal with a crisis situation abroad. 
However, Halifax seemed content with merely weakening the Whigs as opposed to effecting 
their political demise. His conduct showed that he was opened to a national reconciliation 
between the party and Crown. Considering these factors, this chapter suggests that Halifax’s 
conduct against the Whigs at this time could be better described as attempts to diffuse 
Whig extremism rather than destroying the party as a whole. Furthermore, such conduct 
was entirely consistent with his aphorisms which were explicitly critical of extremist 
mentalities. It will be further shown that Halifax in his aphorisms believed such mentalities 
manifested itself specifically in political parties.  
 
Government suppression of the Whigs 
 
Soon after dissolving the Oxford Parliament, Charles followed it up with a declaration 
explaining his reasons for the dissolution. In this declaration Charles explained the reasons 
as being due to the intransigence of the Whigs, thereby laying the chief blame on them.190 
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Despite the trouble the recent Parliaments had caused him, Charles pledged to continue 
having frequent Parliaments as well as to rule according to the laws of the land and preserve 
England from Popery.191 This declaration inspired numerous addresses of thanks throughout 
the nation. Though there is good reason to doubt the genuineness of these addresses, they 
nonetheless served as propaganda showing the supposed support the government 
enjoyed.192 This public display of apparent support coincided with a sustained campaign to 
suppress the Whigs and their bases of support.  
 
The government measures against the Whigs largely comprised of two aspects. The 
first of these was to undermine Whig influence at the local level. This was done by a 
widespread purge of local office holders who were known to be Whig sympathisers and 
replacing them with those who were for the government’s interests or had defected from 
the Exclusionist cause.193 In purging Whig influence at the local level, the government also 
targeted the municipal corporations directly. This was achieved by acquiring their 
corporation charters and issuing new ones that allowed the Crown to appoint their officers. 
The acquisition of these charters often involved the threat of quo warranto proceedings 
whereby the Crown challenged the corporation’s right to exist. The City of London fought 
their quo warranto challenge unsuccessfully and numerous municipal corporations were 
induced to surrender their charters voluntarily under this threat. Through these purges, 
Whig influence within local government diminished significantly.194 
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The second aspect of these measures was an intensified persecution against 
Protestant Dissenters. Since the Exclusion Crisis, the Whigs were commonly associated with 
Protestant nonconformity. Indeed, a significant portion of Protestant Dissenters supported 
the exclusion of the Duke of York from the line of succession; while the Whigs for the most 
part supported the notion of religious toleration for them.195 Furthermore, many of the 
Whigs themselves came from nonconformist backgrounds.196 By 1681, the association 
between the Whigs and Dissenters was solidified in Tory propaganda and was encouraged 
by Charles himself.197 A natural consequence of this was that the fortunes of the one 
depended upon the other, and when the government struck back at the Whigs after 1681 
the Dissenters became an inevitable target. During this period of persecution, heavy fines 
were levied against nonconformity, which often led to imprisonment since many did not 
have the means to pay their fines. To add to this, many of those imprisoned during this 
period also perished in their cells.198   
 
Halifax was an active member of the government machinery during this period. He 
enjoyed a brief period of respite in the country after the Oxford Parliament, but returned to 
London in May 1681 to resume his role as Privy Councillor.199 In 1682 he was rewarded with 
a marquisate and thereafter served as Lord Privy Seal.200 As a member of the current 
government, Halifax did not publicly repudiate its policies. In fact, as will be shown below, 
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Halifax helped keep the government machinery moving. Even Foxcroft, who was generous in 
her interpretations whenever it came to the more unpleasant aspects of Halifax’s career, 
had to admit to his active participation in some of these policies.201  
 
Diffusing Whig extremism at a time of foreign crisis 
 
Halifax’s actions against the Whigs came against the backdrop of a foreign crisis. The 
catalyst for this crisis was French aggression against the Low Countries. This began when 
Louis XIV pressed his claims on Luxembourg in the Spanish Netherlands in March 1681. By 
the end of the year, Louis had taken Strasbourg and was laying siege to Luxembourg.202 
Under England’s 1680 defensive treaty with Spain, Charles would have been obligated to 
come to Spain’s aid. Accordingly, the Spanish and the Dutch were pressuring Charles to help 
check French aggression.203 The English nation, furthermore, was also predisposed to 
wanting to check French aggrandisement as well.204 However, Charles had already 
guaranteed England’s neutrality by a secret treaty with France, also concluded in March that 
year. Under this secret agreement, Charles pledged to not honour his obligations to the 
Spanish and it was also agreed that he would not call a parliament for such purposes. The 
Sun King on his side promised Charles subsidies over three years.205 As a result of these 
foreign entanglements, Charles found himself in a dilemma whereby he was publicly obliged 
to aid Spain against France and secretly required not to do so.206 
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Under such circumstances, Charles’ seemingly troubled domestic situation offered a 
smoke screen for inaction. If England was to assist the Spanish and the Dutch, a parliament 
would need to be summoned to obtain the necessary supplies for the purpose. However, 
one obvious obstacle stood in the way. This was the rift between the Crown and the Whigs. 
After the divisive experiences of the previous Exclusion Parliaments, many contemporaries 
came to believe that so long as the rift continued, a harmonious parliament was unlikely to 
happen much less the actual summoning of one. Hence when France took Strasbourg in 
October 1681, Halifax’s trusted friend, Sir John Reresby, recorded that “our King could 
afford them [the Dutch and Spanish] noe helpe without a Parlament to supply him with 
mony, which it was feared the present jealousies would either prevent, or, if they gave him 
mony, would not trust him with the disposal of it.”207 Charles himself used this prevailing 
climate to his advantage when William took it upon himself to convince the King to take 
action. During a visit to England back in July, William insisted that an understanding be 
reached between the King and the Whigs in order to deal with the foreign situation. Charles 
for his part emphasised to the Prince the delicacy of his present domestic situation. He 
expressed his concerns that the Exclusionists would continue in their demands if a 
parliament was called.208 The situation had not changed within Court by October as the Earl 
of Longford noted that Charles continued to blame his current circumstances on the 
“humour of the people being at present so factious.”209 To Charles’ advantage, the 
                                                          
207 Sir John Reresby, Memoirs of Sir John Reresby: The Complete Text and a Selection from his Letters, preface 
and notes by Mary K. Getter and W. A. Speck, ed. Andrew Browning (London: Royal Historical Society, 1991), p. 
233. 
208 The Life of King James, vol. 1, pp. 691-692; Jones, First Whigs, pp. 194-196. 
209 Earl of Longford to Ormonde, 25 October 1681, in Historical Manuscripts Commission, Calendar of the 
Manuscripts of the Marquess of Ormonde. K. P. preserved at Kilkenny castle, New Series vol. 6, (London: His 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1911), p. 208. 
79 
 
perception of Whig extremism was providing him pretext for foreign inaction, thereby 
helping him keep his agreement with Louis. 
 
Halifax, for his part, advocated checking French aggression. At this critical juncture, 
he was sympathetic to the foreign interests of the Dutch and Spanish, particularly the 
former. In June 1681, English diplomat Henry Sidney reported to William that Halifax was 
among those who desired the Prince and Charles to come to an understanding and that 
Halifax had made “great professions of his being entirely in your interest, and said, you were 
the only foundation one could build upon.”210 Halifax did not know that Charles had 
guaranteed England’s neutrality to Louis, so he held out hopes that the King would be 
forced into checking French aggression should it continue. In December 1681, Halifax wrote 
to his brother that “it is certain if the K. of France will not be perswaded to leave the town 
of Luxembourg at liberty, we are engaged here to call a Parliament.” But Halifax also knew 
that only a harmonious parliament could enable England to check the French, as he 
continued that, “in case that by a miracle we should grow wise and agree, the French might 
perhaps repent the having forced us into our right sense.“211 As this letter suggests, Halifax 
was also under the impression that England’s domestic troubles were hampering her ability 
to act in foreign policy. He did not despair, though, and he assured William in the same 
month that he would endeavour his utmost to resolve the current domestic troubles so as 
to prepare England’s foreign aid next. As he wrote to the Prince, “your Highnesse shall never 
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bee disappointed in the beleefe you have that I will contribute my endeavours… to all the 
publique ends that may put us in such a condition at home as may inable us to help our 
friends abroad.”212  
 
 In diagnosing England’s domestic deadlock, Halifax would have tended to see Whig 
extremism as the cause of this. He had blamed the Oxford Parliament’s dissolution on the 
irreconcilable divisions within it as he explained to his brother that “there were such 
foundations lay’d for heat and dispute, that the King thought it advisable to part with 
them.”213 Even as late in the foreign crisis as January 1682 Halifax wrote to William that a 
parliament was not likely to be conciliatory, because “wee have men here that will sacrifice 
every thing to their anger, besides that it is as much the interest of ill men to hinder an 
agreement, as it is of good men to promote it.”214 Very likely Halifax was in these instances 
referring to the extremism of the Whigs. This is abundantly clear if one accepted the 
attribution of the mid-1681 pamphlet Observations upon a Late Libel to Halifax.215 This 
pamphlet was written in defence of Charles’ declaration justifying the dissolutions of the 
previous two Parliaments. In it the author criticised the extremism of the Whigs as the 
principal reason for these dissolutions.  As the author defended Charles’ dissolution of the 
Oxford Parliament, they wrote that,  
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The Excesses of the Commons were beyond the cure of lower remedies, and there 
was no other choice left, than either to part with the Parliament, or lett the two 
Houses continue sitting in a State of Hostility hardly possible to be reconciled.216 
Even if the attribution of Observations is doubted, there is circumstantial evidence to 
suggest that Halifax was acutely aware of Whig extremism. More than most of his 
colleagues, he would have been particularly predisposed to perceive this. The Whigs had, 
after all, attempted a political revenge on him for his opposition to Exclusion in 1680.217 
Following those attacks, Halifax unsurprisingly blamed his unenviable situation on the 
extremism of the Whigs. Between January and March 1681, he had spoken about the 
“unjust severity of [the] Commons” to Reresby; written to his brother about the “infinite 
anger” of the Commons; and elsewhere expressed forebodings about confronting an “angry 
House of Commons” at Oxford.218 Therefore, when Charles dissolved the Oxford Parliament 
after the Commons had again insisted on Exclusion and rejected other alternatives, Halifax 
was already predisposed to agreeing with the King’s declaration about blaming Whig 
extremism. As such, it is highly probable that Halifax shared the contemporary belief that 
the Whigs’ extremism was the cause of the current deadlock. 
 
It was in this context of Whig extremism hampering England’s foreign policy that 
Halifax willingly participated in the government’s anti-Whig measures. During the foreign 
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crisis, these measures were numerous. He participated in the purging of Whig JPs and 
replacing them with Tories.219 He facilitated the execution of Whig Propagandist Stephen 
College and was also involved in the project to secure Shaftesbury’s indictment.220 His 
confidence in the latter design could be seen when he told Reresby that “ther would be 
enough [evidence] produced” against Shaftesbury to warrant hanging.221 Only when it 
seemed likely that a Whiggish grand jury would return ignoramus on Shaftesbury’s case did 
Halifax support his release as a sign of goodwill.222 Elsewhere he also served as a 
commissioner on the Commission for Ecclesiastical Promotions. The purpose of this 
commission was to ensure that all Church promotions went to staunch supporters of the 
King and Church.223 This particular appointment was one which Halifax also received some 
public censure for accepting.224 Given the prevailing circumstances and his sentiments, 
Halifax’s actions against the Whigs seemed natural at this time. He saw the need for England 
to check French aggression on the Continent, but he knew that this could not happen until 
the domestic deadlock at home was resolved. He very likely saw the Whigs as the main 
cause of this deadlock, so that attacking their political influence was a natural solution to it.  
 
Paralleling these considerations, Halifax’s attack on the Whigs was also consistent 
with the attitudes shown in his aphorisms. His short pieces show a deep concern of the 
consequences arising from one’s identification with infallibility. There is good reason to 
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believe that Halifax diagnosed this mentality in the Whigs. The author of Observations 
referred to this when they wrote that “there Seemeth to be no other Rule allowed by one 
sort of Men, than that they cannot erre, and that the King cannot be in the right.”225 Of the 
Whig’s push for Exclusion, the author was no less critical in a passage that deserves full 
quotation: 
But the truth is, these Men would impose upon us, that an act of Parliament will 
secure nothing they doe not like, and doe every thing they have a mind to: For 
instance, An Act for excluding the Duke is all-sufficient, An Act for limiting him 
impossible; An act of exclusion will secure all, All other Lawes are but Cobwebs not 
to be relyed upon. These Riddles are delivered to us with such authority, that wee 
are to receive them as Oracles, and it is become a Mortall Sinne for any Man to 
question the Sense of them.226 
Here the author expressed their scepticism of the Whig’s foresight, describing their ideas 
about the necessity of Exclusion as uncertain “riddles”. This scepticism was apparent in 
Halifax’s own aphorisms as shown in the previous chapter. More significantly, the author 
noted at the fanatical devotion of the Whigs to their ideas about Exclusion. Those “riddles” 
were being delivered with an air of infallibility, an “authority”, in which anyone who 
disagreed with them were guilty of “Mortall Sinne”. Again, the contentious attribution of 
Observations needs to be kept in mind, and it should be noted that the identification of the 
Whigs with radicalism was common among Tories at this time too.227 On the other hand, 
even considering the uncertainty of the pamphlet’s authorship, Halifax himself saw a similar 
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mentality in the Whigs as well. He had diagnosed this back in 1680, when he lamented to his 
brother at the intense ire he had provoked from the Exclusionists for “differing with them in 
some of their darling points, to wch they are at present so wedded that no reason can be 
admitted in contradiction.”228 Within Halifax’s aphoristic worldview, such an unsociable 
mentality presented dangers to the body politic. 
 
 The problem with claiming infallibility for one’s ideals was that such claims were 
always fallible. This view is apparent throughout his aphorisms. Halifax believed there were 
limits to the human mind, and this shows not only in his remarks about human foresight, 
but also in his acknowledgement that human ideas were always fallible. He had observed 
that several human ideas thought to be immoveable and fundamental were liable to 
exceptions or were abandoned at a later time. With respect to the sciences and philosophy 
he observed in one aphorism that, “Philosophy, astronomy, &c. have changed their 
Fundamentals as the Men of Art no doubt called them at the time.”229 In the case of religion 
it was similarly observed in another aphorism that “the Fundamentals of Divinity have been 
changed in several Ages of the World. They have made no difficulty in the several Councils, 
to destroy and excommunicate Men for asserting Things that at other Times were called 
Fundamentals.”230 Moral fundamentals, those precepts founded upon ideas about what was 
believed to be absolute good and bad were also flawed. This was because good and bad 
were not always fixed but changed with the circumstances. Hence Halifax reflected in one 
aphorism that, 
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It is a fundamental in Nature that the Son should not kill the Father, and yet the 
Senate of Venice gave a Reward to a Son who brought in his Father’s Head, according 
to a Proclamation.231  
Halifax would conclude that human ideas, far from being absolute, were in fact fallible, as 
he wrote “every thing that is created is Mortal, ergo all Fundamentals of human creation 
will die.”232 For him, claims to infallibility for one’s ideals and ideas were erroneous because 
it was not within the scope of the human understanding to come to absolute truth. 
 
 Humanity, however, did not know better; and the consequences were grave. Halifax 
observed how individuals, identifying their aspirations with the infallibility of their mistaken 
fundamental ideas, were inspired act out a myriad of unsociable actions against their fellow 
humans. For him, this was nowhere better seen than in wars for religion. In one aphorism, 
he reflected that, 
The reason why religion has occasioned such disturbances in the world, is because 
nothing else can bear men out, for falling out about they know not what. It 
introduces another kind of reasoning, which does not only excuse, but sanctify 
follyes, immoralitys, animositys, murther, &c. And there can never be an end of the 
consequences of that, which can never be understood.233 
Halifax acknowledged that religious ideas were in the domain of “they know not what” 
meaning that the human mind can never verify their absolute truths; yet religious fanatics 
mistakenly believe that such ideas were so infallible that they grant divine authority to or 
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“sanctify” acts of “follyes, immortalitys, animositys, murther”. For Halifax, unsociability and 
its more extreme forms, fanaticism and enthusiasm, arose exactly from this mistaken belief. 
Political ideals had the potential to inspire this unsociability in individuals too. As one 
aphorism said,  
The salus populi, if any is a fundamentall; but the world will seldome agree upon the 
definition of it; in the contests between King and the people they both generally take 
it for their Motto. A Club in a coffey house, by the multiplying glasse of their 
mistaken politiques, will call themselves the Nation.234 
Again, Halifax acknowledges a certain mystery behind such a fundamental as Salus Populi; 
the idea was there, but its exact manifestation could not exactly be known, hence everyone 
disagrees on it. Yet, there were those who claim to know exactly how this fundamental was 
defined and identify their goals with it, taking it up as their “Motto”. Inspired by a belief of 
infallibility from this identification, each group believes themselves the will and interest of 
the nation, or rather “call themselves the Nation”. This mentality has implications for the 
body politic. Such groups will conduct politics through a narrow worldview, a “multiplying 
glasse”, which saw anyone not of their belief as against their narrow definition of national 
interest. From this, came the same disastrous potential for individuals to fall out “about 
they know not what.” For Halifax, the erroneous belief of the infallibility of one’s ideals and 
aspirations carried dangerous consequences for the wider body politic. 
Such concerns inform Halifax’s criticisms about political parties in general. In his 
aphorisms he diagnosed this unsociable mentality in these ideological groupings. In the first 
place, he observed that parties already had a tendency to identify their ideals with 
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infallibility. However, such identifications were tenuous. As one aphorism said, “Every Party, 
when they find a Maxim for their turn, they presently call it a Fundamental, they think they 
nail it with a Peg of Iron, whereas in truth they only tie it with a wisp of Straw.”235 It should 
not be unsurprising, then, to see that Halifax saw in political parties that tendency for 
unsociability towards those not of their ranks. As he reflected in another aphorism, “the 
best Party is but a kind of a Conspiracy against the rest of the Nation. They put every body 
else out of their Protection.”236 In another aphorism he observed that parties, in their 
struggles against each other, forget their responsibilities in the wider community. “Whilst 
severall parties are at football, they will break all the windows in the town”.237 More 
relevant to the situation that Halifax was facing between 1681 and 1682 was the notion that 
domestic political parties would disregard foreign policy considerations in their ideological 
struggles with one another. As one aphorism remarked,  
It groweth to be the Master Thought; the Eagerness against one another at home, 
being a nearer Object, extinguisheth that which we ought to have against our foreign 
Enemies; and few Men’s Understanding can get above overvaluing the Danger that is 
nearest, in comparison of that more remote.238  
Therefore, Halifax perceived that same singular and unsociable mentality as that which 
came with one’s identification with infallibility.  
 Aside from considerations of foreign policy, Halifax’s attack on the Whigs was 
consistent with his deep concern of the consequences arising from one’s identification with 
infallibility. Furthermore, this concern also offers a way to understanding his moderation in 
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his attack on the Whigs. The concern shown in his aphorisms about political parties was 
largely about mentality and not so much the actual individuals. In line with this, Halifax did 
not seem to be committed to the Whig’s political demise. He seemed content to allow them 
to exist as long as they shed their uncompromising mentality. Accordingly, Halifax welcomed 
and encouraged reconciliation as the opportunities arose. One such opportunity came 
during the months of Shaftesbury’s imprisonment in 1681. Before a Whig grand jury 
returned a verdict of ignoramus on his case in November, there were fears among the party 
that his imprisonment was but the prelude to further rounds of arrests.239 This gave 
incentive for a compromise between the Crown and the Whigs. The latter offered to 
conduct themselves with moderation in exchange for the King granting them a general 
amnesty. Such suggestions began circulating in September, with talk that an amnesty should 
be given to all, including Danby and Shaftesbury and that the “King of England offer on his 
part to forget all, provided the parliament on theirs will change their conduct with regard to 
him.”240 Of such a design Halifax gave full support, with French ambassador Paul Barillon 
being informed that he “has this project in his head, and talks on every occasion, like a man 
who has no other design than to reconcile the King of England with his people.”241 As the 
foreign crisis reached its peak in February 1682, Halifax was also urging Charles to make the 
first move and call a parliament regardless of the Whigs. According to Reresby, Halifax 
argued to the King that the foreign situation demanded a parliament, and that there was 
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nothing to discourage it “but the fear that they [the Whigs] might fly upon high points [such 
as Exclusion]”. Halifax advised that if that were to happen the King could simply dissolve 
Parliament without impunity. But so long as Charles was willing to summon it, there was 
always the possibility of an agreement. If that should happen, Halifax reasoned that “his 
Majesty would then gain the great point to be united at home and formidable abroad.”242  
 
As suggested here, Halifax seemed content with allowing a more sociable Whig party 
to exist rather than being fully committed to their political demise. Brown summarised his 
conduct appropriately when he wrote that Halifax “was not, it seems, vindictive towards the 
Whigs; he wanted to remove their sting, not destroy them.”243 In these acts of moderation, 
Halifax was probably mindful of the current foreign situation and was sensible that the co-
operation of the Whigs was needed in calling a harmonious parliament to check French 
aggression. On the other hand, his nuanced conduct was in keeping with his attitudes shown 
in his aphorisms. They suggest a deep concern about singular and unsociable mentalities 
harmful to the body politic. Furthermore, his thoughts about political parties show that part 
of their danger lay in such mentalities. In view of this consistency, it is plausible to see 
Halifax’s conduct as working to diffuse the Whigs’ extremism, a mentality similar to that 
which he was concerned about in his aphorisms. 
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After the foreign crisis 
 
In the end Halifax was unable to facilitate the desired reconciliation. Such a 
reconciliation turned out altogether unnecessary. In March 1682, the French King 
voluntarily lifted his siege on Luxembourg, ostensibly so that the various German states 
could focus on a looming Turkish threat.244 The passing of this foreign crisis marked the end 
of Halifax’s short though notable effort at facilitating a national reconciliation. Charles' 
government continued its efforts to suppress the Whig opposition and their bases of 
support. Halifax continued his participation in these policies. He became further involved in 
the acquiring and reissuing of new corporation charters so as to give the Crown a greater 
control of over the municipal corporations. Accordingly, it was recorded that sixty-six of the 
new corporation charters passed through Halifax’s office while he was Lord Privy Seal from 
1682.245  
 
There were, however, signs that Halifax was not always fully compliant with the Tory 
programme to destroy the Whigs. One possible example was when Halifax vigorously 
attempted to delay the forthcoming quo warranto verdict as the Whigs were about to lose 
their London City charter in June 1683.246 Exact motivations for this is not apparent, but 
Ronald Hutton suggested that this was to allow room for negotiations between the two 
sides.247 Furthermore, it is also possible that some observers at court were detecting a 
certain independence in Halifax’s conduct that was not completely in line with the Tory 
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programme. This was the case for the Tory Duke of Ormonde, who re-entered English 
politics in 1682, after he was recalled from Ireland where he was serving as Lord 
Lieutenant.248 The next year in January 1683, he wrote to his son an account of the rivalling 
factions in the nation and said, 
We are now come under the three denominations of Tories, Whigs, and Trimmers. 
The first and last have patronage at Court. The language of the last is moderation, 
unity, and peace, joining with the Whigs in their care of Religion, and property, and 
with the Tories for Monarchy and a just and loyal prerogative.249 
 Ormonde suspected that those trimmers who were not in government think “the Earl of 
Halifax to be their Patron, and his converse gives cause to believe it.” In matters of actual 
policy, though, Ormonde knew better. “In consultation he, as yet, is in most things 
unanimous with the thoroughest Tories”, he wrote. Nonetheless, there were occasions 
where “when there is any difference of opinion, it [Halifax’s advice] seems to me to lead in 
the trimming Way.”250 As Ormonde suggested, though Halifax was in the main among the 
“thoroughest Tories”, he was not completely in line with the views of his Tory colleagues 
and had occasions in which he followed the “trimming Way”, which involved the idea of 
reconciling with the Whigs. Halifax, it would seem, continued to show glimpses of 
moderation towards the Whigs. The issue of the Whigs, however, was about to come to an 
effective end a few months after Ormonde wrote this letter. A new phase in Halifax’s 
politics was also about to begin. 
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Chapter 5 – Charles II’s Last Years 
 
The Whig threat largely passed away in the advent of the Rye House Plot revelations. 
In the resulting fallout, the Whig leadership effectively collapsed and its bases of support 
were dispersed. In his newfound security, Charles was able to act more independently than 
during the Exclusion Crisis. In this independence, however, Halifax became disturbed by 
Charles’ unconstitutional and Catholic leaning tendencies. This chapter will outline Halifax’s 
attempts to steer the King away from unpopular rule. As will be shown, Halifax did not idly 
observe those tendencies and on many occasions voiced his concerns to the King. He argued 
that it was prudential for Charles to avoid popular discontent. It will be shown that such 
practical advice from Halifax was characteristic, given his sceptical ideas about government 
authority expressed in his aphorisms. Halifax in his aphorisms believed that there were 
practical limitations in government authority regardless of its claims to unlimited power. 
Furthermore, it was the mood of a nation’s people that was the greatest factor making up 
those practical limitations. Within the worldview of Halifax’s aphorisms, it was prudent 
policy to acknowledge the practical limitations of government and not spark popular 
discontent when it could be avoided. It was a theme that would later be expressed in his 
famous Character of a Trimmer late in 1684. 
 
Steering the King away from unpopular rule 
 
Charles was able to successfully suppress the Whigs after the discovery of two plots 
in June 1683. One of these plots involved the assassination of the King and his brother, 
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whilst the other simply involved the seizing of the King.251 These two plots were lumped 
together and later became known as the Rye House Plot. The discovery of this very real plot 
gave the government all the ammunition it needed to increase the ruthlessness of its 
measures against the Whigs and the Protestant Dissenters. The government moved swiftly 
against the Whig leaders implicated in the Plot. Essex was arrested as a conspirator and died 
in imprisonment; Lord Russel and Algernon Sydney were sentenced and executed.252 These 
and other arrests combined with the fact that Shaftesbury had already died in exile by this 
time marked the collapse of the Whig leadership.253 At the grassroots level, the persecution 
of the Dissenters further intensified in the aftermath of the Plot revelations. With the King 
and Tory propaganda associating Protestant nonconformists with the Whigs, they naturally 
became indirectly implicated in the Rye House conspiracies.254 Outward support for the 
monarchy now also experienced a renewed surge as people took pains to disassociate 
themselves from the Plot.255 The overall outcome of all this was the effective collapse of the 
Whig faction for the time being, its leaders disposed of and its sympathisers suppressed and 
dispersed. So decisive was the Crown’s victory, in fact, that Harris would remark that “by the 
time of James II’s accession the position of the monarchy had been considerably 
strengthened and the Whig Challenge effectively defeated.”256 
 
Charles enjoyed a large measure of independence in his newfound security. The 
collapse of the Whigs and the definite surge in public support meant that Charles was able 
                                                          
251 Hutton, Charles the Second, pp. 420-421. 
252 Hutton, Charles the Second, p. 421; Harris, Restoration, pp. 312-316. 
253 Jones, The First Whigs, p. 8. Shaftesbury died in Amsterdam on 21 January 1683. 
254 Harris, Restoration, p. 322; Lacey, Dissent and Parliamentary Politics, p. 159.. 
255 Harris, Restoration, pp. 317-321. 
256 Ibid. p. 408. 
94 
 
to conduct policies and measures that would have provoked public uproar in the prior years. 
In 1684, riding on the surge of public support he now enjoyed, he wilfully neglected his 
obligation to summon a parliament three years after his last in accordance with the 
Triennial Act of 1664. His secure domestic position also enabled him to show more leniency 
towards Catholics without major opposition. In May 1684, he readmitted his Catholic 
brother back into government without major opposition.257 Some contemporaries, 
however, were undoubtedly disgruntled at this as they saw this as a direct violation of the 
Test Act denying government offices to Catholics.258 Then in October, Charles ordered the 
release of loyal Catholics recusants imprisoned during the Popish Plot panic.259  A further 
notable action was Charles’ decision in December to separate the control of the Irish army 
from the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland, which was planned to be given to the staunchly 
Protestant Earl of Rochester. He then gave two Catholics, Richard Talbot and Justin 
MacCarthy, the command of regiments.260  
 
Halifax was at this time deeply involved in an internal power struggle for the King’s 
influence against a faction composed of York, Sunderland and the Duchess of Portsmouth. It 
was a contest that saw constant political manoeuvring from both sides as they each tried to 
gain the upper hand. It was also a contest that lasted up until Charles’ death in February 
1685, whereupon James succeeded his late brother.261 Despite these preoccupations, there 
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was every indication that Halifax was concerned with Charles’ actions at this time. In 
January 1684, just as the three years stipulated by the Triennial Act was about to lapse, 
Halifax related to Reresby that he had “been very earnest with the King for a Parlament”. 
Accordingly, Halifax argued vigorously for Charles to summon a parliament in accordance 
with the law.262 In October, as the question of releasing the Catholic recusants from 
imprisonment was being discussed, Halifax initially opposed the suggestion. But when the 
King expressed his desire to release those Catholics who had rendered loyal services to the 
Crown, Halifax compromised by agreeing that any releases should be done on a case-by-
case basis. This was as opposed to a sweeping pardon, as Sunderland was suggesting.263 
Then, when Charles spoke to Halifax about MacCarthy’s appointment, the Marquis again 
attempted to dissuade the King from it.264  
 
Central to Halifax’s concerns was Charles’ seeming neglect of his obligations to his 
people. From the Marquis’ point of view, the King was not fulfilling his promises to rule 
according to the laws and Protestant interests. When Halifax spoke out against Charles’ 
decisions, he reminded him of these obligations and warned about the discontent that 
might arise if he ignored them. As Halifax urged the King that a parliament should be 
summoned in accordance with the Triennial Act, he brought up various arguments why it 
was prudent for him to comply with it. Halifax emphasised that Charles had promised to rule 
by law when he dissolved the Oxford Parliament in 1681 and that since now a parliament 
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was required by law to be summoned, “nothing ought to be soe dear to him as to keep his 
word with his people.” There was also the possibility that it would sow new seeds of 
opposition, since “an ill construction might be made” of his noncompliance with the Act.265 
Similarly, when Charles spoke of MacCarthy’s commission in the Irish army, the Marquis 
advised against it on the grounds of legality and prudence. According to Burnet, to whom 
Halifax related this exchange, Charles supported the legality of this appointment by arguing 
that “he was not tied up by the laws of Ireland as he was by the laws of England.” Upon this, 
Halifax disagreed, offering “to argue that point with any person that asserted it before him.” 
He further cautioned the King that “that army was raised by a protestant parliament, to 
secure the protestant interest” and suggested that the appointment would give reason for 
his subjects to suspect that “where his hands were not bound up, he would show all the 
favour he could to the papists.” Halifax added that it would be better if the King rewarded 
MacCarthy “in pensions and other favours, than in a way that would raise so much clamour 
and jealousy.”266 In voicing these concerns, it can be seen that Halifax was attempting to 
steer Charles away from decisions that would alienate him from his largely Protestant 
nation. 
 
Halifax’s concern about Charles’ conduct was consistent with the ideas expressed in 
his aphorisms. He did not believe in the theoretically unlimited nature of government 
authority. To him, government authority was not determined by the speculative ideals 
about it, but rather by the material forces that support it, such as the support of its people. 
A government may in theory claim absolute authority over its subjects, but those subjects 
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were not always complacent to such claims. Halifax observed that the people, once roused 
and antagonised, were capable of real anarchic violence. As he reflected in one aphorism, 
“there is accumulative Cruelty in a number of Men, though none in particular are ill-
natured” so that “the angry Buzz of a Multitude is one of the Bloodiest Noises in the 
World.”267 Similarly in another aphorism Halifax wrote that “the Body of the People are 
generally either so dead that they cannot move, or so mad that they cannot be reclaimed.” 
Moderation simply cannot subsist in the multitude, for “to be neither all in a Flame, nor 
quite cold, requireth more Reason than great Numbers can ever attain.”268 For this reason, 
the people should not be thought of as something that would complacently accept any 
treatment imposed upon them; rather, the collective should be considered as “a slow heavy 
beast” who takes “a great while before it can get up” but when roused takes equal time 
“before it can lye down again.”269 To Halifax, it was this beast, whose actions have material 
impact, which stood in the way of claims to absolute power. 
 
Halifax’s ideas about the people as a slumbering but potentially violent beast have 
implications for his ideas about the nature of government. His wider views about the 
relationship between a government and its people will be further explored in the next 
chapter; it is here only sufficient to stress that his ideas about the multitude lent itself to an 
acknowledgement of the practical limitations of government authority. As one aphorism 
warned, “admitt it to bee a Fundamentall, that nobody ought to resist a Government; yet if 
it is at least as sure, that in some cases the people will rise against it, what doth the 
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Government gaine by a Speculative Maxime, whilst Nature and practise stand in opposition 
to it?”270 Halifax observed that fundamental notions asserting a government’s absolute 
nature have limitations in practice, because such notions as “that nobody ought to resist a 
Government” could be challenged in practical reality. Such abstract fundamentals do not 
describe the nature of governments as they really were. To Halifax, there was a distinction 
between governments in abstraction and governments in practice. This distinction can be 
seen in another aphorism,  
“If the people are in the wrong, when they vindicate what they think to bee their 
right, their being in fault doth not availe the Government that is destroyed by it. If 
such causes do produce such effects, there needeth no further arguing; and the 
reproaching a people with breaking a rule, &c. is but a small Consolation, and 
especially to those who gave the first temptation to it. It is a fundamentall in reason, 
not to provoke a strong creature, &c.”271 
Here, Halifax contrasted the importance of a government’s moral and theoretical claims to 
power with that of the material factors that challenge those claims, namely a general 
rebellion. The former did not dictate the course of events, but the latter did. In the 
aftermath of a rebellion, those who represented the destroyed government can reproach 
the rebels for breaching fundamental rules and laws. But a rebellion produces such real and 
self-evident consequences, that “there needeth no further arguing” and it was “small 
Consolation” to reproach it on the basis of abstract ideas. To Halifax, there was a distinction 
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between theoretical authority and effective authority. The former could claim to be 
absolute, but the latter was in fact limited by material factors, such as the compliance of its 
people. Therefore, Halifax was deeply aware that government authority was in actuality 
limited, despite what speculative theories have to say about it. His attempts to persuade 
Charles away from what he saw as unpopular policies was in keeping with this awareness. 
 
Halifax showed this pragmatic line of thinking when in December 1684 he warned 
Charles about the disadvantages of having an unpopular government. At that time, the Privy 
Council was occupied with a debate of what form of government the New England colonies 
should be reconstituted into. It was suggested that a governor and council, solely 
responsible to the crown, should be given powers to govern their colonies as they deemed 
necessary. Halifax took the opposite side of this. Accordingly, Barillon reported to Louis that 
Halifax on this occasion “took upon him to contend with great warmth, that there could be 
no doubt whatever but that the same laws which are in force in England, should be also 
established in a country inhabited by Englishmen.” The force of his speech was vigorous, 
making use of every argument “by which it could be proved, that an absolute government is 
neither so happy nor so safe, as that which is tempered by laws, and which sets bounds to 
the authority of the prince.” According to this French dispatch, Halifax also supposedly 
“exaggerated the inconveniences of a sovereign power, and plainly declared that he could 
not make up his mind to live under a king who should have it in his power to take, whenever 
he thought proper, the money he had in his pocket.”272 The terms in which Halifax described 
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arbitrary government is significant. Halifax did not touch on the morality or theoretical flaws 
of arbitrary governments, but instead stressed that its claims to absolute power actually 
threatened its stability rather than reinforce it. As to why this was so, Halifax implied that 
the answer lay in practical reality; that any individual rationally interested in advancing their 
own happiness would never willingly support a government that had the power to take it 
away on a whim. The implicit connection vaguely suggested here was that the unpopularity 
of a government tended to dissolve the stability of it, regardless of the supposedly unlimited 
power of the governors. All this further hints at the practical outlook through which Halifax 
saw Charles’ unconstitutional and potentially unpopular conduct at this time. 
 
Halifax’s final appeal: The Character of a Trimmer 
 
By the end of 1684, Halifax’s position in Charles’ ministry was uncertain. The internal 
struggle between Halifax and James’ faction continued and there is disagreement among 
scholars as to who was gaining the upper hand. Foxcroft took the view that Halifax was in 
ascendancy. She surmised, “with little fear of error, that Lord Halifax was to replace his 
Royal Highness [James] as ‘chief favorite and minister,’ with the promise, express or implied, 
of a free hand in affairs both foreign and domestic.”273 Kenyon and Brown, on the other 
hand, were of the view that Halifax’s influence was in apparent and real decline. Brown 
pointed to the Marquis’ supposedly precarious situation in the ministry, whereas Kenyon 
took the stronger view that Halifax’s dismissal was only a matter of time.274 Halifax’s actual 
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position at this time is still up for debate. Hutton believed that these contradictory views are 
evidence of Charles’ cunning, remarking that “never had this monarch’s favourite tactic, of 
telling everybody what they wanted to hear, created greater bewilderment.”275 Whatever 
was the case, it was apparent that Halifax’s various advice was being largely ignored. For 
instance, no parliament was summoned and MacCarthy kept his military commission. 
Halifax’s next attempt at promoting his suggestions would be indirect, through a pamphlet 
entitled The Character of a Trimmer. Likely composed between mid to late 1684, the 
pamphlet was distributed anonymously in manuscript form and began occasioning 
discussion among contemporaries in the following January.276  
 
As with Halifax’s current political situation, there is also debate among scholars as to 
the exact purpose and target audience of this pamphlet. Foxcroft saw the pamphlet as “the 
sketch of a political programme primarily intended for the royal eye.”277 Gooch believed 
that Halifax wrote the piece to “vindicate his character and his creed” from such hostile Tory 
propagandists as Roger L’Esrange, who had been attacking political moderates for some 
time ever since the collapse of the Whigs.278 Brown saw the pamphlet as an attempt “to 
influence the King indirectly by writing an anonymous appeal to public opinion.”279 Halifax’s 
domestic chaplain, also gave his own opinion on this as he wrote that the pamphlet was to 
promote “under a seeming trifle the best Council that could be given to the King and to the 
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well-meaning part of the Nation.”280 Despite the varying interpretations of the pamphlet, it 
is sufficient for the purposes of this narrative to go by one broad suggestion. Whether 
Character of a Trimmer was the “sketch of a political programme”; a defence of his politics 
and policies; or a propaganda piece intended to influence public opinion, these 
interpretations all point to the idea that the pamphlet was an attempt by Halifax to promote 
a political point of view. In this sense, Halifax’s Character of a Trimmer can be regarded as 
another attempt to offer his advice on goverment through a more indirect medium. 
 
On the surface, Character of a Trimmer was a defence against the attacks on political 
moderation by Tory propagandists. In the pamphlet’s own words, it sought to set out “the 
Trimmer’s principles and opinions” for all to decide “whether he can with Justice be so 
arraigned”.281 As indicated by the various scholarly debates surrounding the pamphlet, 
Halifax’s Character of a Trimmer was more complex than a mere justification of political 
moderation. In the course of defending their principles, the Trimmer of the pamphlet went 
on to discuss his opinions on government, religion and foreign policy. On each of these 
topics, the pamphlet promoted various policy and political recommendations. On the topic 
of government, an overarching theme was its promotion of constitutional government, 
where the monarch ruled according to the laws rather than arbitrarily.282 In the sections 
relating to the treatment of religious minorities, the Trimmer recommended that a measure 
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of leniency be given to both Protestant Dissenters and Catholics when executing penal laws 
against them.283  
 
The section on foreign policy indicated Halifax’s continuing concern with French 
aggression abroad. This concern should be further seen in the context of Charles’ growing 
complacency with regards to the French. This trend could be seen even before the Rye 
House Plot revelations. After Louis withdrew from Luxembourg in 1682, Charles was able to 
largely resist the attempts of Spain and William of Orange to pull him into a war against 
France. Accordingly, the King showed little sympathy to William when France invaded his 
ancestral territory of Orange; and he ignored the Spanish when they declared war on France 
in December 1683 in an attempt to rouse support from the Dutch and English. Charles’ 
complacency here, however, did not violate England’s treaty with the Spanish since it was 
purely defensive. Nonetheless, Louis XIV benefited from Spain’s failed retaliation. Spain was 
to lose Luxembourg to France and forced into a twenty-year truce in the summer of 1684.284 
In line with Halifax’s antipathy towards French aggression, the Trimmer of the pamphlet 
emphasised the dangers of French ambitions and criticised those in government who 
supported a Francophile foreign policy.285 
 
Such were the overarching thoughts and recommendations of the Trimmer. 
However, a parallel of themes can be seen running between the pamphlet and Halifax’s 
concern of Charles’ misconduct at this time. Throughout the pamphlet, there was a notable 
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emphasis on the practical limits of authority and the need to avoid unpopular governments. 
The pamphlet was rife with passages arguing that it was practical for a monarch to keep his 
people content rather than disgruntled. For example, a Prince should rule according to the 
law, because it makes his conduct automatically arbitrary by being in accordance with plain 
reason and the universal opinion of his subjects; the laws also serve to rescue the monarch 
from pursuing policies that are disagreeable to these two aspects.286 Furthermore, if a 
prince decides to rule arbitrarily, then he must reckon with resistance rather than absolute 
obedience. As the Trimmer said, when power is exercised without regard for the people, or 
what he called a “Principle of Love”, “there can be no true Allegiance, and there must 
remaine the perpetual seeds of Resistance against a Power which is built upon such an 
unnatural foundation as that of fear and Terrour.” As a consequence, the Trimmer later 
continued that “there can be no lasting radicall securitie, but where the governed are 
satisfied with the Governours”. For this reason, it was observed that “the bravest Princes in 
all times, who were uncapable of any other kind of feare, have feared to greive their own 
people.”287 The Trimmer hence made a noticeable attempt to persuade its readers that it 
was imprudent for a ruler to govern without regard to the interests of their people. This was 
a theme consistent with Halifax’s aphorisms on the topic as well as his actual concerns 
about Charles’ conduct at the time. 
 
However, it was in the conclusion that the Trimmer developed this theme to its 
natural conclusion. Almost echoing Halifax’s own aphorisms, the Trimmer reminded his 
readers that fundamentals about government have no bearing in practice if the people will 
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not admit to them. “It is to be remembred, That if Princes have Law and Authoritie on their 
side, the People on theirs may have Nature, which is a formidable Adversary.” Law and 
authority, being the result of human principles, lose their impact in the face of human 
nature provoked; a people acting upon self-preserving instincts would scarcely care for the 
moral imperatives that underpin law and authority. As the Trimmer continued, “Duty, 
Justice, Religion, nay even human Prudence too, biddeth the people suffer every thing 
rather than resist; but uncorrected Nature, where ever it feeleth a smart, will run to the 
nearest Remedy.” Human passions in this case were to be considered as much as how 
people ought to act, and the Trimmer warned “if their passions are provoked, they being as 
much a part of us as any of our Limbs, they lead men into a short way of arguing that 
admitteth no distinctions, and from the foundation of selfe defence, they will draw 
Inferences that will have miserable Effects upon the quiet of a Government.”288 In short, this 
passage makes clear that there was a distinction between the theoretical and practical 
bounds of government authority and that a ruler should heed the latter if they wished to 
avoid national instability.  
 
The Character of a Trimmer can be read as a more explicit warning of what would 
happen should Charles continue to conduct policies that laid the foundations of popular 
discontent. For the purposes of this narrative, it should not matter whether these reminders 
were primarily for Charles or whether Halifax was cautioning the moderate Tories against 
supporting the King’s current policies. Either way, the pamphlet, while promoting a series of 
recommendations, sought to remind its readers, some of who have political power at court, 
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that there were practical limits to government authority and that if the King desired to rule 
without trouble he would do well to keep his people content. Such warnings were 
consistent with Halifax’s concerns relating to Charles’ conduct at this time. He had 
consistently tried to steer Charles away from what he saw as unconstitutional and 
unpopular policies. But as he was unsuccessful in these attempts the pamphlet can be seen 
as an indirect continuation of these efforts. That Halifax would continue those efforts given 
his current concerns was consistent with his aphorisms, which deemed it a necessity for a 
government to heed the practical limitations of its authority, regardless of its theoretical 
claims to power. 
 
However, it is impossible to know whether Charles would have taken Halifax’s advice 
to heart. Shortly after the circulation of Character of a Trimmer, the King would suddenly 
pass away in February 1685. His brother James would then ascend to the throne, and, as the 
next chapter will show, carry out policies that would alienate the majority of the English 
nation. Charles may not have lived long enough to see if Halifax’s advice carried any 





Chapter 6 – James II’s Reign 
 
James II’s reign began on a high note in his first year. Many factors contributed to 
this. He was able to reassure his English subjects of his intentions to rule constitutionally 
and to preserve the established church; the parliament which met turned out to be 
favourable towards him; and he was able to eliminate the threat to his royal succession 
from the Duke of Monmouth. All these developments meant that James had secured a 
comfortable domestic position by late 1685. Yet, almost immediately he would go on to 
alienate his nation and ultimately bring about a domestic crisis that would see him 
dethroned three years later. The prime cause for such developments was James’ dogged 
pursuit to revive Catholicism in England. 
 
Halifax over this period did not sit idly by as James worked to further his goals. He 
opposed the King’s Catholic designs from the outset and was dismissed from office for it. 
Still, he would play his part outside of government. He would go on to frustrating the King’s 
policies by contributing to and encouraging a national noncompliance. This chapter outlines 
Halifax’s efforts to frustrate James’ Catholic cause in conjunction with the domestic 
developments as it happened. In the course of this chapter, the aphorisms will be examined 
in relation to Halifax’s politics at this time. The previous chapter discussed his aphoristic 
thoughts about the practical limits of government authority. This chapter will emphasise 
that his strategy of mobilising national noncompliance was consistent with this. In doing so, 
this chapter will suggest that it was characteristic of Halifax to opt for such a strategy given 
the ideas expressed in his aphorisms. 
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This chapter also examines another area of Halifax’s conduct at this time. This was 
Halifax’s decision to distance himself from the eventual invitation to William that would 
ultimately bring about the Glorious Revolution. Whereas the Marquis hedged his bets on 
passive resistance to oppose James, there were others who opted for a more direct 
approach to expediting the domestic crisis. These were the people who would eventually 
invite William to intervene directly in English affairs. Halifax’s cautiousness will become 
apparent as he opposed such an approach and consistently warned William against direct 
action. Furthermore, such cautiousness in avoiding potentially rash actions was consistent 
with Halifax’s aphorisms. His short pieces indicated a deep awareness about the fragility of 
one’s reason and how easily one can err by yielding to a sudden impulse, such as an 
excessive eagerness to achieve a particular end. Halifax was, in other words, self-conscious 
about how easily one can lose their ability to make rational decisions when yielding too 
much to their eagerness. 
 
Halifax’s short tenure in office under the new King 
 
The first few months of James II’s reign saw him amass immense political capital. The 
fears and anxieties about his succession, laid out so vividly during the years of the Exclusion 
Crisis, were largely allayed by a swift public promise, before he was even crowned. In his 
highly publicized promise, James endeavoured to preserve England’s church and state as it 
was by law established. With such reassurances from the future King, James’ accession was 
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met with relative popularity.289 Further cementing James’ position was the Tory-Anglican 
disposition of his new Parliament.290 This Parliament, when it sat in May, would confirmed 
its support for the monarchy by granting a revenue that satisfied James’ expectations.291 
James was standing on firm footing, so when the Duke of Monmouth sought to overthrow 
the new King in June the Duke received little backing from the nation.292 The Monmouth 
Rebellion was crushed a month later and the Duke was consequently captured and 
executed. James therefore started his reign on a high note, with him enjoying popular 
support and having disposed of a major rival to his succession. But underpinning the 
nation’s support for the new King was an expectation that he would keep his promise to 
preserve the Church and state as by law established.293 As events turned out, James did not 
make good on his promise. 
 
Halifax remained as Privy Counsellor for a short while upon James’ accession. 
Despite past animosities, the Marquis told the new King in a private audience that he would 
serve with zeal so long as he was not required to undertake anything inconsistent with the 
laws. James, for his part, was willing to retain the services of Halifax, telling him that he 
would remember nothing except for the role he played in opposing the Whigs during the 
Exclusion Crisis.294 But the new King also indicated clearly how little Halifax was in his 
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confidence. Shortly after his succession, James promptly transferred Halifax from the office 
of Lord Privy Seal to the largely ceremonial Lord President.295 Halifax took this ministerial set 
back with seeming equanimity. He told Reresby in April that he would continue to provide 
his services to the King and only hoped that “his Majesty would put noe discouragement 
upon them by imposeing the popish religion.”296 His apprehensions were to be well-
founded. 
 
Given the situation that eventually developed and Halifax’s own personal 
sentiments, his dismissal was inevitable. His forebodings about James’ enthusiasm to revive 
Catholicism in England had been accurate. From the outset, James had intentions to pursue 
measures in favour of Catholics. These intentions were eventually modest as James was 
unsure of the support he enjoyed, but they eventually grew to the ambitious goal of putting 
the Catholic faith on equal footing with Protestantism.297 Concrete signs that Halifax was 
concerned with James’ growing aims can be seen after the Monmouth Rebellion was 
quelled in July. The situation created by the rebellion led to an increase in the size of James’ 
standing army and saw the employment of a number of Catholic officers in it. Legally 
speaking, the Test Act of 1673 allowed James to employ the Catholic officers for only up to a 
period of three months.298 After the danger had passed with the rebellion, Halifax in his 
usual fashion made sure to remind the King of the questionable legality of those Catholic 
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employments. According to Burnet, sometime after the rebellion “the Marquis of Halifax did 
move in council, that an order should be given to examine, whether all the officers in 
commission had taken the test, or not.” Halifax was alone in supporting such a motion.299 
The King also responded by insisting that he intended to keep the Catholic officers in his 
employ.300 This was not the first time that Halifax had spoken out against James’ conduct in 
government. An entry from Reresby’s diary dated a few months back in 23 April remarked 
that Halifax had “in two perticular and private audiences with the King, tould him his mind 
with that planess in relation to his service in point of government that he wondered the King 
(considering his temper) took it with that calmness.”301 By October 1685, the King seriously 
doubted whether Halifax could be relied upon to support his Catholic policies. He 
confronted the Marquis privately and asked him whether he would support the repeal of 
the Test and Habeas Corpus acts in Parliament when it next sat. Halifax, who later in a letter 
described the acts as “the strongest bulwarks of all that is left us”, answered the King in the 
negative.302 Upon Halifax’s refusal, James saw no reason to retain his services and promptly 
dismissed him.303 The King, undeterred, would proceed with his aims to strengthen 
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Opposing James’ Catholic ambitions 
 
Though out of office, Halifax still found a role to play in opposing James’ political 
programme. During the initial stages of James agenda, Halifax focused his efforts on 
securing its defeat in Parliament. His letters to his political colleague, the Earl of 
Chesterfield, signalled clearly the Marquis’ intentions to go into opposition against James in 
Parliament. Before Parliament met in November 1685 he related to Chesterfield of James’ 
intentions to repeal the Test and Habeas Corpus Acts in Parliament. Because Chesterfield 
intended to absent himself from the upcoming session, Halifax implored his colleague to 
attend so that his “friends” there “may have your countenance and assistance, if there 
should be occation, in defending those bills which are the strongest bulwarks of all that is 
left us.”304 However, events would play itself out without much effort from Halifax. When 
Parliament reconvened on 9 November, James would alienate it by an imperious opening 
speech. The King insisted on keeping the employment of his Catholic officers in open 
defiance of the Test Act and, noting the poor performance of the militia during the 
Monmouth Rebellion, asked for additional funding for his standing army.305 Faced with such 
an aggressive speech from the King, the Commons expressed several symptoms of 
discontent. The House made clear its displeasure with the King’s intentions to keep the 
Catholic officers; it voted additional funding to James, but with clear reluctance and on an 
amount not at all according to his expectations; and rather than abandon the militia, the 
House resolved to make improvements to it.306  
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James had made a bad start, but Halifax believed the battle would continue. As 
Chesterfield remained in the country as Parliament sat, Halifax wrote to him again on 10 
November in another attempt to convince him to come up. Again, a clear concern about 
securing the defeat of the King’s aims in Parliament can be seen. Accordingly, he conveyed 
his hope to his colleague that “wee might reserve you for some of those criticall debates 
upon which, to our thinking, every thing dependeth.”307 Halifax played his own part during 
the session. He aligned with the opposition and expressed his disapproval of the King’s 
opening speech when the Lords desired to reconsider it, after having previously voted 
thanks for it.308 Faced with the hostility of both Houses, James never came near his plan to 
repeal the Test Acts in Parliament. The Houses’ resistance on the preliminary issues of the 
standing army and the employment of Catholic officers convinced the King to prorogue it on 
20 November. Afterwards, he dismissed those who had opposed him in Parliament from 
their offices and commissions.309 Parliament’s resistance to James’ Catholic designs would 
have been a relieving outcome from Halifax’s point of view.  
 
 Aside from having to confront an uncooperative Parliament, James also had to deal 
with resistance from the Church of England. From the beginning of his reign, the King had 
been promoting the Catholic faith through various methods. These developments provoked 
resistance from the Anglican clergy who, in turn, preached against it from their pulpits and 
in the press.310 Despite the King’s attempts to put a stop to this, many of the clergy 
nonetheless continued those sermons. Consequently, James deemed it necessary to bring 
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matters into his own hands. In July 1686 he established an ecclesiastical commission to 
bring in line and discipline the clergy and other ecclesiastical institutions such as the 
universities.311 This was, of course, to the further discontent of James’ Protestant subjects, 
many of whom saw the establishment of the commission as a violation of the law.312 
Frustrated with Parliament’s lack of cooperation and the Church’s resistance to his agenda, 
James began seeking new allies. 
 
James was now beginning to see a potential ally in the Protestant Dissenters. The 
Dissenters’ continued persecution by the Anglican Church has perpetuated the rift between 
the two groups. The King thus sought to exploit this division among his Protestant subjects 
and tried to bring the nonconformists to his side.313 Signs of this political shift could be seen 
in March 1686, when James issued a general pardon for religious offences and issued a 
warrant that saw 1,200 Quakers freed over the next six months.314 Over the course of the 
year, James’ gestures towards the Dissenters expanded. He became willing to grant them 
dispensations from the penal laws if they petitioned for relief.315 By the end of 1686, James 
had abandoned his alliance with the Tory-Anglican interests and he was dismissing from 
office any who would not full-heartedly support his Catholic policies.316 The King’s next step 
was to issue his dispensations in a sweeping and wholesale fashion. In April 1687, the King 
issued his Declaration of Indulgence that effectively suspended the penal laws and the Test 
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Act of 1673.317 Through this sweeping declaration, James was hoping that all but the most 
hostile Anglicans would see the benefit of religious liberty and expected addresses of thanks 
from his subjects.318 James followed this declaration with the dissolution of his Parliament in 
July. He and his government were hoping that the Declaration would garner enough support 
from the Dissenters to turn in a compliant parliament next time James summoned one.319 
 
Halifax made his next move at this juncture. The arena was no longer the debating 
chambers of Parliament, but in the sphere of public opinion. The Dissenters needed to be 
dissuaded from trusting James’ offers of relief in exchange for support. Appropriately, he 
penned a propaganda piece at this time entitled A Letter to a Dissenter, which he published 
anonymously in September 1687.320 Halifax’s Letter to a Dissenter essentially tried to 
convince the Dissenters that it was prudent and in their best interests not to rely on James 
for permanent relief from persecution. In making his case against James, Halifax attempted 
to sow distrust in the Catholic party’s sincerity towards the Dissenters. He argued that 
James and his co-religionists’ sudden change of heart should be suspected, especially given 
the Catholic faith’s animosities. As Halifax remarked, “the other day you were Sons of Belial, 
now you are Angels of light”. Given this sudden and extreme change, “it will be fit for you to 
pause upon it, before you believe it: If your features are not altered, neither is their opinion 
of you, what ever may be pretended.”321 Furthermore, by supporting James and his 
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Declaration, the Dissenters would be forfeiting any protection from the laws and putting 
themselves at the mercy of the King’s personal prerogative. “After giving Thanks for the 
breach of one Law, you lose the Right of Complaining of the breach of all the rest; you will 
not very well know how to defend your selves, when you are pressed.”322 Rather than 
relying on James’ dubious support, the Dissenters would benefit more by waiting for the 
next reign. He reassured them that the established church was now “convinced of its Errour 
in being Severe to you” and that the next likely inheritors of the throne, Princess Mary and 
her husband William of Orange, would be more likely to grant them real tangible relief from 
persecution. Given these considerations, it was best to lay under religious persecution a 
little longer until the next reign, when better days were to come.323 
 
In frustrating James’ goals through Parliament and public opinion, Halifax’s strategy 
throughout this period was essentially that of promoting national noncompliance. He firmly 
believed that James could make no progress as long as the Protestant majority of the nation 
resisted. This belief was expressed very early on in 1685 when he wrote to Chesterfield 
about James’ intentions of repealing the Test Acts in Parliament. He noted to his 
correspondent that several lords as well as elements in the court, the House of Commons 
and the army were against the repeal of the Test Acts. With this information at hand, Halifax 
surmised to his colleague “either, that upon sounding men, they will be so discoraged as not 
to attempt these things; or, if they doe, that they will fayle them.”324 As the situation 
developed and James pursued his policies more aggressively, Halifax continued to believe 
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that the King’s progress could be checked as long as the nation rejected those policies. In 
January 1687, Halifax wrote to William, that “though there appeareth the utmost vigour to 
pursue the design which hath been so long laid, there seemeth to be no less firmness in the 
nation, and aversion to change”.325 Four months after James’ Declaration, Halifax 
elaborated in stronger terms on the disadvantageous ground James now stood upon. “There 
are some things that can never prevail upon men’s minds, if they have time allowed to 
consider them; this may be the present case, the whole kingdom being now so well-
informed, that all men are settled in their dislike of the unwelcome thing that is 
endeavoured to be imposed on them.”326 As can be seen, Halifax harboured a strong belief 
that James’ Catholic programme could be checked by the strong discontent it has provoked.  
 
Such a belief, furthermore, was entirely characteristic of Halifax upon examination of 
his aphorisms. The previous chapter has shown Halifax’s deep awareness that there was a 
distinction between the theoretical and practical bounds of government authority. 
Authority had to be supported by material forces, such as the compliance of the people, 
rather than relying solely on fundamental ideas about what should and should not be. 
Expressed in another way, this view meant that a government’s authority depended upon 
the goodwill of its people. Similar to his thoughts about the limits of government authority, 
this corresponding view was likewise expressed in Halifax’s aphorisms. As he wrote in one 
example, “the Heart of the Subjects yieldeth but a lean Crop where it is not cultivated by a 
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wise Prince. The Good-will of the Governed will be starved, if it is not fed by the good 
Conduct of the Governors.”327 By making the metaphorical connection between public 
goodwill and crop yield, Halifax made the suggestion that discontent towards government 
was as detrimental as the effects of experiencing a low crop yield. Another aphorism 
similarly reflected that “where a Prince is not proud of making his people happy, the people 
will not bee proud of making him Great.”328 Here, again, there is an implicit 
acknowledgement that the people play a role in making their prince successful, and that 
they would cease to play that role if their prince showed that he cared not for his people’s 
happiness.  
 
Following from these notions, Halifax was aware that a separation between a 
monarch and its people could only detriment the former. As he wrote in another aphorism, 
“a Separation of interests between the Prince and his people, is so farre from exalting his 
prerogative, that it destroyeth the foundation of his ordinary power.”329 Far from being 
unaffected by national discontent, a prince’s practical authority was greatly hampered when 
unsupported by the people, which formed “the foundation of his ordinary power.” This 
separation of interest was the situation that Halifax found the nation in at this current 
juncture. James was claiming his prerogative to dispense with the penal laws and Test Act 
and was effectively using his position as King to pursue an interest separate from the 
majority of his nation. Halifax’s confidence that a national noncompliance was sufficient to 
frustrate James’ Catholic policies resonated with his acknowledgements that government 
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authority was limited in practice and that its practical effectiveness depended on the 
people. 
 
Halifax’s Letter to a Dissenter provoked at least eight replies, some of which came 
from James’ government.330 However, the pamphlet’s real impact remains unclear.331 What 
is clear is that James continued to face setbacks to his political programme. In the first place, 
contemporary reactions to James’ Declaration were not very warm. Many saw it as an abuse 
of the royal prerogative and criticised it as such.332 The Anglican clergy were unsurprisingly 
displeased and a notable number of them refused to take part in the addresses of thanks for 
the Declaration.333 There was uncertainty about how to react even among the various 
Protestant sects, who, along with the Catholics, would have benefitted most from James’ 
act.334 The King was also facing set back in another project. The government’s expectations 
of favourable Dissenter support in the next parliament were dashed as the responses began 
to come in.335 From August onwards, James began his campaign to sack the next parliament 
with those amenable to his goals. These efforts, however, were met with frequent 
frustrations as many involved were reluctant to aid the King in this endeavour.336 By March 
1688, it was clear that James did not have the support needed, even from the Protestant 
Dissenters, to obtain the compliant parliament he desired.337 
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Frustrated with the lack of progress, James reiterated his goals in his second 
Declaration of Indulgence on 27 April.338 This second Declaration was in essence a 
restatement of the first Declaration, except for its added emphasis on Parliament’s role in 
legally confirming religious liberty. This added emphasis, Douglas R. Lacey posited, was 
calculated to reassure the Dissenters that legal means would be used to establish 
permanent religious liberty if only they would give support to him.339 James followed this 
second Declaration by ordering it to be read throughout the churches. If followed, this 
would have given an appearance of endorsement from the Church leaders.340 This directive 
was to have disastrous consequences for the King. 
 
Avoiding drastic actions 
 
As the situation developed, Halifax remained firm on his strategy of passive 
resistance. In doing this he deliberately maintained a cautious line of conduct. This was in 
contrast to a more direct solution that was being suggested by early 1688. This was the idea 
of inviting William of Orange’s direct intervention in English affairs.341 William indeed was a 
natural candidate to seek aid from. He had a natural stake in the development of the 
situation in England since his wife stood next in line to the throne should James die 
childless. More specifically, the Prince had deep forebodings that either James would 
eventually disinherit his wife’s claim to the throne or that his unpopular rule would spark a 
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rebellion that would similarly leave Princess Mary’s claim uncertain.342 Such concerns only 
increased in prominence as relations between William and James worsened and as rumours 
about the Queen’s pregnancy reached the former.343 As for Halifax’s own position, he coldly 
rejected the idea of expediting the situation by a foreign intervention. According to Burnet, 
when Halifax was asked “if he would advise the prince’s coming over… he looked on the 
thing as impracticable; it depended on so many accidents, that he thought it was a rash and 
desperate project, that ventured all upon such a dangerous issue, as might turn on seas and 
winds.”344  
 
Halifax’s clear aversion to any direct courses of action was natural given his views by 
1688. By this time, he saw that James’ position was becoming increasingly precarious in the 
face of national discontent. Under such circumstances hasty and rash actions to speed up 
what seemed like an eventual collapse could easily backfire in favour of James. This position 
was conveyed in a significant letter in April. In the lengthy letter, Halifax commented to 
William that the strong opposition to James’ programme has driven the King and his 
accomplices into an indecisive and divided state. Such a situation he believed, “will produce 
great effects, if men will let it work.” On the other hand, what would spoil matters now 
were “unseasonable stirrings, or anything that looketh like the Protestants being the 
Aggressors”. As such, Halifax was deeply apprehensive towards individuals who were 
animated by an excited eagerness to expedite the situation at this critical juncture. 
                                                          
342 Miller, James II, p. 133. 
343 Ibid., pp. 184-185. 




“Nothing, therefore, in the present conjuncture can be more dangerous than unskilful 
agitators, warm men, who would be active at a wrong time, and want patience to keep their 
zeal from running away with them.”345 As can be seen here, Halifax deliberately maintained 
a cautious attitude to the developing situation, even as James’ position became increasingly 
weak.  
 
Halifax’s cautiousness corresponded well with the attitudes in his aphorisms. He was 
deeply self-conscious that one’s exercise of reason can suddenly be extinguished by yielding 
to sudden impulses. He saw in the human will, an internal struggle for control between 
reason and nature. “That warr which never yet had a truce, between our reason and our 
passions, will be eternal. And from the moment we let our reason sleep we are 
surprised.”346 A similar idea was expressed in another aphorism. “Humor and reason have 
been ever at cuffs, and the first has generally so prevailed, that it is a wonder the other has 
escaped with beating, and that it has not been murthered.”347 Between human nature and 
reason, Halifax knew which of the two often prevailed. His tendency to see human beings as 
more dominated by their nature than reason has already been touched on in chapter three. 
One important implication of this outlook was that the influence of human nature often led 
one to irrational and self-destructive actions. Glimpses into some of his aphorisms bear this 
out clearly. Anger, for instance, “makes men distinguish ill, and take up arguments which 
burn their fingers”; an overbearing ambition has the tendency to lull individuals to their own 
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ruin since, “men’s thoughts once applied to what they desire, are apt to stick there, without 
considering what they ought to fear”; and the generality of humanity often ignore their 
reason because “the world is too proud to meet reason half way; it will not rise up to it.”348 
Moreover, when one is under the influence of a sudden passion, it was difficult to shake it 
off. As one aphorism reflected, “when a passion once gets astride of us, it is not easy to 
dismount it… The same reason that was too weak to hinder it to get up, will bee too weak to 
get it down againe.”349 Halifax was, therefore, deeply self-conscious of the many elements in 
human nature that were disruptive to humanity’s capacity to act reasonably and rationally.  
 
This awareness extended to Halifax’s ideas about eagerness, as his aphorisms 
warned against yielding too much to it. As one aphorism said, “too much eagerness frights 
the thing we have a mind to catch. It makes it run away from us. Good fortune will not be 
taken by storm; there must be warmth, but it must not be too violent.”350 Halifax was aware 
that the violent “warmth” of individuals, represented in excessive eagerness, was likely to 
extinguish one’s discretion and caution. As he wrote in another aphorism, “Heat of bloud 
hath an aversion to Mediocrity; It will be blazing, and is impatient to hear the cool advice of 
discretion.”351 It was good to be inspired by a little eagerness to offset one’s timidity, but 
one needed to avoid an excess in both by moderating between the two. “Heat Scorneth 
moderation, as Phlegme feareth aspiring; they must bee joined, but it must bee by a skilfull 
hand, or else they are both the worse for being mingled.”352 To Halifax, yielding too much to 
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that “heat” or “warmth” associated with eagerness carried that same danger of having 
one’s reason suspended, much in the same way that being under the influence of a sudden 
impulse or passion did. It has that same potential to lead to irrational actions and 
detrimental outcomes for the individual and their affairs; specifically with eagerness, it 
“frights the thing we have a mind to catch.” Halifax was, in other words, self-conscious of 
the consequences of yielding too much to one’s eagerness. 
 
Given this self-conscious attitude, it was characteristic that Halifax would tend to 
avoid any drastic actions. At a time when he believed that the slightest misstep might prove 
advantageous to James’ government, it was consistent of the Marquis that he would warn 
against any drastically direct actions. Such actions might not be informed by rational 
decision making. It was apt that he would warn William against taking the advice of “warm 
men who would bee active at a wrong time, and want patience to keep their zele from 
running away with them”. Such individuals in their eagerness to alleviate the current 
situation were not guided by reason, but by impulse or their “zele”. Halifax knew well in his 
aphorisms the danger of yielding to human impulses, so that his aversion to these 
individuals and their methods was consistent with those attitudes shown in his short pieces. 
Unfortunately for Halifax, his efforts to promote a purely defensive and non-violent 






The coming storm 
 
James’ directive to have his second Declaration of Indulgence read out by the clergy 
would prove to be a disaster. Seven bishops, among many others, refused to comply, and 
James committed those bishops to the tower. The subsequent Trial of the Seven Bishops 
served as a spectacular defeat for James when the jury found them not guilty of their 
indictment to undermine the authority of the Crown and government. Celebrations cropped 
up around the country on this occasion.353 Halifax was at the fore of those celebrations, if a 
contemporary account is to be believed. Early-Whig historian John Oldmixon described the 
scene at the bishop’s acquittals in the following way. “The court sate the next day, and then 
the Jury came in with their Verdict Not guilty. Upon which the Marquis of Halifax waving his 
Hat over his Head, cry’d Huzzah! The Lords and Gentlemen took the shout from him.”354 
Halifax did have good reason to rejoice. The acquittals not only served as a defeat in James’ 
campaign to control the Tory-Anglican interests, but it also had the effect of further unifying 
the Protestant majority of the nation against the King’s Catholic policies. “The late business 
concerning the bishops hath had such an effect, that it is hardly to bee imagined”, wrote 
Halifax to William; “I look upon it as that which hath brought all the Protestants together, 
and bound them up into a knot, that cannot be easily be untied.”355 To William, Halifax also 
reiterated his optimistic diagnosis of the situation. “I still remain persuaded that there is no 
effectual progress made towards the great design; and even the thing that party relieth 
upon [the birth of the Prince of Wales], is subject to so many accidents and uncertainties, 
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that according to human probability we are secure”.356 The spectacular affair of the bishops’ 
acquittal was for Halifax the ideal outcome he had been hoping for ever since James began 
pursuing his policies. 
 
Halifax would continue his strategy of mobilising public opinion against James’ 
Catholic designs. In the spring of 1688, Halifax penned his Anatomy of an Equivalent to 
continue the struggle on the public front. It was written amidst public discussions about 
certain securities or “equivalents” that would be offered in exchange for the repeal of the 
Test Acts, in whole or part. For James and his government, this new strategy of offering 
“equivalents” was to allay fears that the Protestant religion would be subverted if any part 
of the Tests were repealed. Similar in purpose to his Letter to a Dissenter, Halifax’s Anatomy 
sought to warn his fellow English against trusting this offer of these equivalent securities.357  
 
However, as the Marquis was penning his Anatomy, William of Orange was, in fact, 
making preparations to militarily intervene in England. He was explicitly invited to do so by 
seven Englishmen, who signed and sent the invitation to the Prince of Orange on the day on 
which the seven bishops were acquitted.358 Despite Halifax’s previous exhortations to 
William about avoiding any drastic actions, he was ultimately unsuccessful in dissuading the 
                                                          
356 Halifax to the Prince of Orange, 25 July 1688, in ibid., p. 117. Foxcroft believed that Halifax was alluding to 
the Prince of Wales when he wrote “the thing that party relieth upon”, since there was a widespread belief 
that the Prince would not survive into adulthood if born. See, Foxcroft, Life and Letters, vol. 1, pp. 500, 510 n2.  
357 Brown, Introduction to Part One, pp. 99-109. 
358 The men were the Earls of Shrewsbury, Devonshire and Danby, Viscount Lumley, the Bishop of London, 
Edward Russel and Henry Sydney. 
127 
 






Chapter 7 – The Glorious Revolution 
 
Halifax initially sided with James during William’s expedition against the King. 
However, when James was effectively deposed and William was declared the new King, it 
was the Marquis who formally presented the crowns to the conqueror and his wife. This 
chapter focuses on Halifax’s actions to support William’s bid for the throne. Halifax initially 
showed some willingness to help James expedite the situation in his favour, but he defected 
over to William after the King’s first attempt to flee the country. Halifax would vigorously 
support William’s claim to the crown during the Convention Parliament which met in 
January 1689. This chapter will suggest that Halifax was adherring to the necessities of the 
moment in supporting William. As will be shown, Halifax was well aware that the Prince 
intended to let the existing power vacuum continue if he was not given the crown. The 
Marquis would subsequently argue in Parliament that it was a matter of necessity that 
William fill the vacant throne. Halifax’s pragmatic approach was unlike that of his Tory 
colleagues, who would not support the Prince’s claim out of constitutional scruples. As will 
be seen, Halifax’s adherence to the necessities of the moment rather than constitutional 
principles was entirely in keeping with his aphorisms. As part of his sceptical outlook of 
human ideas, he did not believe that any law or constitution was so fundamental that it 
could stand the test of time and remain applicable forever. For Halifax, it was a mistake to 
adhere strictly to human ideas and what mattered was the ability to adapt as dictated by 





The developments leading to the Convention Parliament 
 
Halifax briefly aided James during William’s invasion. The situation for the King was 
precarious. Ever since William landed at Torbay in early November 1688, news frequently 
came to James of desertions from his army as well as revolts in other parts of the country. 
On 27 November he assembled all of the peers who were present in the capital for 
advice.359 Halifax was among those attended. During this meeting, James settled on calling a 
free parliament as a first step to expediting the situation.360 In order to ensure that William 
did not undertake any further actions to worsen James’ position as Parliament assembled 
and sat, the King also sent Halifax as one of three commissioners to negotiate with the 
Prince and to obtain his concurrence for the free Parliament.361 There is evidence to suggest 
that Halifax may not have been serving James in good faith, though Foxcroft disagrees with 
the inferences drawn from that evidence.362 However, the King’s subsequent actions would 
prevent Halifax’s true motivations, whatever they were, from fully playing out. The reports 
coming from the commissioners were indicating to James that William was unlikely to halt 
his march upon the capital. At this juncture, James decided it was time to extract himself 
from the situation. In the early hours of 11 December, as Halifax and the other 
commissioners were still engaged in their task, the King stole away from the capital with the 
intention of fleeing to France.363 Halifax returned to the capital from his commission not 
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long after James’ flight.364 Whatever his inclinations towards helping the King were, the 
absence of authority and the further anarchy which ensued gave all the plausible reasons 
for a defection to William.365 Halifax would thereafter commit himself to the interests of the 
Prince. 
 
A provisional government was formed among several lords and bishops almost 
immediately after James’ flight. Upon his return, Halifax joined his colleagues and chaired 
their meetings. The first priority of the lords was to restore peace and order within the 
city.366 In addition to these developments, news came that James’ retreat to France was 
foiled and that the King was apprehended by the people of Faversham.367 He was 
accompanied back to London on 16 December, but was afterwards brought to Rochester 
upon suggestions from William’s side that he be removed from the capital. Here, James 
made his second, and successful, escape from the country on 23 December and arrived in 
France on Christmas morning.368 In the capital, as civil unrest was in the process of being 
brought back under control, attention now turned to the state of the nation at large. 
William had left the lords and an assembly of former MPs during Charles II’s reign to 
deliberate amongst themselves how best to bring about a free parliament. Accordingly, the 
lords and former MPs addressed the Prince to issue writs for an election of a convention 
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parliament and also asked him to temporarily assume the responsibilities of government.369 
William duly agreed to these proposals. 
 
Even before the Convention Parliament met in January 1689, separate political 
groupings had begun to develop. Numerous outcomes to the current situation were 
possible at this stage and people gravitated towards the different solutions according to 
their political inclinations. Though there was a group of “commonwealthmen” who 
advocated for far-reaching constitutional reforms, the solutions generally converged upon 
two camps; one which supported retaining and preserving the right line of succession, and 
the other for William to take the English throne. Those in the first camp were inclined for a 
regency, or at the least securing the line of succession by having Princess Mary succeed her 
father, and those in the second camp would want William to take the crown either jointly 
with Mary or as sole monarch.370  
 
For Halifax, his own inclinations seemed predetermined by a critical piece of 
information he had. In a journal notebook, he made note of a private conversation he had 
with William on the 30th of December. The entry remarked that William had reflected 
severely upon the commonwealth faction, saying that “hee did not come over to establish a 
Commonwealth.” The Prince’s intentions were revealed more explicitly as he confided to 
Halifax that “hee would not stay in England, if K. James came again” and that “hee said with 
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the strongest asseverations, that hee would go, if they went about to make him Regent.”371 
William’s intentions severely limited the number of viable solutions, as neither a regency 
nor the crown landing solely on Mary would satisfy him. Effectively, the line of succession 
had to be breached in one way or another if England hoped to retain William’s continual 
support and presence in the current situation. Halifax, who, as Brown noted, saw William’s 
cause as a “bulwark against a possible Jacobite despotism established by the armed might of 
France”, was well aware which side needed to prevail even before the Convention 
Parliament met on 22 January.372 
 
Supporting William’s bid for the throne 
 
The Convention met on the appointed day of the 22nd, but it was not until the 29th 
that the Lords began its discussion on the state of the nation. After voting to agree with the 
Commons that a Popish prince was inconsistent with the government of England, they 
turned their attention to the issue of the empty throne and its absent King. A motion was 
brought in by the Bishop of Ely to resolve the situation through a regency, whereby James 
would still be king by law but not in practice.373 Constitutional consistency was among the 
main concern for these Tories. According to Danby’s fragmentary notes on the debate, The 
Earl of Nottingham argued that it was not possible that a king could forfeit his inheritance 
and under the present circumstances a regency was the remedy that was most in line with 
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the law.374 The Earl of Rochester argued that if the throne was declared vacant, England 
would effectively become an elective monarchy and urged for a regency to avoid this 
extremity.375 Halifax, on the other hand, was suggested as arguing that a regency opened 
the way for James’ full restoration as he remarked that there have been instances in which 
princes have returned to government under similar arrangements.376 The regency scheme 
was defeated by a division of 51 to 49, with Halifax voting against the measure.377 Having 
finished debating on a regency, the Lords turned their attention to the Commons’ crucial 
vote about the vacancy of the throne. 
 
The crucial vote now in question was resolved by the Commons on the 28th and read 
that, 
King James the Second, having endeavoured to subvert the Constitution of this 
Kingdom, by breaking the Original Contract between King and People; and, by the 
Advice of Jesuits, and other wicked Persons, having violated the fundamental Laws; 
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and having withdrawn himself out of this Kingdom; has abdicated the Government; 
and that the Throne is thereby vacant.378 
 As with the regency scheme, there was much disagreement about the Common’s vacancy 
vote among the various lords. They agreed that James had broken the original contract with 
the people, but encountered issues over the word “abdicated” and also with the clause “the 
Throne is thereby become vacant.” Accordingly, the Lords voted that “abdicated” be 
changed to “deserted” and that the vacancy clause be struck out of the resolution entirely. 
The amendments were subsequently sent down to the Commons the next day for its 
consideration.379  
 
Similar to the motivations for the regency scheme, the Lords’ non-concurrence on 
the vacancy vote was animated by a desire to preserve strictly the line of succession and 
ensure constitutional consistency. It was explained in a free conference on 6 February that 
the Lords were uneasy with the “vacancy” because they intended that the crown was only 
ceased in the person of James himself and that it was impossible that his lawful successors 
were consequently barred from it. As the Earl of Clarendon argued, “no Act of the King’s 
alone can Bar or Destroy the Right of his Heir to the Crown, which is Hereditary, and not 
Elective.”380 By removing the vacancy clause, the Lords explained that there was in fact no 
vacancy to fill, since the crown would automatically fall on the next successor after James’ 
civil demise. The Earl of Pembroke argued that “I think it is sufficient to know that there are 
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Heirs who are to take the Lineal Succession, though we do not, or cannot positively name 
the particular person; and therefore we may well conclude there is no Vacancy.”381 As the 
Lords explained their disagreement with the Commons, it was clear some were immovably 
attached to the preservation of constitutional law. Nottingham feared that by declaring the 
throne vacant, England might become an elective monarchy. For him, the constitutional 
obligation to uphold the hereditary succession “is Reason enough for my Lords to disagree 
to it [the suggestion of vacancy], it bringing in the Danger of a Breach upon the 
Constitution”.382 Clarendon likewise invoked constitutional law in his defence for the 
hereditary succession, asserting that “by all the Laws we have now in Being, our 
Government appears to be Hereditary in a Right line of Descent”.383 Pembroke pointed out 
the constitutional obligations of every Englishman under law. “The Laws made are certainly 
part of the Original Contract; and by the Laws made, which establish the Oath of Allegiance 
and Supremacy, we are ty’d up to keep in the Hereditary Line, being Sworn to be true and 
faithful to the King, his Heirs and Successors.”384  
 
Halifax supported the Commons and their vacancy clause.385 Specifically, he argued 
for William to fill the apparent vacancy and urged his colleagues to acknowledge the 
extraordinary nature of the situation. Contemporary diarist Roger Morrice recorded that on 
31 January Halifax, “immediately after a suitable preamble of the necessity of filling the 
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Throne because there could be no Legall Process, nor no authoritative acts done he moved 
that the Prince of Orange might be Crowned, pressing it with many reasons”.386 Halifax’s 
emphasis on necessity over constitutional principles was characteristic in the context of his 
aphorisms. Chapter four has touched on his belief that no human fundamentals were 
immutable and that it was politically dangerous to identify oneself with the infallibility of 
those mistaken fundamentals. For Halifax, there was an additional reason why worshipping 
those ideas was considered folly: it was impractical to do so. Because those notions were 
not fundamental in its true sense, they were not applicable at all times. Such notions might 
do more harm than good under certain circumstances. This was the case for fundamental 
laws and constitutions as well. As one aphorism expressed,  
The Law hateth perpetuities; so doth Naturall Reason too. There is hardly one 
proposition of reason that is in it selfe immortall. The same thing that in the first 
institution could not admitt a word to bee said in opposition, may in processe of 
time and change of Circumstances, become destructive.387  
Similarly, another aphorism reflected that a constitution “is alterable; and by that draweth 
nearer Perfection; and without suiting itself to differing Times and Circumstances, it could 
not live. It’s Life is prolonged by changing seasonably the several Parts of it at several 
times.”388 Here, Halifax conveyed his belief that a fixed constitution was not immortal and 
that it was a mistake to take it as such. From his point of view, a constitution “could not 
live” if it did not suit itself to “differing Times and Circumstances”. Only by accepting that a 
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constitution was not immoveable can its life be “prolonged by changing seasonably the 
several Parts of it at several times.” Both these aphorisms convey Halifax’s sceptical views 
that no abstract law or notions about constitutions could stand the test of time so that it 
would be applicable forever. For Halifax, it was imprudent when individuals refuse to 
acknowledge this fallibility in fundamental ideas and blindly adhere to them. 
 
Action should not be governed by a strict internal devotion to preconceived ideas; 
rather, it should be dictated by a consideration of the external circumstances. Halifax 
expressed this vividly in one aphorism,  
Salus Populi is the greatest of all Fundamentals, yet not altogether an immoveable 
one. It is a Fundamental for a Ship to ride at Anchor when it is in Port, but if a Storm 
cometh the Cable must be cut.389 
Here, Halifax acknowledged that fundamental ideas, because they fail to comprehend all 
possible scenarios, should be better seen as guides for best practice rather than 
immoveable rules; that a ship should anchor at port is considered best practice, but it 
should not be followed regardless of circumstances. Considerations of the prevailing 
situation, such as the coming of a storm, ultimately dictated conduct. Another aphorism 
conveyed this same notion of prioritising circumstances over devotion to ideals. As Halifax 
wrote, 
                                                          
389 Halifax, “Political Thoughts,” p. 224: 1-4. 
138 
 
Some would define a Fundamental to be the settling the Laws of Nature and 
common Equity in such a sort as that they may be well administered: even in this 
case there can be nothing fixed, but it must vary for the Good of the Whole.390 
For the Marquis there was a general wisdom in the adhering to the circumstances of the 
moment. “As the truest definition of the greatest beauty is that of the woman we love, so 
the least faulty definition of what is wisest, is that which is most seasonable at that time.”391 
Carrying this thoughtful and pragmatic mentality may be considered the closest thing to a 
fundamental in politics. As Halifax wrote in another aphorism, “to do what is best for the 
time (with a due regard to the Consequences) may bee called the fundamentall of the wiser 
part of Mankind”.392  
 
Such a sceptical and pragmatic mentality was fully consistent with Halifax’s vigorous 
support for William at this time. He knew full well that William would abandon England to 
its own fate if he were not made king one way or another. Halifax fully accepted the realities 
imposed by such circumstances. He alluded to this when he confided to Reresby at this time 
that “he was not privy to this design of the Prince his coming at the first; but now that he 
was here, and upon soe good an occasion, we were obliged to defend him.”393 Halifax’s 
emphasis on the necessities of the moment and his willingness to suspend constitutional 
considerations were consistent with his character as shown in the aphorisms above. It was a 
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mentality that he would urge his colleagues to adopt during the final debate over the 
vacancy issue on 6 February. 
 
As the deadlock over the vacancy vote continued, public pressure on the two Houses 
for agreement began to mount. People petitioned to the two Houses to agree, which caused 
some concern about indirect influences on the debates in Parliament.394 Out of doors 
pressure was indeed a likely factor in the Lords’ later concurrence with the Commons; but it 
was from William and Princesses Mary and Anne which this pressure came from. In a 
meeting, likely held on 3 February, William met with Halifax, Danby and several other lords 
to convey explicitly that he would not accept anything less than being king, either ruling 
jointly with Mary or alone. Princess Mary also made it clear that she would not rule except 
jointly with her husband. On the crucial day of the 6th, Princess Anne, who was next in line 
after Mary, made it publicly known that she was willing delay her succession should Mary 
predeceased William. All this helped tip the scale in favour of William’s supporters as it put 
much pressure upon the Lords to acquiesce.395 After the aforementioned free conference 
between delegates from the two Houses failed to resolve the deadlock, a crucial debate in 
the Upper House took place over the issue. Halifax, according to Clarendon, played a 
prominent role in this debate. He urged his colleagues to accept the necessities of the 
moment and reassured the constitutional Tories that the monarchy was only made elective 
on this one crucial occasion; after William’s and Mary’s reign, the crown would effectively 
become hereditary again. According to Clarendon’s account, “the great argument used by 
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my Lord Halifax (who was the head of the prevailing party, and drove furiously,) was 
necessity; and that the crown was only made elective pro hac vice, and then reverted back 
to its hereditary channel again.”396 As a result of this House debate, the Lords eventually 
voted concurrence with the Commons without amendments.397 The Lords’ concurrence with 
the Commons’ vacancy vote paved the way, though not without some further heated 
debates, for William becoming king ruling jointly with Mary. Accordingly, the Lords promptly 
agreed that the two be declared King and Queen.398 On 13 February 1689, Halifax as speaker 
pro tempore of the House of Lords formally offered William and Mary the crowns. This 
symbolically concluded the reign of James II, whose birthright to the throne Halifax had 
defended from Exclusion only nine years prior. 
 
After the Revolution 
 
During the initial stages of William III’s reign, Halifax was brought into his Privy 
Council and obtained his preferred position of Lord Privy Seal. From the beginning, Halifax 
was a confidant of the new King, with Foxcroft remarking that “throughout the brief period 
during which Lord Halifax held office under William III, he was undoubtedly… His Majesty’s 
only confidant.”399 Yet the King’s favour was not enough to shield him from the antagonisms 
of the returned Whigs, whose hatred for Halifax had not abated. After a sustained attempt 
to pull him down from office, Halifax eventually decided to resign willingly. Despite the 
King’s urging him to remain, the Marquis resigned his post as Lord Privy Seal in February 
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1690. This brought a definite end to the history of Halifax’s active involvement in 
government.400 
 
After being driven from office, Halifax occupied much of his time to literary pursuits. 
Between 1690 and 1695, two political works by Halifax were published. The first, Papers of 
the Great Almanzor, was a collection of thirty three aphorisms which subtly criticised the 
politics and people that drove him out of office. These aphorisms also hint at Halifax’s 
growing dissatisfaction with William’s own government methods.401 Other contemporary 
issues also occupied his thoughts as he published his Rough Draught of a New Model at Sea 
in 1694. This pamphlet was published during a time when naval reform was in discussion 
and the question arose of whether officers were to be chosen from tarpaulins or 
gentlemen.402 Halifax’s New Model attempted to chart a middle course. Rather than 
needing to choose between the two classes of men, the pamphlet advocated that the navy 
should be composed of a mixture of both gentlemen and tarpaulins, with the proportion 
“directed by circumstances of which the Government is to judge”.403 At around the same 
time, Halifax was also working to complete another pamphlet that would be published 
shortly after his death. Entitled, Some Cautions Offered to the Consideration of Those who 
are to Chuse Members To Serve in the Ensuing Parliament, this pamphlet outlined several 
types of political undesirables who should not be elected to sit in Parliament. Within this 
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pamphlet, the Marquis also unleashed his censure on political parties and party politics.404 It 
was also during this late period that Halifax authored and collated a large bulk of the 
aphorisms used in this study.405 Though much time was spent on literary pursuits, Halifax 
did not retire completely from political life. After his resignation from office, the increasingly 
party dominated nature of government brought Halifax into constant opposition against 
it.406 In opposition he remained to his last breath, until his death on 5 April 1695.407 
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Chapter 8 – A Confined Humanity: Halifax’s view of the Human 
Condition 
 
The preceding chapters have shown the consistency of Halifax’s political conduct with 
his various aphorisms. In these discussions of his short pieces, various glimpses of Halifax’s 
view of the human condition can be seen, from the limits of human foresight to the nature 
driven character of human beings. This brief chapter will gather the threads and synthesise 
them into a fuller picture. It will delineate Halifax’s twin beliefs of the mind’s limitations and 
the nature driven character of human behaviour as the two major components of his view 
of an imperfect human condition.  This chapter will show that Halifax, rather than rejecting 
those limitations and imperfections, explicitly accepted them. It was this conscious 
acceptance of these boundaries of the human condition that form an overarching theme to 
his aphorisms, and by extension his politics. 
 
The acceptance of human imperfection 
 
Within the worldview contained in Halifax’s aphorisms, humanity was confined in two 
major areas. The first area was in the human mind and the epistemological limitations it 
faced. Halifax’s deep belief that there were limitations in the human mind can already be 
detected in the aphorisms of the preceding chapters. Of those on human foresight, it 
showed that he believed the mind was incapable of predicting the future and all its 
contingencies with certainty. It is also apparent that Halifax was inclined to believe that 
human fundamental ideas were inherently fallible and far from absolute. The aphorisms 
showing these views suggest that Halifax acknowledged that the mind could only produce 
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conditional claims to knowledge rather than certainty claims. This sceptical view of human 
knowledge was explicit in his other aphorisms. As he reflected in one, “that which is 
generally called knowledge, might more properly bee termed a rationall Guessing. There is 
hardly a right name given to any one thing in the world.”408 Humanity would like to extol 
human knowledge to the level of absolute certainty, but they do not realise that what they 
claim to be knowledge was simply a probe in the dark. Were humanity to know of the 
conditional nature of their knowledge, they would realise that an element of doubt was 
always involved. As another aphorism reiterated, “that which is called Knowledge, might 
more properly bee called the art of guessing, which implyeth doubting.”409 Halifax’s 
aphorisms in this area indicated his belief that the human mind was essentially limited in its 
scope to know with absolute certainty. 
 
Then there were Halifax’s ideas about the essential character of humanity. The 
previous chapters have shown the Marquis’ belief that individuals were more guided by 
human nature than reason. Such beliefs, furthermore, meant that there were limits to how 
effectively one can exercise their reason and that they were liable to acting irrationally on 
sudden impulses. For Halifax, this image of humanity’s character being more beast than 
man was an inescapable reality. This idea forms the second major area in which Halifax saw 
humanity as confined to boundaries. He believed in the impossibility of overcoming the 
natural beast in the human. In one aphorism Halifax wrote that,  
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A man may in some occasions correct and suppress his nature; but it would be an 
insolence, even in the most faultless men, to think they could always do it, without 
exception. If a passion be born with us, it can never be so supprest, but it will at some 
times sprout and shew itself; it may be cut even with the ground, but it cannot be 
taken up by the roots.410  
One may suppress their passions and nature momentarily, but it will always eventually 
sprout up again. In another aphorism, he similarly wrote that “nothing lasts but even and 
natural motions, and tho’ we may get the better of nature for a moment, by a sudden 
violence, yet it is sure in conclusion to prevail.”411 To Halifax, human nature was an 
inseparable part of the human condition and which inevitably tampers with one’s exercise 
of reason. Those who believe otherwise and attempt to transcend humanity’s natural 
boundaries would be gravely disappointed. Such individuals, Halifax observed, often turn 
out to be those most susceptible to the influences of their inner stirrings. “Those that 
pretend to get the better of nature, are generally, of all others, the most subjected to the 
weakness of it”, he wrote.412 
 
As can be seen, the worldview shown in Halifax’s aphorisms contained a profound 
awareness that humanity was limited in the act of knowing and limited in its exercise of 
reason and rationality. All this should not be taken to mean that Halifax was a pessimist with 
regards to the human condition. For example, his belief in the inherent bad of human 
nature did not mean he rejected the inherent good. In all things there was a good in the bad 
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and a bad in the good. As he astutely reflected in one aphorism, “nothing inclines one more 
to believe an infinite wisdom, than that there is nothing in itself so good that has not an ill 
side, and nothing so ill that has not a good one.”413 Halifax well knew the self-destructive 
actions that human nature can bring out in an individual, but he also acknowledged it was 
responsible for much of the good in human actions too. Virtue, for instance, had its roots in 
one’s vices and passions, as he wrote “vertues many times owe their being to vices, as there 
would be no Industry, if there was no Luxury.”414 In fact, Brown had shown in many 
instances that Halifax believed pride and vanity played a heavy role in motivating virtuous 
actions.415 For this reason, vanity and pride were not to be entirely condemned. As Halifax 
himself wrote, “if most solid vertues were not rewarded with the vanity of having them 
known, there would be yet fewer instances of them in the world, than there are.”416 As 
such, Halifax believed that human nature was vital to positive action, remarking that “there 
is a sort of passion that a Stoick would condemn, which yet is necessary to animate men to 
great actions, that without such motives, their thoughts would fly but a little above the 
ground: there would be no towring vertue”.417 
 
 Similarly, despite his belief in the mind’s inherent limitations, Halifax did not view 
the desire to know and speculate as innately meaningless. Among other reasons, he 
understood that inquiry and speculation was a healthy endeavour that ensures the vitality 
of the mind. Constant inquiring ensures the health of one’s mental spirit because it was 
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from this activity that an individual derived a great satisfaction. As Halifax mused in one 
aphorism, “it may bee said of knowledge as it is of hunting; the entertainment is more 
valuable than the quarry.”418 These benefits extend even to the act of inquiring beyond 
one’s understanding. Halifax’s view on this was explicit when he wrote in another aphorism 
that “it is of good use to the understanding to ayme at things hardly possible to bee learnt; 
It giveth exercise to the intellectual faculties that make them stronger, &c.”419 Therefore, 
Halifax tended to recognise that inquiry and speculation itself was not harmful, even in 
cases where the subject of inquiry was unknowable. This measured response can be seen in 
Halifax’s views on human foresight and fundamental ideas. It was not folly to make use of 
one’s foresight, nor to theorise on fundamentals. The former can be of practical use to an 
extent and the latter provided general guides to approach the world. It was in not 
acknowledging the fallibility of that foresight or those fundamental ideas that Halifax 
criticised. He was, in essence, critical of one’s refusal to accept the limitations of the human 
mind.  
 
 Halifax, then, was not a pessimist but rather a realist. He believed that the way 
forward was to navigate oneself within the boundaries inherent in the human condition. In 
terms of human nature, this meant checking one’s more dangerous impulses and passions 
whilst allowing the less harmful ones a looser leash. As one aphorism said, “A man should 
do with his passions as he does with his horse; check them so as that they may not run away 
with him; but not tame them into such a dullness, that they can never gallop.”420 The same 
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can be said of humanity’s epistemological limits. For Halifax, it was fine to “ayme at things 
hardly possible to bee learnt”, but one must ultimately submit to humanity’s 
epistemological limitations. This meant not making a certainty claim, whether negative or 
positive, on the matters where truth was impossibly distant from one’s grasp. As one 
aphorism reflected, 
 To doubt of the Spirituall demonstrations, may agree with good sense, but to defy 
every thing wee do not understand, is an arrogant piece of ignorance. When wee do 
not comprehend a thing, the best is, to let it alone, for else wee shall play the fool 
about it. There is not more impertinence in any thing, than in the impossible 
enquiryes about Religion.421 
Here, to “defy” something unknown was to make a strong knowledge claim on it; it was to 
claim that a negative viewpoint was true. Halifax believed making such strong claims was a 
mistake and consequently “wee shall play the fool about it.” For him, it was prudent to 
simply acknowledge that some things were beyond the reach of human certainty. When one 
has reached the utmost of their understanding on a particular inquiry or idea, it was best to 
pause and “to let it alone” rather than insist on reaching an absolute answer. 
 
Halifax explicitly accepted the boundaries of humanity. It was an integral part of his 
worldview. Unlike those who refused to accept the flawed nature of the human condition, 
Halifax understood that the moulding of humanity was beyond one’s control. That he took 
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on this view was implicit when he attributed human boundaries to a sort of intelligent or 
external design. Halifax wrote in one aphorism,  
It may be a doubt, whether nature has not been kinder to us in making our 
knowledge and our pleasures lame, than if they had been perfect, because it 
leaves us the tast of inquiring, expecting, &c. which are the entertainment of life, 
that without them would be a dead thing.422  
Halifax again implied external design when he pondered, “when wee say that Nature hath 
made us defective, I doubt whether or no it is good Sense. Can it bee said that a horse is 
defective because hee cannot fly?”423 Within his worldview, it was a mistake to believe that 
humanity could improve beyond the boundaries set on it. “Nature” rigorously enforced 
those boundaries such that none would be able to violate them. As another aphorism said, 
When Men have an ambition to strut above Nature, in revenge it giveth them 
terrible falls. Nature is very proud to those that provoke her by their philosophical 
insolence. A man that aymeth at being wiser or stronger than Nature, sheweth an 
arrogance that is to be pityed.424 
By leaving the origins of the human condition with some unknowable external circumstance, 
Halifax thereby pushed the control of it out of humanity’s grasp. The confines of humanity 
were an unchangeable fact of reality. Furthermore, it was a fact that was prudent accept. 
“Wee are as Nature hath made us, and wee generally play the fool, when wee endeavour to 
bee another thing”.425  Halifax’s aphorisms show not only a deep awareness of the 
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imperfect nature of the human condition, but that he also fully and explicitly accepted them 
as well.  
 
It was this acceptance of human imperfections that formed a major theme to his 
aphorisms. This major theme could be considered a mentality with which Halifax 
approached a myriad of topics in his aphorisms. This mentality, moreover, was one that 
resonated with Halifax’s political conduct. His various political actions have been shown to 
be consistent with this acceptance of human imperfection. His adherence to circumstances 
rather than human foresight and abstract ideas was apparent during the Exclusion Crisis and 
Glorious Revolution. His attack on the Whigs was consistent with his criticisms of those who 
dangerously refused to accept the fallibility of the mind’s ideas. His advice to Charles and 
actions against James suggest that he was keenly aware of the flaws in human ideas about 
the nature of governments. Finally, though human nature and its harmful influences were 
an inescapable fact of reality, Halifax was aware that they need to be checked at certain 
times. This view resonated with his concerns about Whig ambitions during the Exclusion 
Crisis and his refusal to take part in William’s invitation. Therefore, it can be seen that 
Halifax’s acceptance of human imperfection can be regarded as an underlying theme to his 
politics between the Exclusion Crisis and the Glorious Revolution. Furthermore, it is not 
entirely out of the question that the Marquis consciously applied this theme to his politics 
and life. As he wrote in one aphorism, “a Wise man will never bee so extreamly wise, as not 
still to remember that hee is a Man.”426 
  
                                                          





 Contemporaries such as Burnet interpreted Halifax’s political conduct as indications 
of a lack of principles. Historians such as Macaulay came to the Marquis’ defence and 
painted him as a virtuous moderate who was committed to the principle of trimming 
between political extremes. Still other scholars understood Halifax’s career through 
Machiavellian concepts or themes such as Toryism. This study has offered another way of 
understanding Halifax. It has interpreted his politics and career in terms of the Marquis’ own 
private character as shown in his aphorisms. Halifax, from his aphorisms, was an individual 
who was deeply aware of human frailty. He believed that the human mind was limited in 
what it can know with certainty; and he observed that humanity was more prone to human 
nature than reason. Halifax accepted these imperfections of the human condition and he 
was consistent with this acceptance in his political conduct. His politics was consistent with 
his keen awareness that people had no right to be as certain of themselves as they were. His 
political conduct also points to his self-conscious awareness that human nature needed to 
be checked where it becomes harmful. In short, Halifax’s political career between the 
Exclusion Crisis and the Glorious Revolution was entirely in agreement with his personal 
outlook of the human condition. 
 
 Of course, the actual course of Halifax’s political career was far from linear. He 
defended the Crown from the Whigs but he did not worship the Crown. After helping 
Charles defeat the Whig challenge, he shortly found himself speaking out against the King’s 
conduct. He would not take part in the invitation for William to intervene in England, but 
nonetheless found himself offering James’ crown to the Prince when he came over. 
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Moderation or pragmatism goes a long way to explaining his variable career. He would 
attack the Whigs due to their extremism, but he refused to entrench himself in the Tory 
position. His moderate position allowed him to both oppose the Whigs and speak out 
against Charles’ misconduct whenever he saw reason to. Halifax’s pragmatism also allowed 
him to recognise and react to the drastically changing circumstances before and after 
William’s invasion. His varying actions during this episode was, in large measure, due to his 
pragmatic acknowledgement of the prevailing circumstances rather than a stubborn 
adherence to principles.  
 
It is telling that Halifax was able to disagree with almost everybody in his time. He 
disagreed with the Whigs, with his monarchs and with the Tories. Such a turbulent political 
career indicated that Halifax had a very different view of politics than most of his 
contemporaries, or, rather, that his contemporaries had a very different view of politics 
than the Marquis. In examining Halifax’s politics, this study has inadvertently suggested how 
different his contemporaries were from the Marquis’ point of view. The Whigs indulged in 
their foresight despite its limitations and mistook their ideals as infallible; Charles late in his 
life seemed to be forgetting that unlimited government power was only a theory; James 
certainly was inclined to ignore this insight; and the Tories for some time could not see that 
fundamental ideas about laws and constitutions were fallible ideas useful only as general 
guides. Furthermore, some of his contemporaries did not seem to be self-conscious of the 




In this context, one might say that Halifax came into constant disagreements with his 
contemporaries because the former advocated a politics that was largely ignored by the 
latter. Halifax conducted a politics that acknowledged that even the most intelligent, astute 
or disciplined individuals inevitably erred. For Halifax, self-assurance leads to unsociable, 
alienating and imprudent conduct. Self-doubt as opposed to self-assurance was the correct 
mentality to conduct politics. A politics conducted on the basis of self-doubt would 
recognise the fallibility of the human mind and question the rationality of one’s own actions. 
Halifax, between the Exclusion Crisis and the Glorious Revolution, conducted a politics that 
was consistent with this recognition of human frailty. Indeed, his politics seem to be imbued 
with this recognition. The variable course of his career, then, was the product of a clash of 
views; Halifax advocated for his contemporaries to recognise their own inherent frailties, 
whilst his contemporaries largely ignored this. Unfortunately for Halifax, his politics was 
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